1. DECISION An appeal has been filed by Laghari Corporation Limited, Maghi Goth, against the order of the learned Junior Labour Court, dated 12-9-75 directing re-instatement of Mr. Allah Diwaya, Workman, (ex-Engine Driver) by setting aside the order of his termination dated 25-2-75 passed by the appellant Management. The respondent moved the learned Lower Court where as a result of the evidence led by the parties, the respondent was re-instated under the impugned order on the ground that one factory was working throughout the year and the respondent having worked against a permanent job as engine driver was entitled to be retained in service in that capacity and that his termination was unlawful.
2. In the present appeal, a preliminary objections as to limitation has been raised on behalf of the respondent. The impugned order was announced on 12-9-75 whereas the appeal has been filed on 21-10-75. According to the official stamp impressed on the copy of the impugned judgment application for the copy was made on 24-9-75, the copy was ready for delivery on 13-10-75 and the same was delivered on 14-10-75. Ordinarily the appeal was to be filed by 18th of October, 1975 there was a delay of three days in filing the appeal for which no condonation has been urged on behalf of the appellant either by a regular application or by verbal requests on some justifiable grounds. On the other hand it teas averred that the appeal is within time inasmuoh as the provisions of section 36-D (1) make for allowance of a period of fifteen days and after a copy of the judgment of the learned Lower Court is physically delivered to the parties concerned, section 36-D
(1) reads as follows:- "Any party aggrieved by a decision of a Junior Labour Court under section 36-D, may prefer an appeal to a Labour Court within 15 days of the delivery thereof and a decision of the Labour Court in such appeal shall be final."
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to emphasise by laying special stress on the word "delivery" occurring in the provision and has asked the Court to interpret it as actually handing over of the judgment and not the mere announcement thereof and in that score has contended that as the copy of the impugned judgment was actually handed over to the appellant on 14-10-75, the appeal filed on 21-1075 was well within time. I am unable to agree with this contention as the simple meaning of the word 'delivery' in my understanding is synonymous to the "announcement" and could not be stretched to the physically handing over of the judgment. Accordingly, the appellant was bound to file the appeal at the maximum by 18October, 1975, to get the maximum benefit of the statutory period of 15 days. Under the circumstances, the appeal is held to be time-barred and is therefore dismissed. The file may be consigned.