1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court, dated 30-7-1992, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed in limine.
2. ' Brief facts of the case are that the appellant claimed before the Rehabilitation Authorities and then the Additional Custodian that Shop No,143/1, situated in Lower Bazar, Muzaffarabad, in fact, was never allotted to respondent No,4 and, thus, the same should be allotted to him as he was not only entitled to the allotment on merits but has also been running business since the year 1960.
3. ' There has been protracted litigation between the parties before the Rehabilitation Authorities, the Multiple Judge and the Rent Controller. The detail of the said litigation need not be narrated here.
4. Suffice it to say, the claim of the appellant was rejected by the Rehabilitation Commissioner and the Additional Custodian holding that the shop in question was allotted to Khan Muhammad Usman, respondent, in the year 1955 who, subsequently reconstructed the same as it was not in good condition. The appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court seeking the declaration that the findings of the Rehabilitation Authorities and the Additional Custodian are without lawful authority. The learned Single Judge in the High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine holding that there are concurrent findings of the facts that the shop in question was validly allotted to respondent No,4 and there is no material on the record to disturb the said findings.
5. ' We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court did not appreciate the point that the findings of the Rehabilitation Authorities and the Additional Custodian are based on inadmissible evidence and, thus, the said can be corrected in exercise of writ jurisdiction as being ' an error in law'. The learned counsel has taken us through the impugned judgments of the Rehabilitation Commissioner and the Additional Custodian and maintained that the findings are based on photostat copies of various orders and, thus, can be rightly disturbed in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He has relied on the cases reported as Chief Election Commissioner v. Abdul Majid PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 120 and Muhammad Shafi Khan v. Ghulam Din (PLD 1992 SC (AJ&K) 58) in support of his contentions.
6. ' In reply, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel, for the respondents, has argued that the status of respondent No,4 as an allottee cannot be challenged because the appellant admitted himself to be the tenant of respondent No,4 in the ejectment proceedings initiated before the Rent Controller, a copy of which has. Been placed on the record in this Court. He has argued that one is not entitled to any relief by invoking the writ jurisdiction if he does not come with clean hands. He has submitted that even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the appellant has any case on merits, he cannot be permitted to argue that respondent No,4 was not a genuine allottee after accepting his title as such and paying the rent to him as his tenant. It may be observed here that the case of respondent No,4 is that he was validily allotted the shop in question in the year 1955 and subsequently he rented out the same to the appellant; initially the appellant had been paying the rent but subsequently he refused to pay the same. It is further the case of respondent No,4 that as the shop was in dilapidated condition, he reconstructed the same after obtaining due permission from the Custodian.
7. ' The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that in the proceedings for ejectment before the Rent Controller, the appellant admitted himself to be the tenant of respondent No,4 and took the stand that the respondent had refused to accept the rent two years prior to filing of the objections to the application for the ejectments. Thus, he has contended that after admitting the respondent's position as his landlord, he cannot deny his title in terms that he was not a valid allottee.
8. ' We have given our due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The attested copies of the judgments of the Rent Controller and that of the District Judge passed on appeal have been placed on the record of this Court by the respondent. The perusal of the judgment of the Rent Controller clearly shows that the appellant accepted before the Rent Controller that he was tenant under the respondent and had been paying rent to him but two years prior to filing of the objections to the application before the Rent Controller, the respondent himself had refused to accept the rent. Consequently, Issue No,1 had also been framed on the point. Thus, it is clear that the appellant admitted the title of the respondent to the shop in question before the Rent Controller. It is celebrated principle of law of writs that a person who seeks the remedy by invoking writ jurisdiction must come with clean hands. Thus, a person who admits the opposite-party as owner or allottee of an immovable property, cannot be, later on, permitted to take a contrary stand. Under Article 115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat which is corresponding to section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, a tenant of immovable property cannot be permitted to deny the title of the landlord at a subsequent stage. For the sake of convenience, Article 115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat is reproduced as under:-- "No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given."
9. ' The principle embodies in the above-cited provisions has been elaborated in cases reported as Indian Electric Works Ltd. v. Mrs. B.S. Mantosh (AIR 1956 Cal. 148) and B.K. Ghosh v. R.K. Jovsurendra Singh (AIR 1959 Manipur 27). In the former case it was observed that so long as the tenant holds the possession neither in the ejectment proceedings nor in any other action by the landlord he can be permitted to set up a superior title or plead that the landlord had no title. In the latter case it was observed that any action for use and occupation against a tenant who occupies the land as licence of another, the tenant cannot be allowed to call upon the landlord to show title under which he rented the property. This is not merely a technical rule but is based upon public convenience and policy.
10. It is evident that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the appellant has any case on merits, he cannot get any redress in exercise of writ jurisdiction in view of the principle enunciated above. As the appeal can be conveniently disposed of on this short ground, we need not dilate upon the other points raised at the Bar.
11. ' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal it is hereby dismissed with costs.