' SABIHUDDIN AHMAD, J.---By this petition the petitioner has called in question Notification of the Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, whereby the petitioner was removed/transferred from the Office of the Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board and was directed to report to the Education Department. The admitted facts are that the petitioner was a civil servant working in BPS-20 in the Education Department of the Provincial Government by a Notification, dated 11th June, 1997. He was appointed Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board (statutory body established under Sindh Textbook Board Ordinance, 1970) (hereinafter mentioned as the Ordinance), for a period of three years in terms of section 4(2)(a) of the Ordinance. Before the expiry of the said term, however, the impugned Notification was issued. Which read as under:-- "NOTIFICATION ' Dr. Muhammad Sharif Memon, an Officer of Education Department, Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board, Jamshoro, is removed/transferred with immediate effect from the Office of Chairman in term of clause 5(1) of Sindh Textbook Board Ordinance, 1970.
2. On the removal/transfer from the Office of Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board he shall report to Education Department for further order. MUHAMMAD SAEED MEHDI, CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF SINDH."
2. I have heard both the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Advocate- General at length on merits as well as jurisdictional aspects of the case.
3. Mr. Naimatullah Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner mainly argued that the petitioner's appointment as Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board, was effected under section 4(2) of the Special Law i,e, the Ordinance, as is evident from the terms of his appointment letter and he could only be removed from the office in accordance with the specific stipulation contained in section 5 of the Ordinance, which read as under:-- "5. (1) Government may, by order in writing, remove the Chairman a member, if he--
(a) refuses or fails to discharge or becomes, in the opinion of Government, incapable of discharging his responsibilities under this Ordinance; or
(b) has, in the opinion of Government, abused his position as Chairman or member; or
(c) has knowingly acquired or continues to hold, directly or indirectly, or through a partnef, any share or interest in any contract or employment with or by or on behalf of the Board or in any land or property while in his knowledge is likely to benefit or has benefited as a result of the operation of the Board; or
(d) has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude or adjudicated insolvent or is found a lunatic or becomes of unsound mind or has been dismissed or otherwise disqualified from Government service."
4. Mr. Ghulam Nabi Soomro, learned Additional Advocate-General on the, other hand contended that the petitioner was a civil servant and was appointed as Chairman of the Board in the exercise of statutory powers available to the Government under the Ordinance as a civil servant he could be transferred anywhere under section 10 of the Civil Servants Act. His status as an officer in BPS-20 was not being impaired. Moreover, he argued that the petitioner had no vested right to hold office of the Chairman, Textbook Board for the entire period of three years tenure. In this context he relied upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan v. Moazzam Hussain Khan and others (PLD 1959 SC 13), wherein it was held that the reversion of a civil servant appointed to ex-cadre tenure post to his substantive post. Did not amount to reduction in rank in terms of Article 181(2) of 1956 Constitution. Mr. Naimatullah Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand has relied upon two recent decisions in the cases of Prof. Feroz Yousuf Khan v. Secretary to the Government of d (1988 PLC (C.S.) 763) and Dr. Ghulam Muhammad Malik v. The Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab 1998 PLC (C.S.) 888. In the first case the Sindh Service Tribunal by majority held that when a civil servant was appointed as Member of the Public Service Commission for a fixed tenure, an order, cutting short his tenure amounted to his removal which could only be effected in accordance with the statutory requirement of section 6 of the Sindh Public Service Commission Ordinance. In the second case, a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court was pleased to hold that an order repatriating a civil servant from the post of Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education on the ground of his "not coming up to expectation" without giving him an opportunity of showing cause was mala fide and liable to be set aside in Constitutional jurisdiction.
5. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel and the cases cited by them. Prima facie the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Moazzam Hussain Khan, does not appear to be applicable to the present case. In the first instance it may be recalled that the Constitution of 1956 only protected certain limited terms and conditions of service of civil servant and their Lordships were examining the question from the narrow stand-point as to whether premature termination of a tenure appointment amounted to "reduction in rank". Under the present scheme of our Service Laws, however, a civil servant can seek redress in respect of any order impairing his terms and conditions of service or varying them to his disadvantage. Therefore, even if such premature termination does not strictly amount to the petitioner's in reduction of rank, he could still assail the order if it was unlawful and he was adversely affected thereby before the appropriate forum. Secondly in Moazam Hussain Khan's case their Lordships were interpreting the provision in fundamental rule and in this context late Muhammad Muneer, C.J. Observed:-- "In my opinion, the fact that the period of five years is described in the rules as a 'normal' period, which is 'relaxable' and 'extendable' shows that no Government servant who is appointed to the post of Director, Intermediate Board can as of right claimed to remain on that post for a full period of five years " (Underlining ours).
6. On the other hand the tenure of appointment of Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board is determined by statute and not service rules. The law provides for a fixed tenure leaving no room for relaxation or extension though reappointment of incumbent can be made for another tenure. In the circumstances the view taken by the Sindh Service Tribunal in the case of Prof. Feroz Yousuf Khan, while interpreting a similar statute appears to be correct. It may be added that even in Moazzam Husain Khan's case it was held that premature termination of tenure appointment might amount to removal though not exactly removal from service.
7. Be that as it may, the impugned order itself states that the petitioner's removal was effected under clause (apparently section) 5(1) of the Sindh Textbook Ordinance. This has been reiterated in the parawise comments filed on behalf of the respondents. The aforesaid statutory provision which is quoted in para. No, 3 above mentioned four specific contingencies, which reflect upon a person's capacity to hold office and attaches stigma to him. Prima facie no action under the aforesaid provision can be taken without affording the affected person an opportunity of being heard. We, therefore, find a great deal of substance as far as the merits of the case are concerned.
Nevertheless, we are refraining from expressing a final opinion in view of what is being discussed below.
8. Notwithstanding the merits of the controversy the learned Additional Advocate-General also questions our jurisdiction to entertain this petition in view of the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution. He argued that the petitioner was a civil servant and could approach the Service Tribunal for redress of grievances relating to his terms and conditions of the service. Mr. Naimatullah Qureshi, in reply, contended that the petitioner though initially a civil servant, was deputed to work in an autonomous statutory body as Chairman, Sindh Textbook Board. As to this factual and legal position there is no dispute. Learned counsel, however, further argued that in view of the above position he could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, in relation to his terms of appointment in a foreign organization. In support of his contention he once again relied upon the majority decision of the Sindh Service Tribunal in the case of Prof. Feroz Yousuf Khan, wherein the Chairman, Munawar Ali Khan (as he then was) observed:-- "No doubt the appellant was a civil servant prior, to his appointment as a Member of Sindh Public Service Commission as he was then holding the post of Deputy Director Colleges, Hyderabad the question is if he retains his position as Member of the Public Service Commission.
' Sindh Public Service Commission is a statutory body created and governed by its own Law and Rules. It was established by the Public Service Commission Ordinance, which also provides for composition of the commission, appointment and removal of its Chairman and Members, their terms and conditions of service including the tenure of their appointment etc. In this way the Public Service Commission is an independent body governed by the law and rules totally different from the law and rules applicable to civil ervant We are, therefore, of the view that the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission are not civil servants. The appellant has filed this appeal, not as Deputy Director but as Member of the Public Service Commission. Accordingly he could be held as civil servant for the purpose of filing the present appeal.'
9. In response to the question as what would be the effect of the amendment in the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, effected through Sindh Act XXXI of 1994, whereby employees of institution set up under Provincial enactments may also seek redress from Service Tribunal, Mr. Ghulam Nabi Soomro, brought to our attention the newly incorporated section 3-E of the Act which reads as under:-- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, service of corporation, is declared to be the service of the Province and if every person holding a post in the Corporation, not being a person who is on deputation to the Corporation, shall, for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be a civil servant." (Underlining ours).
10. Emphasising the underlined part of the above-quoted provision Mr. Soomro contended that in view of such specific stipulation could not be treated as a civil servant in terms of section 3-E. He is indeed correct in fairness to him the observations of the Service Tribunal quoted above, all full support his view-point, inasmuch as the provision of the Public Service Ordinance, in the relevant context are quite similar to those of the Textbook Board Ordinance, With profound respect to the learning of the author of the aforesaid judgment, we are unable to share this view on account of the reasons stated below.
11. For the purpose of determining the correct legal position vis-a-vis, the right of a civil servant deputed to work in an autonomous Organization to approach a Service Tribunal the definition of a civil servant contained in section 2 of the Sindh Civil Servants Act, may be examined. Section 2(b) of the Act reads as under:-- "'Civil servant means a person who is a member of civil service of the Province or holds a civil post in connection with affairs of the Province. But does not include--
(i) a person who is on deputation to the Province from the Federation or any other Province or authority: or (ii)
(iii)
12. The provision of the Federal Civil Servants Act and similar statutes in the other Provinces are almost identical. Obviously the expression "members of the civil service of our Province" or persons holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of a Province are not merely autologous. It is settled law that no provision in a statute can he deemed to he redundant. It is, therefore, evident thattthis definition covers two types of persons i,e, those, who are members of a regular service in the Province and those who are for the time being holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Province, Again some persons working for the" Government, have been expressly excluded from the definition of a civil servant. For our purposes, those mentioned in sub-clause (1) are relevant. It has been clearly spelt out that a peisOn who is for the time =being on deputation to the Province from the Federation or any other Province or authority, will not be treated as a civil' servant of the Province, whether he is for the time being deputed to work. Section -10 expressly provides, inter alia, that a civil servant may be required to serve under the Federal Government in another Provincial Government or a Corporation or ,Local Authority, established by any such Government the obvious implication of -these provisions is that while a member of civil service of a Province may be required to serve under any other Government Or an autonomous body his status as a civil servant is not affected. The first proviso to section 2(b) is designed to ensure that while such civil servant may on deputation be required to work under another Government or in an- autonomous body, he does not become 4 civil servant of the Government, where he is required, to work but continues to retain his status as an employee of his parent employer. If a member of a Civil Service of a Province of Sindh is required to work under an outside agency or for instance the Federal Government, disciplinary action thin can only be taken by the Government of Sindh and not the Organization, wherehe is for the time being deputed to work. We are fortified in this view by the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Mazhar Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (1991SCMR 435). In this case the appellant who was a member of the Irrigation Service of the Province of Punjab, was deputed to work with the Federal Government as Joint Secretary and was subsequently promoted as Additional Secretary. A departmental inquiry into his conduct while rendering service under the Federal service was held and he was compulsorily retired from service by an order of the President. After unsuccessfully assailing such order before the Punjab Service Tribunal the appellant approached the Honourable- Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since his lien with the Punjab Government had not terminated and he was not confirmed against a permanent post in the Federal Government he continued to remain a civil servant of the Province and the order of his retirement was void.
13. With great respects, we are also unable to share the view that the Sindh Service Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to entertain proceedings unless the grievance of the appellant was founded upon a violation of the provision of the Sindh Civil Servants Act or the Rules made thereunder. In the first place it may be appreciated that after the amendment of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act in 1994 and the Federal Service Tribunals Act, 1997, grievances of an employee of statutory bodies are also justiciable before Service Tribunal. Obviously such employees arc not governed by the Civil Servants Act or Rules made thereunder, but by the provisions of the statutes under which they are constituted, statutory rules and at times contracts of employment. Obviously the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction to redress their grievances in terms of the law applicable to them. Moreover, under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act a person who falls within the definition of a civil servant under that act can prefer an appeal against an order of a competent Authority, which has defined to mean an Authority competent to pass an, order in respect of the terms and conditions of his service. It is entirely immaterial as to whose such authority is and what law is applicable. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that even in a hypothetical case where a civil servant of a Province is working on deputation with another Government or authority and is aggrieved by an order passed by such Government or authority governing his terms and conditions of his employment he can always approach the Service Tribunal of his parent Province for redress of his grievances.
14. In view of the above we are of the opinion that an appeal against the impugned order would be competent before the Sindh Service Tribunal, and, therefore, our jurisdiction to entertain this petition is barred by Article 212 of the Constitution. Indeed, the points of law involved were of some difficulty and the petitioner could approach the Tribunal for a condo nation of delay in filing an appeal or seeking benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act which the Tribunal is fully competent to grant.
' For the foregoing reasons this petition is dismissed. We must record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Naimatullah Qureshi and Mr. Ghulam Nabi Soomro, learned Additional Advocate-General.