1. ' NAIMUDDIN, L-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution calls in question the decision dated 10-2-1977 passed by the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi respondent 1 on an appeal filed by the petitioners against the order dated 18-10-1976 passed by the 1st Sind Labour Court, Karachi, responi dent 2 on an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 19(9 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) filed by Mohammad Din, respondent 3.
2. ' The facts giving rise to this petition, briefly stated, are: Respondent 3 who was working as a matter in the Raschel Department of the petitioners' factory, was verbally ordered on 28-7.1975 by Mansoor Ahmed of the petitioner's factory not to come for duty from the following day. Therefore, on 6-8- 1975 respondent 3 sersed a grievance notice on the petitioners informing them of the aforesaid order of Mansoor Ahmed and further informed them that since 2Q-7.1975 he had been regularly visiting the factory's gate and the office at the Cloth Market but they were not allowing him to perform his duty and also avoiding to see him and be, therefore, requested the petitioners to issue an order for allowing him to perform duty and to give him compensation for the unemployed period.
3. ' However, the petitioners instead of meeting his request, by the letter dated 12-8.1975, informed bum that he was absenting from duty from 29-7-1975 and that his absence exceeded more than 10 days without leave. He was required to submit his explanation for his absence without leave within 2 days of the receipt of the letter. The petitioners by their another letter dated 20.8-1975 addressed to respondent 3 informal him that they had sent a charge-sheet dated 9-3-1975 and had decided to hold an enquiry and required him to appear along with his witnesses on 30-8-1975 at the factory premises. However, respondent 3 did not make any reply nor he attended the enquiry proceedings and accordingly the order of his dismissal was issued on 16-9-1975 after ex parte enquiry.
4. ' In the meantime on 28.8-1975 respondent 3 filed an application under section 2S-A of the Ordinance, being Application No, 933 of 1975, which was dismissed by respondent 2 by the order dated 18-10.1976 on the ground that the application filed on 28-8-1975 was premature as he was dismissed from service on 16-9-1975.
5. ' It may be mentioned here that before respondent 2, respondent 3 examined himself and Mohammad Ratique and Abdul Mennen. The petitioners filed affidavits of the Manager Zaheer Ashraf, Mansoor Ahmed, Sarwar Khan, their Chowkidar, denying the case set up by respondent 3 and they were cross-examined on behalf of respondent 3.
6. ' Aggrieved by this order respondent 3 went up in appeal before respondent I who allowed the same by the order impugned in this petition.
7. ' We have heard Mr. Abdus Samad Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, Advocate for respondent 3.
8. ' The learned Advocate for the petitioners has raised two fold contentions before us. His first contention is that the notice and the subsequent proceedings before the Appellate Court were premature as respondent 3's services were terminated on 16-9-1975 and that the order of the Tribunal is based on non-consideration of the material evidence available on record and therefore void.
9. ' As regards the first part of the first contention namely, respondent 3's application was premature, the submission is that respondent 3 was dis nissed from service on 16-9-1975 and he filed the application with respondent 2 on 28 -1975. However, the learned counsel agreed that the version of respondent 3 that he was ordered not to come on duty from 29 74975 and he was not allowed to perform his duties although he daily visited the factory gate and office premises, if true he had a grievance and according to the provisions of subsection (1) of section 25(A) of the Ordinance he was required to bring his grievance to the notice of the petitioners within a period of two months which he accordingly brought to the notice of the petitioner. We are therefore, unable to see how the notice was premature. As regards the second part of the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, he agrees that for the same reasons as mentioned above respondent 3 had a cause to approach respondent 2 under section 25 (A) of the Ordinance particularly, when the petitioners instead of removing him issued a show-cause notice alleging that he had remained absent from duty for more than 10 days. We therefore. Find no substance in the contention.
10. ' However, as regards the second contention that the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, respondent 1, has not considered the material evidence on record, we find substance in it. The learned oaunsel for the petitioners has pointed out that the petitioners had filed the affidavits of their Managers S. Zaheer Ashraf, Mansoor Ahmed, against whom it was alleged that he had asked respondent 3 not to attend his duty, and Sarwar Khan Chowkidar and they were cross-examined on these affidavits. However, their evidence was not considered by respondent 1. It is conceded by the learned Advocate for respondent 3 that this evidence was material although he seriously questions its veracity. However, a perusal of the impugned order of respondent I would shoo that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has not adverted in the order to this evidence which lends support to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the same has not been taken into consideration. It was necessary for the learned Tribunal to have referred to this evidence or at least the order should have shown that he took the same into consideration, for whatever worth it was and whether it was believable or not. Non-Consideration of a material piece of evidence in a judicial or quasi-judicial order is one of the recognised grounds for interference with such an order in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. See hist. Hajiran Sughra v. District Judge and Settlement Cmsmissioner, Hyderabad and others (1). In the matter the learned counsel for the parties agreed that this matter may be remanded to 00 Appellate Tribunal to pass fresh orders after applying its mind to the evidence of the aforesaid persons. We accordingly, set aside the order of respondent 1 and remand the case to it for reconsideration and for passing such order as it may deem fit and proper after taking into consideration the evidence of the aforesaid persons.
(1) 1969 SCMR 686