1. MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J---This appeal, by way of leave, is preferred against an order passed by the High Court on September 16, 1997, whereby the revision petition filed by the appellant, herein, was dismissed.
2. 2.The precise facts, culminating into the present appeal, are that a pre-emption suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant in the Court of Sub-Judge Bhimber. The. trial Court before striking the issues directed the plaintiff-appellant on November 17, 1996, to deposit 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land on or before December 21, 1996. The plaintiff-appellant failed to deposit the 1/5th of the consideration amount as directed by the Court but on the same date, i,e, Dec.21, 1996, moved an application before the trial Court requesting it to allow him to deposit the security amount instead of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land. In the alternative he prayed to extend the time and provide him an opportunity for depositing the 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land. The application to the extent of allowing him to deposit the security was disallowed, however further opportunity for depositing the 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land on or before January 21, 1997, was allowed.
3. 3.The appellant challenged the validity of the aforesaid order by filing a revision petition in the High Court which was dismissed on 13-3-1997. After the dismissal of the revision petition the plaintiff- appellant moved another application before the trial Court for allowing him to deposit the 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land which was allowed at his own responsibility as the file from the High Court had not been received back by the trial Court. Respondent No,1 moved an application before the trial Court for dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff on the ground that 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land had not been deposited by the plaintiff within the time fixed by the Court. This application was rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated 13-6-1997. Respondents challenged the aforesaid order by filing a revision petition in the High Court which was accepted and the suit filed by plaintiff-appellant was held to be rejected on 16-9-1997. The aforesaid order of the High Court is the subject of appeal before this Court.
4. 4.Arguing the case on behalf of the appellant, it was contended by Ch. Muhammad Riaz Alam, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the High Court erred in accepting the revision petition filed by respondents and did not properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. The learned counsel submitted that once the deposit had been accepted by the trial Court the same should have been taken as a valid deposit and the High Court should not have accepted the revision petition filed by the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions placed reliance on reported cases Allah Ditta and 5 others v. Khan Muhammad 1984 CLC 2699 and Muhammad Hussain v. Hassan Muhammad and 2 others 1996 M LD 842.
5. 5.On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Ayub Sabir, the learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently contended that plaintiff-appellant had been throughout negligent in the case and did not bother to company with the orders passed by the trial Court from time to time. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents precisely was that plaintiff-appellant was not serious enough to pursue the case and to make the deposit as he had been using the delaying tactics.
6. According to the learned counsel ultimately the deposit of 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land was made by the plaintiff-appellant at his own responsibility, when neither the time was extended by the High Court nor by the trial Court. The learned counsel strenuously contended that the deposit of amount made by the plaintiff-appellant when the date for its deposit had already expired, by no stretch of imagination it could be construed to be a valid deposit and as such for non-compliance of the order of the Court his plaint was rightly rejected.
7. 6.We have given our due consideration to the arguments addressed at Bar by both the learned counsel for the patties and perused the record. The suit was filed on December 6, 1995. On November 17, 1996, the plaintiff-appellant was directed to deposit 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land on or before December 21, 1996. The plaintiff-appellant failed to do the needful, instead moved an application before the trial Court to modify the order for the deposit of 1/5th of probable value of the suit land into one for depositing the security. In the alternative a prayer was made for extension of time for the deposit of 1/5th of probable value of the suit land. The application, as said earlier, to the extent of modifying the order was disallowed. However, the plaintiff-appellant was directed to deposit the 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land upto January 21, 1997. Even against this order the plaintiff-appellant filed a revision petition which was dismissed by the High Court on March 13, 1997. However on March 15, 1997, the deposit was made by the appellant at his own responsibility. In the background of these circumstances it can safely be concluded that the first date for making the deposit by the plaintiff-appellant was Dec.21, 1996, but he failed to make the deposit. Then the time was extended by the trial Court to January 21, 1997, but even on this date too the plaintiff-appellant failed to make the deposit as ordered by the Court. This order, as said earlier, was also assailed by the appellant by way of revision petition before the High Court which was dismissed. Ultimately, being left with no option, the plaintiff-appellant tendered the deposit on 15-3-1997 at his own responsibility.
8. 7.To have a correct perception of the matter it is deemed expedient to reproduce section 21 subsection (4) of the Right of Prior Purchase Act. It reads as under:--- "21. (4) If the plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may fix to make the deposit or furnish the security under sub-section (1) or (2) his plaint shall be rejected or his appeal dismissed as the case may be."
9. In our view these provisions embodied in section 21(4) are mandatory in nature and the Court in the absence of a sufficient cause is to pass an order in accordance therewith in rejecting the plaint if the order is flouted. The right of pre-emption being in the nature of a piratical right, the Courts have always leaned against it and while allowing such a right have consistently insisted upon the strict compliance of law applicable to pre-emption; and this is the reason that the provisions of pre-emption laws are, necessarily, to be construed conservatively and applied strictly. The Courts are not to act mechanically and are not required to take leniently the circumstances which led to an omission. It may also be observed that in the instant case when the time for deposit was extended by the Court uptil January 21, 1997, afterwards the same was neither extended by the High Court during the pendency of the revision petition nor by the Trial Court after the dismissal of the revision petition. In these circumstances, the deposit, thus, made by the appellant after the lapse of period fixed could not be construed to be a valid deposit under any circumstances.
10. 8.The cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant have no relevancy to the case in hand as the facts in those cases were clearly distinguishable. In the case of Allah Ditta and 5 others v.
11. Khan Muhammad, referred to above, the powers of the Court for extension of time have been discussed. To this rule we have no cavil as it is perfectly within the competence of the Court to extend the time for making the deposit provided the circumstances so justify. Therefore, as said earlier, this case has no relevancy to the instant case. The other case referred by the learned counsel for the appellant instead of supporting his contention supports the case of respondents.
12. The principle enunciated in the case of Muhammad Hussain v. Hassan Muhammad and 2 others 1996 M LD 842 is laid down at page 94 in the following manner:--- In our opinion the time fixed by the Court to make the deposit or to furnish the requisite security can be extended by the Court but for doing so there should be a reasonable explanation as to why the order of the Court has not been complied with. It follows that the plaintiff has to put forward an explanation accompanied by a request for extension of time. The provision under reference is mandatory in nature and has to be strictly construed. The Court, however, cannot reject the plaint immediately. If an explanation for the default is given the Court is legally bound to consider whether the circumstances were such as to justify an extension of time. But our considered view is that explanation is to be given by the person who has failed to comply with the order of the Court and is not for the Court to seek it. In our view from the phraseology of subsection (4) the requirement of seeking an explanation is not spelled out. Seeking of explanations from litigants who have failed to implement the orders of the Court does not conform to the procedural law and does not seem to be necessary or practical."
9. The nutshell of the above discussion is that finding no force in this appeal it is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.