SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.- On 31.3.1979, National Bank Brought a suit inter alia against the appellant, who was a guarantor, for recovery of a sum of Rs. 19,014.30/- with interest. The suit was decreed on 10.10.1983 by the learned Civil Court. On 24.9.1985, the respondent Bank took out execution and in pursuance thereof the house of the appellant was attached on 30.10.1985.
2. On 25.1.1986, the appellant herein moved an application under rule 26 of Order 21 for the stay of execution. A similar application was also moved by some other judgment- debtors. On 9.9.1986, both the applications were dismissed for non-prosecution. A joint application was moved by the appellant and the judgment-debtors on 22.10.1986, the ground on which restoration was sought was the ailment of the appellant. A medical certificate of a private practitioner was submitted along with the application for restoration.
3. Vide order dated 19.3.1989, impugned in the present appeal, the said application for restoration was dismissed. On the basis of the finding of the learned Special Judge Banking, that there was no sufficient cause for restoration of the said application, It was also found by the learned Special Judge Banking that the application under rule 26 of Order 21 of the CPC was without any merit as the only ground taken therein was that while defendants Nos. 6 to 9 in the suit, had absented themselves, he was the only person to contest the suit and thus this property should not have been attached.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The learned counsel for the appellant has not addressed us on the question of restoration of the application under Order 21 rule 26 of the CPC. He has contended that as a result of amendment in the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans), Ordinance, 1979 by virtue of Ordinance II of 1993, which was enforced on 1.3.1983, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree because on 1.3.1983 the suit stood transferred to the Court of the learned Special Judge. He relied on Mst. Yasmeen Night and others Vs. National Bank of Pakistan and others (P.L.D. 1988 S.C. 391).
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank submitted that the appeal was directed against an ing restoration and, therefore, the argument based on Ordinance II of 1983 was not relevant. He also submitted that the question now being raised was not raised either before the learned Civil Court or the learned Special Judge Banking. He also referred to a D.B. judgment of this Court in F.A.O. 14 of 1991, decided on 6.7.1994 in which the amending Ordinance of 1983 and the judgment in Mst. Yasmin Night's case supra came under consideration of this Court.
He next contended that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree.
6. As far as the ing restoration is concerned, no exception could be taken. The medical certificate by the private practitioner to justify the absence has been dis-believed by the learned Special Judge, Banking for the reasons recorded in para 6 of his judgment.
7. As far as, the objection of the learned counsel that the decree passed by the learned Civil Court was a nullity, the contention has no force in view of a D.B. judgment dated 6.7.1994 rendered in F.A.O. No. 14 of 1991 and other connected appeals, ln the said case, a number of execution applications were rejected by the learned Special Judge Banking on the ground that the decree was passed by the Civil Court after enforcement of Ordinance II of 1983. After taking into consideration the case of Yasmin Night and others \/s. National Bank of Pakistan and others (P.L.D.
1988 S.C. 391), National Bank of Pakistan Vs. Taj Muhammad (P.L.D. Lahore 417) and United Bank Ltd.
Vs. Mian Abdul Khaliq (P.L.D. 1988 Lahore 225), it was held that the judgments and decrees passed by the Civil Courts had become past and closed transactions and could not be re-opened, in view of the law laid down in Multiline Associates Vs. Ardeshir Cowarjee and others (1995 S.C.M.R. 362), the said judgment is binding on us and we respectfully follow it.
8. In view of the above, the appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed.