' FAZAL KARIM, J.---The respondents' case in the writ petition was that they were "carrying on their business in the market which belongs to Zila Council of which respondent No,1 is the Chairman/Administrator"; that "all the shopkeepers including the petitioners are the tenants under the Zila Council. They have not paid the rent for some time now because they were given assurance by the Government from time to time that the ownership rights will be conferred on them"; that they were willing to pay the arrears of rent "in case the Government decides that the ownership rights will not be conferred on them". According to them ejectment proceedings had been initiated by the Zila Council against them and the other shopkeepers without any notice. In short their claim was that they could not be ejected from the shop "except in due course of law and in compliance with an order of ejectment from the rent controller". They, therefore, prayed that the respondents before the High Court namely that Deputy Commissioner, Narowal as Chairman of the Zila Council, Assistant Commissioner. Shakargarh as Administrator, Municipal Committee and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Shakaragarh "be directed to desist from ejecting the petitioners etc. From shops of Zila Council, Shakargarh or demolish the shops in question without any notice to the petitioners and without hearing them".
2. By his order dated 30-1-1995, the learned Judge in the High Court directed the office to intimate the respondent No,2 (Assistant Commissioner, Shakargarh) "on telephone at the expense of the petitioners to appear with record of the case before this Court on 31-1-1995". The order of the date 31-1-1995 shows that the Assistant Commissioner appeared before the learned Judge and undertook "to accommodate the petitioners and other similarly placed people by giving them alternate land". The learned Judge disposed of the writ petition with the following observation "Let him do so according to law. This being so, the petitioners shall not be disturbed unless a suitable piece of land is allotted to them".
3. The petitioners namely Deputy Commissioner, Narowal, Assistant Commissioner, Shakargarh and Deputy Superintendent of Police, Shakargarh seek leave to appeal against the learned Judge's order dated 31-1-1995.
4. It is maintained that the land on which the shops in question stand either belongs to the Zila Council or to the Highways Department; that the position of the respondents and that of the other shopkeepers was that of licensees; they had also illegally occupied part of the land. In any case, so argued the learned counsel, the Assistant Commissioner in his capacity of Administrator, Municipal Committee, Shakargarh had no authority in law to make a statement binding the Zila Council or for that matter the Highways Department. Learned counsel for the respondents agreed that the petitioners' position was that of tenants/licensees under the Zila Council. That being so, learned counsel for the petitioners is right in contending that the Assistant Commissioner in his capacity as Administrator, Municipal Committee, Shakargarh could not have undertaken "to accommodate the petitioners and other similarly placed people by giving them alternate land". It appears that to so accommodate the respondents and the other shopkeepers was a matter of policy and that was not a matter for the Assistant Commissioner in his capacity of Administrator of the Municipal .Committee, Shakargarh, when admittedly the land on which the shops stand belongs to the Zila Council or as stated by the petitioners' counsel, to the Highways Department. Nor were in the facts of the case the respondents entitled to the relief that they would not be disturbed "unless a suitable piece of land is allotted to them". It has been seen that all that the respondents claimed was that they should not be ejected otherwise than in due course of law; they had not asked for the relief of being given alternate land and that relief could not, therefore, be granted to them.
5. We, therefore, convert this petition into an appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 31-1-1995 and direct that the respondents shall not be ejected otherwise than in due course of law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.