1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---The appellants, who carry on business in the name and style of Awami Air-conditioned Coach Service, filed Suit No,806 of 1997 on the original side of this Court inter alia, against Al-Haj Choudhry Barkat Ali, owner of Shalimar Air-conditioned Coach Service. They, as plaintiffs, claimed to be transporters and holders of route permit for plying contract carriages from Karachi to Nawabshah and Nawabshah to Karachi. The respondent-defendant No,1 was also stated to be a transporter and permit holder for the same route. Because there were no applicable rules, the case of plaintiffs was that the transporters, in order to maintain due law and order on identical routes, avoiding accidents by indulging in overtaking and to fore stal monopoly of any single transporter, normally, entered into mutual agreements. One such agreement was entered into between the two transporters here on 17-11-1994, whereby the appellants-plaintiffs were provided fixed timings of departure of their vehicles from Karachi to Nawabshah and vice versa.
2. Such was also endorsed by the Sindh Air-conditioned Bus Owners Association (Regd.), represented by respondent-defendant No,3, and indeed a mechanism for enforcement was also worked out as per the tri-partite agreement dated 2-11-1996. However, shortly before filing of the suit, allegedly, the respondent-defendant No,1 failed to abide with the terms of the arrangement, resulting in lodging of a report, dated 1-3-1997, with Brigade Police Station. Correspondingly, the referred suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiffs has a legal right to avail of the mutually agreed timings and for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent- defendant No, 1 from violating the same.
3. ' The learned Single Judge declined interim relief to the appellants Plaintiffs on 28-7-1997, essentially, for three reasons. Firstly it was found that there was no consideration for the agreements, secondly such were opined to be specifically unenforceable and , thirdly, because the property at Hyderabad, to be touched by the vehicles operating on mutually agreed timings, had nothing to do with the appellants, being exclusive the property of the respondent-defendant No,l.
4. ' On 5-9-1997, we allowed this appeal through a short order, which is reproduced below:--- "We heard the learned counsel upon an undertaking that this appeal can be heard, admitted and disposed of at the same time .
5. ' For reasons to be separately recorded, it is admitted and allowed."
6. ' Examining the purported agreement dated 17-11-1994, we have found that it is therein expressly stated that it was the Shalimar Air-conditioned Coach Service (defendant No,1), which had accorded the timings mentioned therein and what is more such had a nexus with the premises of Shalimar. The words employed are these:-- "The above mentioned times fixed/given by the first party from Shalimar Air-conditioned Coach Service."
7. ' As regards the arrangement dated 2-11-1996, such is recorded as an agreement on the letter head of the Sindh Air-conditioned Bus Owners' Association (Regd.). That document evidences further improvement and streamlining of the earlier agreed terms and was, apparently, concluded in a session of the association, which was presided over by Khalid Abbas Khan Niazi, President of the Association, (respondent-defendant No,3). The document also spoke of a decision by the transporter brother hood to implement the agreement dated 2-11-1996, aforesaid and envisaged, correspondingly, a mechanism, for enforcement at the level of the referred Khalifa Abbas Khan Niazi. It is also on record that, pursuant to retraction of the respondent-defendant No,1 a session of the Association was again held on 14-6-1997, where the appellants-Defendant were permitted to initiate due legal process for enforcement.
8. The concept of "consideration" in a contract, as envisaged in section 2(d) of the Contract Act, does not, necessarily, mean or imply a monetary benefit or anything susceptible to an accurate valuation in terms of money. It means and signifies any abstinence, forbearance, detriment or responsibility shown, suffered or undertaken by a promisee or any other person at the instance or desire of the promisor which, in turn, gives rise to a corresponding right, interest, benefit or profit to the promisee. Speaking, tentatively, for this is still an interim stage in the proceedings, the appellants-plaintiffs were restricted to ply their vehicles within specific periods of time, with a matching advantage to the respondent-defendant No,1 to have a free-play for the remainder of the time span, by honouring the restrictions undertaken and suffered at the level of the appellants.
9. What is more, the venue of such operation was also clearly stipulated, as quoted. It, therefore, follows that the postulation were both as regards the timings agreed upon and the place to be touched for the journey. This. Ex facie, was sufficient consideration. Even if it is conceded that the use of the defendant's premises was in the nature of a licence, as found by the learned single Judge, the fact remains that the licence was a concomitant and possibly inseparable part of the contract and if the contract was to be allowed to be worked upon, the elements of time and space should have been allowed the necessary inter-play.
10. ' Taking up the question of specific performance of the contract, it is correct that where a permanent injunction cannot issue under section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, an interim injunction is also subject to the same preclusion. One of the postulations of section 56 is that a permanent injunction shall not issue to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. In the category of such contracts are those envisaged in section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The learned Single Judge has not clarified the reason why one of the clauses of such section interact with the contract in the suit not is any such clause duly identified. One, therefore, is left to guess the implications. Ostensibly and in all probability, the learned Single Judge may have implied that for the non-performance of the contract in question, compensation in terms of money could be adequate relief [section 21(a)]. However, the plaintiffs never sought compensation and it is doubtful that an abrupt retraction of the contract in dispute could have been readily and adequately assessable in terms of money. Obviously any such monetary claim would have given rise to minute matters of accounts. Another clause in section 21 of the 1877 Statute, which could have been in the view of the learned Single Judge may have been a situation involving "a contract, which is in its nature revocable" [section 21(d)]. There also it is not clear as to how such a finding could have been arrived at without recording due evidence in the matter. In any case, these are all guesses, because the learned single Judge has not ascribed any reason as to why the contract in question, in his opinion, was not specifically enforceable and, thus, not amenable to an interim injunction within the framework of Order 39, Rule 2, C.P.C. The tentative conclusion, therefore, that the contract was not specifically enforceable is not well-founded. We may add here that in terms of rule 2 of Order 39, where the suit is for related permanent injunction, an interim, injunction from committing breach or causing other injury may be sought even though "compensation is claimed in such suit".
11. While concluding, we would like to re-emphasise the sanctity of contracts. Where parties have, lawfully, entered into mutual commitments, with open eyes and free volition, maturing into contractual obligations, such cannot easily be allowed a unilateral and wilful disclaimer. In cases where a single breach has not undercut the entire contractual obligations, and the matter admits of continuing breaches or a contract has not become impossible of performance or one or other prohibitions of law, including those in section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, do not patently come into play, Courts are to lean in favour of saving rather than discarding contracts.
12. These were the reasons on account of which we had allowed this appeal through the short order above quoted. In the result, the respondent No,1 and those claiming under such respondent would stand restrained from retracting I their obligations under the agreements dated 17-11-1994 and 2- 11-1996 during the pendency of the suit from which this appeal has, arisen.