1. ' WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---This review petition is directed to seek recall of the judgment delivered in Civil Appeal No,283 of 1994 on 22-5-1998. The facts of the case are duly detailed in such judgment and need not be restated. Review is sought on the following grounds:--
(a) The learned State counsel erroneously reported the fact that FIR No,59 of 1992, registered at the instance of the police functionaries, stood cancelled per order of the concerned Magistrate dated 25-11-1992 Such was factually incorrect because this Court on 24-11-1992 had stayed the High Court order in the referred civil appeal and, therefore, neither the F.I.R. Was cancelled nor any question arose as to its cancellation.
(b) Likewise, it was erroneously asserted by the State Counsel that challan, pertaining to F.I.R. No,62 of 1992, filed by the private persons, also at Police Station Shaher Sultan, stood submitted.
(c) Because the High Court had intervened in the investigation process, the impugned judgment of the High Court was liable to be recalled upon giving effect to earlier pronouncements of the Court.
2. ' It would be advantageous here to reproduce the relevant portion from the judgment in Civil Appeal No,283 of 1994 because it is such operative portion of the judgment which would determine whether the present is a fit case for grant of review. The relevant excerpt is this:- "We have heard the learned counsel and perused the record. Raja Muhammad Anwar, Sr.
3. Advocate, Supreme Court, appearing for the appellants, apart from the cited case law in the leave granting order, has placed reliance on Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim, PLD 1994 SC 281 and Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan, 1994 SCMR 2142. There can be no cavil with the proposition that, on principle and as a rule, the Court, in terms of section 561-A Cr.P.C. (which unless judicial proceedings are pending is not invocable) read with Article 199 of the Constitution, can neither routinely transfer an investigation nor otherwise interfere with the process of investigation, if taken in hand. The doctrine is, however, subject to well-recognized exceptions, emerging from Article 199 of the Constitution and,. Where detention is involved, in line with section 491 Cr.P.C. The exclusions in the rule have been given effect to ever since and even before the decision of their lordships in the case of Shahnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another (PLD 1971 SC 677). Such exceptions, inter alia, include launching of mala fide investigations or resorting to investigative process ex facie wanting in jurisdiction. It was recently observed by this Court in Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State, 1996 SCMR 24, that the High Court has due jurisdiction to correct the course of investigation and pass necessary orders to ensure justice and fairplay. It was added that the police do not have entire and total authority of running investigations according to their whims. The same case is authority also for the proposition that the High Court has necessary power to ensure that the concerned police officials are alert, vigilant, prompt and dutiful. Note may be taken here of Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Yousaf Butt, PLD 1997 Lah. 15 where one of us, Khalilur Rehman, CJ., as he then was, opined that intervention in the investigation of a cognizable offence was permissible, if it was shown that such was being conducted by abusing statutory powers or the machinery of criminal law was being used for mala fide or ulterior purposes. Those circumstances, patently subsisted in the proceedings from which this appeal has arisen. The High Court had, on facts, rightly ordered the registration of due F.I.R. It refrained from naming an investigating officer on its own and left the discretion to the DIG concerned, who duly exercised the option. There the matter ought to have stayed and the Investigating Officer should have been allowed to have his way. If anything was wanting on the score of mala fides, such was incontrovertibly supplied by, at the instance of the concerned officers, taking away of the investigation from the S.P., Range Crimes, and apparently, contumaciously making over the same to the Crimes Branch, Lahore. In the meantime, we have also been informed that F.I.R. No,59 of 1992, registered at the instance of the police, against the referred private parties, stands cancelled, per order of the concerned Magistrate, dated 25-11-1994.
4. What is more, the learned Judges in the High Court were not in error when they held that for registration of an F.I.R. a prospective or projected accused is in no case entitled to a prior hearing and the principles of natural justice do not extend to such matters.
5. ' In the circumstances, where we are told that, the challan, under the F.I.R. Of the private individuals, has since been submitted and the proceedings are duly pending, no case for interference is made out. In the result, the appeal is dismissed."
6. ' Now, the various grounds, upon which a judgment or order of this Court may call for review, are succinctly set out in Abdul Ghaffar-Abdul Rehman v. Asghar Ali, PLD 1998 SC 363. There, Ajmal Mian, C.J., inter alia, spelled out the principles as under:-- "15. From the above case-law, the following principles of law are deductible:
(i) that every judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court is presumed to be a considered, solemn and final decision on all points arising out of the case;
(ii) that if the Court has taken a conscious and deliberate decision on a point of fact or law, a review petition will not lie;
(iii) that the fact the view canvassed in the review petition is more reasonable than the view found favour with the Court in the judgment/orders of which review is sought, is not sufficient to sustain a review petition;
(iv) that simpliciter the factum that a material irregularity was committed would not be sufficient to review a judgment/order but if the material irregularity was of such a nature, as to convert the process from being one in aid of justice to a process of injustice, a review petition would lie;
(v) that simpliciter the fact that the conclusion recorded in a judgment/order is wrong does not warrant review of the same but if the conclusion is wrong because something obvious has been overlooked by the Court or it has failed to consider some important aspect of the matter, a review petition would lie;
(vi) that if the error in the judgment/order is so manifest and is floating on the surface, which is so material that had the same been noticed prior to the rendering of the judgment, the conclusion would have been different, in such a case a review petition would lie;
(vii) that the power of review cannot be invoked as a routine matter to rehear a case which has already been decided nor change of a counsel would warrant sustaining of a review petition, but the same can be pressed into service where a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier by judicial falliability;
(viii) that the Constitution does not place any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to review its earlier decisions or even to depart from them nor the doctrine stare decisis will come in its way so long as review is warranted in view of the significant impact on the fundamental rights of citizens or in the interest of public good;
(ix) that the Court is competent to review its judgment/order suo motu without any formal application;
(x) that under the Supreme Court Rules, it sits in divisions and not as a whole. Each Bench whether small or large exercises the same power vested in the Supreme Court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are decisions of the Court having the same binding nature."
7. The reproduced portion of the judgment sought to be reviewed clearly shows that the cancellation of the official F.I.R. And the claimed submission of the challan, pertaining to the F.I.R. Of the private persons, were only ancillary and peripheral matters. None of these was a material or crucial aspect of the case. Having re-examined the controversy the inescapable conclusion is that the result of the Civil appeal would have been the same irrespective of the question whether the said F.I.R. Stood cancelled or not or the referred challan had or had not been submitted. Besides, the applicable case-law was duly considered and nothing worth noting has been added to the same in the review. The question of law was and remains that the High Court did have jurisdiction to interfere even in the investigation process if, on facts, it was found that the police functionaries had either acted in a mala fide manner or had travelled beyond the parameters of their jurisdiction. That precisely was the situation in which the High Court had required the DIG, D.G. Khan Range, to have the investigation conducted by the S.P. Crimes, working in his own office, something that the DIG, after the investigation had substantially progressed, unceremoniously altered by, at the instance of the police functionaries, transferring such investigation, contrary to the High Court order, to another person in a different city. On the factual plane, the record has been called and we have found that the error, if any, occurred on the basis of Zinmi No,9 in which the original investigation officer had proposed the cancellation of the official F.I.R. And correspondingly supported the case built up in the F.I.R. Of the private persons. Nothing, therefore, emerges for recall of the judgment in Civil Appeal No,283 of 1994. The review petition is dismissed and with costs.