1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J.---The petitioner in Constitutional Petition No, D-110 of 1997 bases his entitlement in such petition on a letter dated 28-11-1994, issued to the petitioner by the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, which common to the connected petitions, we hereunder reproduce in extenso:-- ' Subject: APPOINTMENT ON CONTRACT BASIS AS TRAINEE EXECUTIVE.
2. ' We are pleased to inform you that you have been appointed as ' TRAINEE EXECUTIVE' on contract basis in State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan on the following terms and conditions:--
(i) Your services are being placed at the disposal of D.-G. M. And Zonal Head, Group and Pension (South), for posting..
(ii) You will draw a stipend of Rs,4,000 per month.
(iii) You will not be employee of the Corporation in terms of State Life Employees (Service)
3. Regulation, 1973, consequently you will not be entitled to Provident Fund, Pension, Gratuity and any other benefit admissible to regular employees under the said Service Regulations.
(iv) Your appointment is purely temporary and your services are liable to be terminated at any time on 15 days' notice or pay in lieu thereof from either side. If, however, your conduct is not found satisfactory, your services shall be liable to be terminated on 24 hours' notice.
(v) The period of your contractual appointment may be extended on such terms and conditions for such period as the Management may deem fit.
(vi) Your appointment is further subject to other terms and conditions as may be laid down by the Corporation from time to time.
(vii) Your appointment on contract will automatically terminated on completion of six months' period without any notice or pay in lieu thereof unless extended with mutual agreement.
4. (viii)You will be required before joining to produce your educational/professional certificates etc. And domicile certificates.
(ix) You will not be entitled to any T.A./D.A. For joining the duty.
(x) Your appointment will be effective from the date of you join duty.
(xi) If you are prepared to accept this appointment on the above terms and conditions, you may report for duty before 10th December, 1994 to the D.G.M. And Zonal Head Group and Pension (South)
5. State Life Building No, 9, Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed Road, Karachi alongwith the documents mentioned in para. (viii) failing which this appointment shall be treated as withdrawn and cancelled.
(xii) Please return the duplicate copy of this duly signed and dated by you in token of your acceptance of the above terms and conditions of this ad hoc appointment.
6. ' Thanking you."
7. ' We have underlined the relevant portions of the quoted letter in order to verify the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether the petitioner was only a trainee and not the holder of a post so as to attract the invocation of the newly inserted section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The argument would be clearer when section 2-A itself is also reproduced which we hereby do:-- "2-A. Service under certain Corporations, etc. To be Service of Pakistan.---Service under any authority, corporation, body or organization established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be Service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or organization shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act."
8. ' It is evident that section 2-A aforesaid is in two parts, the first declaring service under any authority, corporation, body or organization, established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest to be, in virtue of such clause, as service of Pakistan. Plainly, if the Legislature had stopped there, merely being in the service of Pakistan could not have entitled those in the service of the designated institutions to seek appropriate redress in relation to service disputes before the Service Tribunal. This arises because it is only civil servants, as defined under the law, who can seek such relief before the Service Tribunal. Hence, the necessity to insert the second clause in section 2-A aforesaid, whereby every person holding a post under the institutions named was deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act. Reverting, contention of the learned counsel is that because the petitioner was only a trainee executive, the petitioner did not hold any post in the State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan so as to make him amenable to the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and thus, excluded from the jurisdiction of this Court by operation of Article 212 of the Constitution. Reliance by the learned counsel is made on two judgments from the Indian Supreme Court, the first reported as State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta AIR 1967 SC 884, and the second State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad AIR 1967 SC
903. Relevant passage in the first of these citations is para. 10, whereas that in the second is para. 9, which in that order are reproduced below: "(10) In the context of Articles 309, 310 and 311, a post denotes an office. A person who holds a civil post under a State holds 'office' during the pleasure of the Governor of the State, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, see Article 310. A post under the State is an office or a position to which duties in connection with the affairs of the State are attached, an office or a position to which a person is appointed and which may exist apart from and independently of the holder of the post. Article 310(2) contemplates that a post may be abolished and a person holding a post may be required to vacate the post, and it emphasizes the idea of a post existing apart from the holder of the post. A post may be created before the appointment or simultaneously with it. A post is an employment, but every employment is not a post. A casual labourer is not the holder of a post. A post under the State means a post under the administrative control of the State. The State may create or abolish the post and may regulate the conditions of service of persons appointed to the post."
9. ' (Emphasis added).
10. "(9) In its ordinary dictionary meaning the word 'to post' may denote either (a) to station someone at a place, or (b) to assign someone to a post, i,e,, a position or a job, especially one to which a person is appointed. See Webster's New World Dictionary (1962). The dispute in this case has arisen because the State Government applies the first of the two meanings and the High Court the second. In Article 233 the word 'posting' clearly bears the second meaning. This word occurs in association with the words 'appointment' and promotion' and takes its color from them. These words indicate the stage when a person first gets a position or job and 'posting' by association means the assignment of an appointee or promote to a position in the cadre of District Judges.
11. That a special meaning may be given to a word because of the collection of words in which it figures, is a well-recognized cannot be construction. Maxwell ('on Interpretation of Statutes', 11th Edn., p. 321 and the following pages) gives numerous examples of the application of this principle, from which one may be given here. The words 'places of public resort' assume a very different meaning when coupled with ' roads and streets' from that which the same words would have if they were coupled with 'houses'. In the same way the word 'posting' cannot be understood in the sense of 'transfer' when the idea of appointment and promotion is involved in the combination. In fact this meaning is quite out of place because 'transfer' operates at a stage beyond appointment and promotion. If 'posting' was intended to mean 'transfer' the draftsman would have hardly chosen to place it between 'appointment' and 'promotion' and could have easily used the word 'transfer' itself. It follows, therefore, that under Article 233, the Governor is only concerned with the appointment, promotion and posting to the cadre of District Judges but not with the transfer of District Judges already appointed or promoted and posted to the cadre. The latter is obviously a matter of control. Of District Judges which is vested in the High Court. This meaning of the word 'posting' is made all the more clear when one reads the provisions of Articles 234 and 235. By the first of these articles the question of appointment is considered separately but by the second of these Articles posting and promotion of persons belonging to the judicial service of the State and holding any post inferior to the post of a District Judge is also vested in the High Court. The word 'post' used twice in the article clearly means the position or job and not the station or place and 'posting' must obviously mean the assignment to a position or, job and not placing in charge of a station or Court. The association of words in Article 235 is much clearer but as the word 'posting' in the earlier article deals with the same subject-matter, it was most certainly used in the same sense and this conclusion is thus quite apparent."
12. ' There can be no cavil with the observation of the learned Judges of the Indian Supreme Court that the concepts of a post or employment are not always synonymous and while a person may be in employment he may not be holding a post. Indeed the dissertation seems to be a reverberation of Black recounting: "Although an office is an employment, it does not follow that every employment is an office" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1082, Contennial Edition 1891-1991). Now synonyms of the word post are an office, employment or appointment. A post is also inter changeable with a situation or a position. Thus, the implications in law remain unaltered. It follows that the word post, contextually, may be used in a limited sense and yet in other circumstances it may have the broadest of connotations. Thus, when we speak of the offices of Attorney-General, Auditor-General or Advocate-General, we are talking of Constitutional posts or offices. Likewise, there can be posts of Vice-Chancellor or of Registrar in a University. These are limited users of the word post. On the other hand, there can be broader implications of the same word. It may have, as seen, the connotations of an appointment, employment or even a situation or position. Thus, a clerk in an organization may not be holding a distinct post in the limited sense and yet he may be occupying an office or position in the organization. Such a holder cannot, however, be said not to be holding any post in the broader sense of that word. Much the same is true of a mechanic, a plumber or a carpenter. Plainly the insertion of section 2-A. In the Service Tribunals Act has been through a remedial measure. The provision, therefore, has all the elements occasioned by a remedial statute.
13. The words "every person" with which the aforementioned clause commences clearly spell out the legislative intent viz., to provide relief in a broad measure, which may have been necessitated in the attending circumstances. The construction thus has to be beneficial. The word post, accordingly, used here is employed in the most comprehensive of senses. The context does not furnish any justification to clothe any restricted meanings to the expression. In our view, therefore, ad hoc employees or those in temporary employment and others in such categories as well cannot be excluded by attributing limited meanings to the word post used in the section.
14. ' There is yet another aspect which has been adverted to in this case. Mr. Abdul Qadir Siddiqui, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, has brought to our notice the opinion of this Court in Gulzar Ahmed v. WAPDA 1986 PLC (C.S.) 745, where workman under the deeming provisions of the newly inserted section 1-B in the WAPDA Act, XXXI of 1958, were treated to be civil servants. That opinion appears to have been to an extent modified by the Supreme Court in WAPDA v.
15. Muhammad Ashraf Naeem 1997 SCMR 1128, where the relevant observation in paragraphs 9 and 10 was as under:- "9. This provision of law is in two parts. By the first, service under the Authority has been declared to be a service of Pakistan. The second part, which is distinct from the first is that every person holding a post under the Authority of the type described shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The result of this bifurcation is that the employee shall be deemed to be in service of Pakistan but not necessarily a civil servant as defined in the Civil Servants Act. If the respondent stands excluded from the definition of the civil servant as contained in the Civil Servants Act, then the statutory provision made for the civil servants will not apply. In the case in hand, it appears that the respondent is excluded from the definition of 'civil servant' being covered by the definition of employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, clause (xix) to Schedule (II) whereby person connected with the generation, transformation and supply of electricity are to be treated as workmen for the purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act.
10. The Civil Servants Act provides as hereunder:-- ' civil servant' means a person who is a member of an All-Pakistan Service or of a civil service of the Federation, or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation, including any such post connected with defence, but does not include-- (i)
16. (ii)
(iii) a person who is a 'worker' or ' workman' as defined in the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934) or the Workmen's ' Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)."
17. ' This decision of the Supreme Court, however, came up for reexamination in Waseem Ahmad Khan v. WAPDA 1997 SCMR 2000. In virtue of the decision last-mentioned it has since been found that while for the purpose of the Factories Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act, a person under the amended provisions in the WAPDA Act or West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, may still continue to be a workman and not qualify as a civil servant, the position stands clearly altered in relation to grievances under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and cognate grievances under that legislation may no longer arise, the jurisdiction pertaining to service matters having been exclusively conferred on the Service Tribunal under the deeming provision of the amendatory law, appertaining to the WAPDA Act.
18. ' While the last cited case from the Supreme Court jurisdiction clinches the issue, we may add here that there is a distinction between section 1-B, introduced in the WAPDA Act through Ordinance XVI of 1975 and section 2-A since inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Such section 1-B is reproduced hereunder:-- "(1-B) Service under the Authority is hereby declared to be Service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under the Authority, not being a person who is on deputation to the Authority from any Province, shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973)."
19. ' It will at once be seen that while the words "shall be deemed to be a civil servant" in section 1-B are predicated and controlled by the following words, namely, "for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973)" there are no such controlling words in section 2-A, lately inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. It will further be seen that section 2-A employs words to the effect that every such person as is spoken of above "shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purpose of this Act". It signifies that a person, so deemed to qualify, shall be a civil servant independently of the definition of a civil servant, as the same occurred in the unlamented Act.
20. ' Indeed no significant difference would occur even if the new class of civil servants is tested also on the touchstone of the definition clause in the Service Tribunals Act. The concept of civil servant is treated in section 2(a) of the Service Tribunals Act and that is as below:-- "2(a) ' Civil servant' means a person who is, or has been, a civil servant within the meaning of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 (LXXI of 1973)."
21. ' Thus, there is no independent definition of a civil servant in the Service Tribunals Act and recourse is taken to the Civil Servants Act,.
22. 1973. In such Act, the applicable definition clause is this:-- "2(1)(b). 'Civil servant' means a person who is a member of an All-Pakistan Service or of a civil service of the Federation, or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation, including any such post connected with defence, but does not include--
(i) a person who is on deputation to the Federation from any Province or other authority;
(ii) a person who is employed on contract or on work-charged basis, or who is paid from contingencies; or
(iii) a person who is a ' worker' or 'workman' as defined in the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934) or the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)."
23. The implications of the deeming clause in the newly-inserted section 2-A immediately become manifest. They for all intent and purposes connote creation of a new category of civil servants under the deeming concept and all exclusions, such as being on deputation, employed on contract or work-charged basis or being paid from contingencies or being a worker or workman, as defined in the Factories Act, 1934, or the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, disappear, in the face of the deeming provision. The effect, accordingly, is that, every person who is in the employment of such institutions, as are spoken of in section 2-A, is to be treated/deemed a civil servant who can, if aggrieved, seek his remedies from the Service Tribunal. This indeed is a degree of upstaging of employees in the referred institutions. The object is patent. That is none other than to provide relief to such persons on priority basis. The intent becomes further crystallized when it is seen that the word "final" has since been deleted from section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act and that amendment, having been brought in the main part of section 4, makes the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal available to aggrieved servants even where there be no "final" orders and in actuality only such orders are in the field which are yet to mature and attain finality.
24. ' Not meaning to be disrespectful, we may point out here that there also appears to be an error in the decision reported as WAPDA v. Muhammad Ashraf Naeem (supra). Section 1-B in the amended WAPDA Act had pointedly excluded "a person who is on deputation to the Authority from a Province" from what was a deemed civil servant, a category already standing excluded by section 2(1)(b)(i) of the Civil Servants Act, the object manifestly being that the other exclusions in 2(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) were not intended to be excluded. To read the last-mentioned exclusions in the deeming clause, therefore, may have amounted to read something in the new definition which was not there nor was meant to be there.
25. ' This was so far as Constitutional Petition No, D-110 of 1997 was concerned. As regards Constitutional Petition No, D-194 of 1997, Mr. Sirajul Haque, the learned counsel for the petitioner there, does not subscribe to the arguments of Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, but has his own arguments on the subject. Mr. Sirajul Haque has pointed out that the declaration of service in a corporation etc., as service of Pakistan per section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, is not a declaration which can be introduced through an ordinary legislation. Referring to the concept of Service of Pakistan, as it occurs in Article 212 of the Constitution, the learned counsel has taken us to the definition clause of Service of Pakistan in Article 260 which for reasons of convenience we recast here:-- "' Service of Pakistani' means any service, post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a Province, and includes an All-Pakistan Service, service in the Armed Forces and any other service declared to be a service of Pakistan by or under Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or of a Provincial Assembly, but does not include service as Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Prime Minister, Federal Minister, Minister of State, Chief Minister, Provincial Minister, Attorney-General, Advocate-General, Parliamentary Secretary or Chairman or Member of a Law Commission, Chairman or Member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Adviser to the Prime Minister, Special Assistant to a Chief Minister, Adviser to a Chief Minister or Member of a House or a Provincial Assembly; "
26. ' To be precise the argument of the learned counsel is that if any further declaration of service of Pakistan is to be made in terms of the reproduced definition clause such can only be done through an Act whereby the Constitution of Pakistan to such extent is relevantly amended. Our attention has been drawn to Articles 238 and 239 in the Constitution which envision amendments to the Constitution through an Act of Parliament. Article 238 is this:- "238. Subject to this Part, the Constitution may be amended by Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)."
27. ' However, in terms of Articles 239(1) and 239(4), an amendment through an Act of Parliament can only be carried by votes of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of each of the House in which a Constitution amendment bill is introduced or transmitted. We do not think that Act of Parliament spoken of in the definition clause, pertaining to the Service of Pakistan necessarily means a Constitution Amendment Act. In fact, Act of Parliament is itself defined in Article 260 and is defined as follows:-- "' Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)' means an Act passed by Majils-e-Shoora (Parliament) or the National Assembly and assented to, by the President."
28. It seems to us that where a new class or category of employment is to be declared as falling within the service of Pakistan such may come about through an ordinary legislation and a simple enactment passed by Parliament and that is precisely what has occurred when section 2-A above was inserted. However, and at the same time, it also seems to us that if those employments, which have already been defined as covered by the term service of Pakistan in Article 260, are to be taken out of the terminology such can only come about through a Constitutional amendment which of course, is not involved here. In the circumstances, this argument fails.
29. ' We are not inclined to advert to the merit of the controversy because that is a field which we would like to leave open for the Tribunal, if and when approached but whenever that eventuality arises, the Tribunal would approach the dispute keeping in view the law and justice of the case.
30. ' In Constitutional Petition No, D-195 of 1997, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not appeared though the petitioner is present. The petitioner is unable to identify as to why his learned counsel is not in attendance. In any case, the petitioner does not have anything to add to what has already been argued before us. For the same reasons as in the other two petitions identical result should follow in this petition.
31. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that the petitioners here are fully covered by the postulates of ' ' section 2-A aforesaid. Their remedies before this Court are controlled by Article 212 of the Constitution and basically it is the Service Tribunal where the petitioners must revert. This being the legal position, the three petitions are dismissed and the interim orders, such as there be in the same, stand vacated.