1. ' This is an application under section 151, C.P.C. (Civil Miscellaneous Application No,2335 of 1997) filed by the Judgment-Debtor (J.D.) requesting the Court to recall its Order, dated 10-11-1997 which had been passed on the statement made by their Counsels without consulting/approval of their client. The facts relating to the application are as follows:--- ' M/s. Haseeb Express (Pvt.) Limited, Plaintiff/Decree Holder (D.H.) filed a suit against Azerbaijan Hava Yollari, Defendant/Judgment Debtor (J.D.) inter alia, to restrain them from terminating their General Sales Agreement and appointing any other agent in Pakistan. It transpires that during the course of the proceedings the Court appointed the Official Assignee as a Commissioner and Receiver of the business of the J.D. To carry on their business on behalf of the Plaintiff. Ultimately on 8-12-1996 the Suit was decreed on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. The Compromise Decree was not implemented and on 8-5-1997 the D.H. Filed the present Execution Application No,45 of 1997.
2. ' The D.H. Also filed an application under Order 21, Rule 32(5), C.P.C. Inter alia, for appointment of Official Assignee as Receiver of the business of J.D. In the Counter-Affidavit to the said application, the J.D. Took the plea that the policy regarding delivery of transportation documents had changed and the documents are now handed over at the principal office and to the concerned person after due verification. In this connection they produced a copy of a certificate, dated 8-10-1997 (annexure D/5) stating that "...The Heads of appointed agents abroad should come to head office to State Concern "Azerbaijan Hava Yollari" to get the transportation documents, which are financial documents of highly strict accountability which are issued only after their signature". The certificate is signed by Director General and Senior Legal Officer of State Concern Azerbaijan Hava Yollari.
3. ' It appears that on 10-11-1997 the Court passed the following Order: "M/s. Zaheeruddin Khan and Mr. M.K. Shikoh, Advocates undertake to hand over all the relevant transportation documents and tickets to the representative of the decree-holder on their arrival in Baku. Mr. Zaheeruddin Khan, also makes a statement that he and Mr. Neel Kishov, learned counsel for the D.H. Would be accompanying the D.H. To Baku for observing above compliance."
4. ' On 19-114997 Mr. Tasawar Hussain Rizvi, Advocate for the Judgment-Debtor filed the abovereferred application for recall of the Order, dated 10-11-1997. His grounds in support of the application are as follows:---
(1) The Counsels for J.D. Were not authorized to concede to delivery of tickets to the representative of the agent in view of the New Policy, dated 8-10-1997 (Annexure D/5) which was a part of the Counter-Affidavit filed by the J.D. He has relied upon Order 3, Rule 4, C.P.C., 1987 CLC 1208, 1987 CLC 813 and PLD 1984 SC (Azad Jammu and Kashmir) 13.
(2) Under Rules 145 and 148 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 an advocate shall not represent conflicting interest. The two counsels were representing conflicting interests.
(3) The Decree-Holder cannot go beyond the terms of the Consent Decree under the law of estoppel. According to him under Article 7 of the Consent Decree which reads as follows: "Traffic Documents: ' All travel documents including passenger tickets and baggage checks, exchange vouchers required by the Agent in connection with the sale of transportation herein shall be supplied by Principal provided always:
(a) Such documents shall remain the absolute property of Principal.
(b) The G.S.A. Shall be responsible for the safe custody and care of such documents."
5. ' The Head of the organisation of the Plaintiff must go to Baku to get the transportation documents and not his representative. In support of his argument he has relied upon PLD 1985 Lah. 229 and PLD 1987 SC 107.
6. ' Mr. Sharifuddin Pirzada, learned Advocate for the Decree-Holder has argued that a counsel has implied authority to settle a suit which authority was exercised to avoid an order of appointment of a Receiver and has relied upon 1981 SCM R 1081, AIR 1949 Cal. 63 and AIR 1935 Allahabad 480 in support of his contention.
7. ' I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates of both parties. My findings are as follows:--- ' By Vakalatnama, dated 27-7-1997, the Judgment-Debtor appointed Messrs Zaheeruddin Khan, Babar Zaheer and M.K. Shikoh, Advocates, "...To appear, plead and act for me/us as my/our Advocates in the above matter or proceedings and to conduct, prosecute and/or defend the same...." The learned Advocate for J.D. Has urged that in the presence of Annexure D-5 which clearly states that "Heads of appointed agents abroad should come to Head Office to get the transportation documents", the council had no authority to consent to handing over of the documents to the representative for the D.H. It is well-established law that a counsel has authority to take all actions necessary for the proper conduct of his clients cause. This includes the power to withdraw interlocutory applications and even a Suit. The counsel also has implied authority of his client to enter into compromise and settle disputes unless such authority has been expressly excluded in the Vakalatnama. The wordings of the Vakalatnama given by the Judgment-Debtor to their counsel does not expressly limit their authority. The Application for appointment of a Receiver (Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No,2133 of 1997) was pending. A receiver had previously been appointed in the suit and could again be appointed by the Court. To avoid such an eventuality, the counsel, in my opinion, rightly agreed that the transportation documents would be given to the representative of the D.H. Instead of the Head of the agent. The Judgment-Debtor was, thus, saved from a possible adverse order.
8. It is an established principle of law that a principal can appoint an agent to act for him. Under section 188 of the Contract Act, 1872 an agent having an authority to do an act has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act. The counsels were conscious of this principle of the law of agency when they consented to the impugned order. They acted properly in the performance of their duties in the interest of their client. To safeguard their client's interest they went to the extent of ensuring the presence of the counsels of both parties in Baku at the time of delivery of the required documents. I am clearly of the opinion that the counsels for J.D. Did not exceed their authority B but acted in the best interest of their client under the prevailing circumstances. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the Judgment Debtor are general proposition of law relating to appointment of pleader and Karinda and do not appeat to support his contention.
9. ' Rule 145 of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 states that an Advocate shall not acquire an interest adverse to a client in the property or interest involved in the case while Rule 148 states that an Advocate shall not represent conflicting interests. There does not appear to be any conflict of interest between J.D. And their counsel. I fail to understand the relevancy of the aforesaid Rules to the present case.
10. ' The terms of the Consent Decree nowhere specify that the .Head of the agent would have to go to Baku. Further, the alleged Annexure D-5, dated 8-10- 1997 ' has been issued by the officers of J.D.
11. Long after the passing of the Consent Decree on 8-12-1996 and therefore, cannot be referred to in the implementation of the same unless expressly required by its terms. Learned counsel for J.D. Has not shown any provision in the Consent Decree whereby ,Annexure D-5 can be read therein for its enforcement. He has also not been able to explain how the impugned order is going beyond the Consent Decree and is barred by estoppel. PLD 1987 SC 107 at p. 120 E and PLD 1985 Lah. 229 at p.233 relate to the general law of estoppel which does not appear to be applicable here as the Decree Holder is not backing out from any responsibility imposed upon it in the terms of the Consent Decree. The argument is, therefore, rejected.
12. ' In view of the above, the Application is dismissed with costs of Rs,2,000 (Rupees two thousand only).