' Learned counsel states that the last date for filing of the appeal was 8-1-1977. The appeal was filed on 4-1-1977, therefore, according to him, it is within limitation. The office pointed out is its note dated 5-1-1977 that the court-fee was insufficient. There were several other objections including the one that certified copy of the Rent Controller's order was to be filed. I he appeal u as returned on account of these objections with the note that it might be relied after removal of objections "within limitation". Learned counsel refiled it on 17-1-1977 without removing all the objections. In his note it was insisted by him that the court-fee had been correctly affixed. On 19-1-1977, the office again returned the appeal with objections qua court-fee, better copy of Rent Controller's order and absence of application for condonation of delay. Learned counsel vide his note dated 21-1-1977 refiled the appeal again insisting that there was no question of limitation and asked the office to place the appeal before the Court as it is.
2. Learned counsel has today explained that the deficiency in court-fee was made good on 18-1- 1977. The office had objected with the note that initially the appeal was filed on 4-1-1977 without proper court-fee and without certified copy of the Rent Controller's Order. It was pointed out to the learned counsel that although the copy of the order was filed on 18-1-1977, the deficiency in the court-fee was made good on 21-1-1977 with the result that the appeal by then had become barred by 14 days. The office once again requested the learned counsel to file an application for condonation of delay. Another objection with regard to dim copy of the Rent Controller's order was also raised. Learned counsel, while removing the objection with regard to the copy, refiled the appeal with insistence that it was not necessary to move an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act and that the appeal be fixed for hearing as it is. It is in these circumstances that the office has presented this appeal for hearing under objection.
3. Learned counsel started arguing the appeal without adverting to this aspect of the cafe. When pointed out, he insisted that the appeal is within time and that it was not necessary for him to file an application fcr condonation of delay. After the arguments when it was pointed out to him that the appeal is barred by time and is otherwise too liable to be rejected, he has now requested for time, so that he may move an application for condonation of delay.
4. The only explanation why deficient court-fee was initially paid and why the learned counsel continued insisting till 21.1-1977 that the appeal be put up for hearing as it is, is that although, according to the ruling of this Court, the court-fee was to be paid on annual rental value and thus, was deficient, as stated by the learned counsel, he was informed by another lawyer that a Special Leave to Appeal had been granted by the Supreme Court to consider the question of court-fee.
This furnished hardly any justification for the learned counsel not to follow the law laid down by this Court unless it is upset by the Supreme Court ; notwithstanding the fact that the office had been insisting that the court-fee should be paid on the rental value. It was in the very first note dated 5- 1.1977 that the learned counsel was told to remove these objections and refile the appeal within limitation. He still had time and could remove the objection and refile the appeal within limitation but due to the reasons best known to him, he insisted otherwise. Subsequently also the attitude of the learned counsel was of non-cooperation with the office. It would not have cost the appellant much to move an application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The objection raised by the office with regard to court-fee was not flimsy nor unreasonable. The learned counsel knew that the office had not indicated any further time beyond the time of limitation within which he could supply the deficiency in court-fee. Thus, he could not be under a misapprehension that the time for supplying the deficiency was extended. In any case, It is clearly noted in the first objection that the appeal was to be re-submitted "within limitation". Thus, there is no question of extension. The learned counsel did supply the deficiency in court-fee on 21.1-1977 as pointed out by the office. In other words, he accepted the position at a late stage that the court-fee was deficient but notwithstanding the same ho again insisted that there was no need for filing an application for condonation of delay.
5. Obviously, the initial filing of the appeal on 4-1-1977 without proper court-fee and then without any subsequent extension of time, the supply of court-fee on 21-1-1977 would render the appeal, time-barred and also liable to 'rejection'. A possibility for condonation of delay subject to the condition that the learned counsel had reasonable cause for not doing theirs needful might be there but that could not be done without a proper application supported by an affidavit supporting the causes of delay.
6. Keeping in view all there circumstances it is held that the appeal when completed and properly filed or deemed to have been filed on 21-1.1977, bad become time-barred and was also liable to rejection. No sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay, nor there is any proper application in that behalf. The request now made by the learned counsel for time to file an application, on account of the aforenoted circumstances and his attitude in so far as reasonable objections of the office are concerned, is disallowed. This appeal accordingly is rejected and also dismissed as time-barred. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.