1. In a suit for declaration challenging Mutation Nos. 323, dated 5-10-1946 and 1283, dated 19-6-1987, the petitioners/plaintiffs filed an application under section 5 of Limitation Act for extension of time.
2. The said application was resisted by the respondents/defendants. However, the learned Trial Court accepted the said application vide order, dated 13-3-1996.
3. 2.Revision against the said order was filed and was vehemently resisted by the petitioners on the ground that the impugned order did not fall within the purview of "case decided", as such, the very revision was not maintainable. This plea did not find favour with the revisional Court, who consequently accepted the case and set aside the order of Trial Court vide order, dated 12-11-1996.
4. 3.The petitioners have approached this Court for setting aside order, dated 12-11-1996 by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
5. 4.The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that order of Trial Court, dated 1-3-1996 on application under section 5 of the Limitation Act did not fall within the ambit of "case decided", as such, the very revision petition was not maintainable. In support of his contention, he has relied upon Sheikh Mukhtar Ahmad v. Muhammad Sadiq and 2 others (PLD 1996 Lahore 340). He further argued that the revisional Court could exercise its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C., only if the Trial Court had acted illegally or with material irregularity, that the Trial Court by passing order, dated 13-3-1996 has not either acted illegally or committed any material irregularity, so the said order could not be assailed in revision. In support of this contention, he relied upon Malik Hadayat Ullah and 2 others v. Murad Ali Khan (PLD 1972 SC 69).
6. 5.Conversely, the impugned order has been supported by the learned counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 2 to 5. His contention is that order, dated 13-3-1996 fell within the purview of term "case decided", as the expression "case decided" does not necessarily mean the decision of entire suit and it may relate to a decision of an interlocutory matter requiring a judicial mind. And as such revisional Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the revision vide order, dated 12-11- 1996. He relied upon Messrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others (1992 SCMR 718) and Pakistan Fisheries Karachi and others v.
7. United Bank Ltd. (PLD 1993 SC 109). He thus, argued that revisional Court acted legally, while passing the impugned order. He further argued that as the impugned order, dated 12-11-1996 has been passed by the learned Additional District Judge by exercising his revisional jurisdiction, so the constitutional petition against the said order is not maintainable. In support of this proposition, he relied upon Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others (PLD 1985 SC 131). He thus, prayed that the petition be dismissed.
8. 6.Great stress has been laid down on the point that as order, dated 13-3-1996 did not amount to "case decided", so the very revision petition was not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioners has mainly relied upon PLD 1996 Lahore 340, but the same is not applicable to the facts in hand. It has been held in that authority that an order admitting or declining to admit evidence oral or documentary does not amount to "case decided" being not revisable under section 115, C.P.C. Similarly PLD 1978 Quetta 107 is not relevant to the facts in hand, as it has been held therein that if the decision is appealable, then remedy under section 115, C.P.C. is not available. Admittedly, order, dated 13-3-1996 was not appealable, hence revision was competent. Again, it has been held in PLD 1972 SC 69 that action under section 115, C.P.C. will only be admissible, .if Court below acted illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, Trial Court entertained an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, which could not be entertained, as such, acted illegally and with material irregularity. Consequently, revisional Court was competent to set that mistake right by passing the impugned order. Thus, this authority on the face of it advances the case of the respondents rather than of the petitioners. It has been held in 1992 SCMR 718 that expression "case decided" does not necessarily mean the decision of entire suit, it may relate to a decision of an interlocutory matter requiring judicial mind. Again it has been laid down by the apex Court in PLD 1993 SC 109 that expression "case decided" can be construed as a decision given in respect of any state of facts after judicially considering the same, which need not necessarily dispose of the entire matter in suit pending before a Court subordinate to the High Court.
9. 7.Examining the present case in the light of decisions referred to above, it is clear that the order of Trial Court squarely fell within the expression of "case decided" and, as such, was amenable to revision, having been passed by the Trial Court with manifest not only legal infirmity but also with material irregularity. There can be no cavil with the proposition that such defects were liable to correction in exercie of the revisional jurisdiction and were rightly set right by the learned Additional District Judge. Now the impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge in his revisional jurisdiction, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be illegal or to have been passed without lawful authority, as such, the same cannot be subjected to further scrutiny by means of a Constitutional petition. I am fortified in this view by illuminating obervation contained in PLD 1985 SC 131.
10. 8.In the light of facts stated above, it is clear that no interference in exercie of Contistutional jurisdiction of this Court is called for a neither illegal assumption or irregular exercise of jurisdiction, nor perversity or arbitrariness in the matter is borne or spelled out.
11. 9.Petition consequently, merits dismissal and is hereby dismissed in limine