' NAIMUDDIN, J.-The facts giving rise to this petition briefly stated are The petitioners and respondents 4 to 32 are the Khatedars of lands situated at watercourse 9-T, Ex-Ranipur Minor, Khairpur District.
2. Zawar Qaim, respondent 2, and Hidayat All respondent 3, are the owners of the lands bearing Survey Nos. 8, 28/2, 30/1, 32, 648, 683, 690, 691, 692, 753, 754 and 849 situated in Deh Miani and settled at watercourse No, 9-T, Ex-Ranipur Minor. They have also lands bearing Survey Nos. 243, 21', 252, 253, 254, 2 i5 in Deh Daraza which are settled on watercourse No, 3-R, Ex-Daraza Minor. Teey applied for transfer of beech from watercourse No, 3-x Daraza Minor to watercourse No, 9-T Ex Ranipur Minor, Khairpur District, in order to consolidate the area on the same watercourse for better cultivation. Their case was recommended by the Executive Engineer Irrigation, West Division Khairpur, to the Superintending Engineer, Khairpur Irrigation, for approval vide letter No, IC/ 4581 dated 30-12-1971. The Superintending Engineer, by his order dated 12-1-1972, sanctioned the change subject to observance of all the formalities under section 91 of the Irrigation Act, 1879 (hereinafter called the Act).
3. Thereafter, it appears, that the Executive Engineer invited objections from the Khatedars of watercourse No, 9-T, Ex-Ranipur Minor. Since they were opposed to the change the Executive Engineer, Irrigation West Division Khairpur, made a reference under section 91(3) of the Act to the Deputy Commissioner, Khairpur, who by his order dated 31-1-1973 remanded the case to the Executive Engineer with the direction that he should dispose of the matter after hearing all the Khatedars. The Executive Engineer heard the Khatedars and vide his reference dated 30-7-1973 submitted that 10 out of 43 Khatedars were agreeable to this change. The matter was therefore, again considered by the Deputy Commissioner, who disapproved of the change by his order dated 15-12-1973, mainly on the ground that 43 Khatedars had objected to the transfer of the beech and that the balance of covenience was on the side of the petitioners.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order respondents 2 and 3 preferred a revision under section 93(3) of the Act to the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Sind, Irrigation and Power Division, respondent I. Before respondent 1 it was submitted that the water supply in the existing watercourse was already insufficient and therefore the transfer of additional area would affect them adversely and that their land would be affected by seepage as the new area proposed on their watercourse was higher than their lands.
5. In regard to the first objection respondent 1 directed the Executive Engineer, Khairpur to supply the cultivation figures of the outlet 9-T, Ranipur Minor and which were submitted by respondent 1 and were found satisfactory by him. With regard to the other objectors respondent 1 directed the Executive Engineer to get the spot levels of survey numbers under transfer and which was done and it was found that the said spot levels indicate that the proposed arrangement as approved by the Irrigation Officer would not affect the petitioners adversely as the adjoining lands of respondents 2 and 3 area proposed to be transferred were nearly at the same level. Accordingly, he set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Khairpur, dated 15-12-1973 by the order dated 24-6-1974 which is impugned in this petition.
6. We have heard Mr. Shahenshah Hussain learned Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Jamaluddin Shaikh Advocate for respondents 2 and 3,
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the impugned order is without lawful authority on the following grounds : (1) The power of Revision under section 91(3) of the Act could be exercised suo motu but not on an application of respondents 2 and 3.
(ii) Respondent in could decide the case on the existing record but could not call for the report from Executive Engineer and decide the case on its basis.
(iii) Respondent 1 has acted for a purpose which is not relevant to the provisions of section 91 of the Act. The order is main fide in law for respondent 1 has favoured respondents 2 and 3.
8. In order to appreciate the contentions and the grounds raised before us it would be appropriate if we reproduce the provisions of section 91 of the Act which are as follows "(1) Whenever it appears to any Canal Officer not interior in rank to an Executive Engineer that it is expedient to change the source of water supply of any land for the more efficient distribution of water, he shall serve a notice on the holder or holders of the land and, if he proposes to transfer the source of water supply of the land to any existing watercourse, on the owner or owners of such watercourse also, calling upon them to state in writing their objections, if any, as to the source of alignment or construction of the proposed watercourse.
(2) (1) If no objection is raised within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, the Canal Officer may change the source of water supply of the land in such manner as be thinks expedient.
(h) If any objections are received within the said period of thirty days, the Canal Officer shall give the holder or holders of the land and the owner or owners of the watercourse a reasonable opportunity of being heard and may, if the said objections are settled to change the source of water supply accordingly. Off) If no settlement in respect of the said objections be arrived at between the Canal Officer and the holder or holden of the land and the owner or owners of the watercourse the Canal Officer shall forthwith refer the matter to the Collector whose decision, which shall be given after giving the holder or holders of the land affected an opportunity of being heard, subject to any orders that may be passed in revision by the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive as regard the alignment and construction of the proposed watercourse and shall not be called in question in any civil Court."
9. Now considering the first ground of attack on the impugned orde that the revieional powers could be exercised suo motu and not on the application of the aggrieved party we find that no such restrictions are provided in subsection (e) of section 91 of the Act and we are unable to read any such restriction therein for the object of the provisions seems to be to provide remedy to those who are aggrieved by an order which I improperly made but without restricting the exercise- of such powers suo motu in cases which come d rectly to the notice of the Commissioner.
' It is common knowledge that under section 115, C. P. C. Also wh it is not specifically provided whether these powers could be exercised suo mow or on an application such powers are exercised in both the manners.
' While considering the provisions of subsection (5) of section 36 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Ordinance, 1949 which provides that : " the Custodian or Additional Custodian may, within the prescribed period, and after giving notice to the parties concerned and the Rehabilitation Authority review his own order", their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Saibai v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property, South Zone, West Pakistan, Karachi (I) observed at page 68 of the report as follows : "it will he seen that the substantive law does not require that for the purposes of review a Custodian or an Additional Custodian should be moved by any patty in that behalf."
' Again their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Syed Abdul Rehman and others v. Settlement Rehabilitation and Claims Commissioner, Karachi and another (2) while considering the provisions of subsection (3) of section 7 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 the material part whereof provides that : "A Claims Commissioner may suo mow call, within the prescribed period, for the record of any case which has been decided by a Claims Officer, a Deputy Claims Commissioner or an Additional Claims Commissioner under his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed therein and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit"; observed as under "Now the question is what this subsection means. Does it prescribe limitation for the exercise of Claims Commissioner's power in revision ; or does it also give right to a party to move him in that behalf If the former view is correct then the scope of Revision would bo confined only to such matters coming to his notice otherwise than from parties directly interested in the claims in question. That this cannot be the intention is clear from the object of the Act, and the setting of the above section therein. The primary object of the Act was to provide for the registration and verification of claims of displaced persons in respect of their properties in India. It was really a measure designed to eliminate the hardships and miseries of as large a number of persons as possible, who had been compelled to leave India iust after Partition. One must also not forget that the displaced persons had to leave India suddenly and hence evidence of title to the abandoned properties was not always readily available. The object of this section was therefore, to provide remedies to those who were aggrieved by an order improperly made, rejecting or reducing their claims. The narrow interpretation which Mr. Brohi wants to put on it will really defeat the very object of the Act. It is a sound rule of Construction that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and in such manner as to render the enforcement of a substantive right effective. Reading subsection (3) of section 7 in the context of the whole enactment, in our opinion, the power of revision was not intended to be limited in the manner suggested by Mr. Brohi. This view also finds support from the decision of this Court in Sahibrai v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property (1957) 1 SCR 71)."
From the above observations of their Lordships it is clear that the powers of revision can be exercised suo motu as well as on the application of any party unless the provision under which such powers are exercised contain is any condition or restriction as to the exercise of powers in both the manners and under the present provisions we find no condition or restriction restraining the exercise of powers in one manner or the other.
10. Taking up the second ground that respondent 1 could take into consideration only the existing record and could not base his order on the
(1) PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 63 (2) PLD 1966 SC 362 ' report of Executive Engineer we may mention that under section 91 subsection (3) the decision of the Collector has been made final and conclusive subject to any order that may be passed in revision by the Commissioner and for exercise of the powers of revision by the Commissioner no restrictions or limitations have been provided therein and no such conditions have been imposed by or under the said provisions as are found in section 115 C. P. C. For exercise of the revisional powers by a District Court or a High Court. It is true that under the Code of Civil Procedure the distinction is made between a revision and appeal as under section 115 of the C. P. C. a revision only lies where an appeal does not lie but since under the Act no appeal has been provided we are of the view that the word 'revision' has D not been used in section 91(3) of the Act in a restricted sense or in the sense in which it is used in section 115. In Ryes Ali Abid Zaldi and others v. Deputy Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Gujranwala and others (1) learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court while construing the provisions of section 19(1) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlemment) Act, 1958 in relation to the nature and scope of the revision thereunder after discussing a number of cases observed as follows :- Respectfully following the above law I hold that since in the instant case the revisional power under the Act is not subject to any specified restrictions like those mentioned in section 115, C. P. C. It is more akin to an appeal or a second appeal rather than a revision under section I 15 of the C. P.
Code."
' The nature and scope of revision under the Karachi Rent Restriction Act. 1953 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Takhir All an 't another v. Chief Judge, Karachi Small Cruses Court and another (2) and it was observed by his Lordship Peale Akbar, J. At page 150 of the report as follows : "Thus the revision provided in the above subsection has all the characteristics of an appeal. In other words the revisional power under this Act is not subject to any specified restrictions like those mentioned in section 115, C. P. C. It is, therefore, clear that the word 'revision' in this Act has not been used in the same sense as what is technically known as a revision under section 115 of the C. P.
Code."
' Respectfully following the above observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court we hold that in section 91(3) the word 'revision' has been used in its widest sense and includes all the possible powers which ar exerciseable in an appeal.
11. While elaborating the third ground the learned counsel for the petitioner firstly submitted that source of water supply could be changed only for more efficient distribution of the water aad the proposed change is in disregard of this object. He further submitted that the watercourse could be changed only when it was expedient and not when it was helpful only to one party namely, respondents 2 and 3.
As regard the first submission we may state that the finding of respondent 1 is that the proposed arrangement as approved by the Irrigation Officer could not affect the petitioners and respondents adversely as the adjoining lands of the petitioners and the area of respondents 1 and 2 proposed for transfer are at the same level. He further found, "Though respondents did not furnish other reasons to establish how they will be put
(1) L D 1967 Lab. 836 (2) PLD 1963 SC 147 ' to difficulty, if the appellants' (respondents 2 and 3) land is transferred on W. C.
9. T. Ex-Ranipur minor. The land of applicants, when transferred to W. C. Ex-Ranipur Minor will remain at the tail and that of the respondents at its Head reach. Thus the objections of the respondents do not have any substance."
' He also observed that the learned Deputy Commissioner in his order had not discussed the merits of the objections, but only disapproved the proposed change simply because there were some objections and the examination of the objections however, indicated that they were not genuine, ' As regard the second submission that watercourse could be changed only when it was expedient and not when it was helpful to only one party namely, respondents 2 and 3, we may state that according to the ordinary p Dictionary meaning 'expedient' means 'advantageous', 'suitable' and according to the Black's Law Dictionary it means, 'Apt and suitable to end in view, Werner v.
Biederma (1), or whatever is 'suitable and appropriate in reason -for the accomplishment of a specified object Fustace v. Dickey (2), Therefore, respondent 1 had to see while considering the proposal whether it was advantageous to all the parties to change the watercourse or not. No ,doubt as shown above he has found that the change of the source would not adversely affect the petitioners which finding means that the change is advantageous to resnondents 1 and 2 and is not disadvantageous to petitioners and other respondents and therefore, it was advantageous to all' -the persons concerned. Accordingly, we hold that respondent 1 acted in furtherance or the object of the Act.
' As regards the last ground that the order is ;nolo fide in law for respondent 1 has favoured respondents 2 and 3 at the expense of the petitioners or other respondents Every order which is passed in such proceedings by an officer has to be in favour of one contesting party or the other contesting party and simply because it is in favour of one party or the other it does not become an order mala fide in law unless it is shown that it has been passed unduly at the expense of other party or in furtherance of an object which is not covered by the enactment or is in colorable exercise of the powers.
' We therefore, find no substance in any of the grounds urged in support of the contention which therefore, also fail. Accordingly, we dismiss this petition but in the circumstances of the case leave the parties to bear their own costs.
(1) 6i Ohio App. 423=28 N 2d 957
(2) 240 Mass 55=132 N E 852