' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.---By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above five appeals which have been filed with the leave of this Court against common judgments all dated 31-1-1995 of a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 349 of 1990, 367 of 1990 450 of 1990, 624 of 1990 and 1382 of 1991 respectively, filed by the respondents, allowing the same as under:- "These petitions are allowed with costs and aforementioned objections of the respondents against the petitioners are set aside. The petitioners will be entitled to the benefits of the S.R.O. No,517(1)/89, dated 3-6-1989 as it was in force and in operation in terms of its application in the manner indicated in this judgment."
2. The brief facts are that of encourage the establishment of industries in Gadoon Amazai Industrial Estate, hereinafter referred to as the Gadoon Estate, and in order to discourage poppy cultivation and to provide alternate jobs, the appellants issued S.R.O.NO.517(1)/89 dated 3-6-1989, hereinafter referred to as the S.R.O., whereby such raw materials and components which were to be imported for the exclusive manufacture of goods by recognised industrial units located in the Gadoon Estate were exempted from the payment of customs duty and sales tax subject to the conditions contained therein. The S.R.O. Has been reproduced in toto in the judgment under appeal and, therefore, it is not necessary to reproduce the same.
' The respondent in Civil Appeal No,848 of 1995 established a unit in the Gadoon Estate for the manufacture of "Polyester Texturised Yarn" with the capacity of 1000 metric tons annually. The raw material imported for the said item was Pre Oriented Yarn (P.O.Y.). They applied to the Central Board of Revenue for the benefit of S.R.O., which was declined. After that they approached the High Court through Writ Petition No,349 of 1990, which was allowed.
' The respondent in Civil Appeal No,849 of 1995 established a unit in the Gadoon Estate to manufacture various kinds of paper products. The raw material used was paper in jumbo rolls.
They also approached the Central Board of Revenue for the benefit of the S.R.O. But they were also declined. Consequently, they filed Writ Petition No,367 of 1990, which was allowed as above.
' The respondent in Civil Appeal No,850 of 1995 also established a unit in the Gadoon Estate to manufacture Polyethylene Tubular Film and Plastic Buttons. The raw material .Used was Polyester Blanks and Chalk Blanks. Their request for availing of the benefit of S.R.O. Was also declined.
Thereupon, they filed Writ Petition No,450 of 1990, which was allowed as above.
' The respondent in Civil Appeal No,851 of 1995 also established a unit in Gadoon Estate for the manufacture of Polyester Texturised Yarn with the capacity of 600 metric tons. The raw material used was Pre-oriented or Partially Oriented Yarn (P.O.Y.). They also approached the Central Board of Revenue for the benefit of S.R.O. But the same was declined. Then they filed Writ Petition No,624 of 1990, which was allowed as above.
' The respondent in Civil Appeal No,852 of 1995 also established a unit in Gadoon Estate for manufacturing of aluminium doors and windows. The raw material used for the same was Aluminium Profiles, floor hinges, rivettes etc. They also applied for the benefit of S.R.O. Without any success. Then they filed Writ Petition No,1382 of 1991, which was allowed as above.
3. Mr. K.G. Saber, learned A.S.C. Appearing for the appellants, has vehemently contended that the learned Judges of the Division Bench were not justified in recording a finding of fact on the questions, whether the process of manufacturing used by them fell within the ambit of 'manufacture' referred to in the S.R.O., and whether the items for which the benefit of S.R.O. Was claimed as raw material fell within the ambit of the S.R.O.? According to him, the same were technical questions involving expertise knowledge and, thus, the High Court erred in holding that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of S.R.O. He has referred to the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and 2 others v. Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Ltd. (PLD 1991 SC 992) and the case of Deputy Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Lahore and 2 others v. Tyrex Pakistan (Ltd.), Lahore and another (PLD 1992 SC 364).
' Mr. Tanvir Bashir Ansari, learned Deputy Attorney-General, in response to the Court notice, has supported the submissions made by Mr. K.G. Saber but added that the word "exclusive" used in the S.R.O. Cannot be treated as redundant which has been done by the High Court. His further submission was that the fiscal statutes should be construed strictly. To reinforce the above submission he referred to the case of Messrs V.N. Lakhani & Company v. m.v. Lakatoi Express and 2 others (PLD 1994 SC 894).
' On the other hand, Mr. M. Sardar Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos.848, 850, 851 and 852 of 1992, has vehemently contended that since the Central Board of Revenue declined to grant the benefit of S.R.O. And as the Peshawar High Court in its earlier judgment in the case of Khawaja (International) Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Swabi v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax Division, Mardan and 2 others (PLD 1990 Peshawar 169) had already dealt with the above question and laid down the guidelines, it was open to the learned Judges of the Division Bench to have examined the aforementioned writ petitions in aforesaid terms. His further submission was that the construction placed by the department to the expression "such raw materials as are imported for the exclusive manufacture of goods" is not in accordance with the well-settled principle of interpretation. He also submitted that factually the Central Board of Revenue had granted this benefit to a number of other parties having similar units and producing some articles involving the use of raw materials like the one which were involved in the present appeals. To reinforce the above submission, he invited our attention to Para 8 of the High Court's judgment, which reads as under:- "(8) Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to other establishments who import paper and alter into paper sacks for storing in the cement, the imported sheets altered into corrugated sheets and stainless steel imported and converted into utensils and demonstrated the same in the Court which have been exempted from the Customs duty and Sales tax under the S.R.O.No,517(1)/89, dated 3-6-1989 and the petitioners are discriminated for no reasons or rhyme. Learned D.A.-G. And learned A.-G. Had no answer to the same. We need not decide or make observations in this respect as their cases are not pending hearing before US.
' Mr. M. Sardar Khan, besides relying upon the above two judgments of this Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and 2 others v. Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Ltd (supra) and in the case of Deputy Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs, Lahore and 2 others v, Tyrex Pakistan (Ltd.), Lahore and another (supra), has referred to the following cases:-
(i) Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyallpur v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad (PLD 1959 SC. (Pak.) 103);
(ii) Colony Textile Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore Zone, Lahore 1976 PTD 128;
(iii) Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Ltd., Karachi v. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Division No,2 Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1985 Karachi 126);
(iv) Khawaja (International) Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Swabi v. Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax Division, Mardan and 2 others (PLD 1990 Peshawar 169);
(v) The Deputy Commissioner Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. M/s. Pio Food Packers (AIR 1980 SC 1227);
(vi) Empire Industries Ltd. And others v Union of India and others (AIR 1986 SC 662);
(vii) Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1988 SC 2237); (viii)M/s Name Tulaman Manufacturers (Pvt.) Ltd., Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad (AIR 1989 SC 79);
(ix) The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. M/s. Coco Fibres (AIR 1991 SC 378);
(x) M/s Saraswa ti Sugar Mills v. Haryana State Board and others (AIR 1992 SC 224); and
(xi) Commissioner of Income-tax, Orissa and others v. M/s N.C. Budharaja & Company and another (AIR 1993 SC 2529). ' to demonstrate what constitutes the manufacturing process.
4. Mr. M. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned A.S.C. Appearing for the respondent in Civil Appeal No, 849 of 1995, besides adopting the arguments of Mr. M. Sardar Khan, has vehemently contended that in the present case the question, as to whether the respondent was involved in the manufacturing process, was adjudicated upon by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Northern Zone, Customs House, Lahore, in Appeal No,CE-180 of 1990 in relation to the issuance of L-1 Licence. He has referred to the case of Hirjan Salt Chemicals (Pak) Ltd. v. Union Council and others (1982 SCMR 522) and "Words and Phrases" Vol. 26 page 621, to demonstrate what is ' manufacture'.
5. Before touching upon the merits of the above contentions, it may be pertinent to point out that the S.R.O. Was rescinded on 9-5-1991 and, therefore, the dispute relates to the period up to the above date. The aforesaid rescission has been upheld inter alia by this Court.
6. In our view, it is not necessary to refer all the above judgments in detail. It was suffice to reproduce para. 6 of the judgment in the case of Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Ltd., Karachi v.
The Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Division No,II, Karachi and 2 others (supra), which reads as follows:- "6. From the above-cited cases, it is evident that the basic question in issue is, whether the process of pasting and cutting of the paper board is carried out with the object to complete the product or in other words, whether the carrying out of the above process results into a finished product marketable under a separate trade name. If. Paper board remains paper board in spite of the fact that two thin paper boards are pasted with each other to make it thicker or it is cut to bring it to the required size, in our view; the same remains paper board and not a different item warranting the levy of excise duty second time. It may be pointed out that in most of the above-cited cases, the levy of excise duty second time is held justifiable only if process of treatment brings about into existence a new marketable item, for the example coarse cloth is a separate marketable item, in contrast to refined cloth, tanned leather after carrying out the processes of bleaching and glazing result into a new marketable product and similarly assembling of various components of a vacuum flask results into an end product in the forms of vacuum flask. We are, therefore, of the view that the respondents have not dealt with the point in issue in its right perspective and have misconstrued the relevant provision of law. It is- not the case of the department that the process of pasting and cutting results into a new product. We are, therefore, of the view that the levy of the excise duty was not warranted by law."
' The author of the above judgment happened to be one of us (Ajmal Mian, C.J.). The aforesaid judgment was affirmed by this Court in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs and 2 others v. Orient Straw Board and Paper Mills Ltd. (supra), in which while construing section 2-F of the Central Excise and Salt Act, it has been held that the definition of 'manufacture' given therein will include any process incidental or ancillary for completing a manufactured article by any process so as to make it a finished product in all respects and shall fall with the fourcorners of the term "manufacture".
7, Reference may also be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Hirjan Salt Chemicals
(Pak) Ltd. v. Union Council and others (supra), in which the word "manufacture" has been defined as merely means the process of converting certain articles used as raw material by means of physical labour or mechanical power into different shapes or forms which alter forms to be used directly for consumption or by other manufacturing as raw material for making something else.
8. We may observe that there is nothing on record to indicate that the Central Board of Revenue while declining the respondents' aforesaid applications for the benefit of S.R.O. Had examined their cases in the light of what has been consistently 'held by the superior Courts as to the meaning of the word "manufacture" used in the S.R.O. In our view, that Central Board of Revenue was under an obligation to have allowed the respondents to place on record material to indicate that the process which they are carrying on in their units constitutes manufacturing process in terms of the S.R.O.
9. There is also no clear indication that how the words "exclusive manufacture" have been construed. The above words have seemingly been employed in the S.R.O. To connote that the items of raw material/components, which are to be imported and for which the benefit of the S.R.O. Is sought, should be exclusively used for manufacturing of the items for which they have been imported. They have nothing to do with the status or the stage or the condition of the imported raw material/components.
10. In our view, it was not proper on the part of the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court to have decided the above technical questions without getting first the decision of the Central Board of Revenue on the basis of the material which the parties might have produced before it in support of their claims. The High Court generally does not investigate disputed questions of fact in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. However, it can interfere with a finding of fact if it is founded on no evidence or is contrary to the evidence on record or the inferences drawn therefrom are not in accordance with law. We may refer to Mr. M. Aitzaz Ahsan's contention that the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs in his order dated 8-5-1990 had already adjudicated upon the question that the appellants were engaged in the process of manufacturing in terms of the S.R.O. This contention runs counter to the actual legal position. The above order of the Collector relates to the issuance of L-1 licence which has nothing to do with the question of benefit under the S.R.O. The Collector was mindful of the above fact and, therefore, in concluding para. Of the aforesaid order, he made the following observation: "It is made clear in unambiguous terms that grant of L-1 licence for manufacture of ascertained items in terms of Central Excise law shall have no relevance to the availability or otherwise of the concessions to the appellants in terms of S.R.O.No,517(1)/89, dated 3-6-1989. The said S.R.O.
Envisages its own mechanism for availing the concessions and the appellants shall have to satisfy the concerned authorities that they fulfil the prescribed conditions and that would certainly not depend on the issuance of L-1 licence only. Both the issues are completely independent of each other."
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that we would allow the aforementioned appeals; set aside the judgments under appeal and remand the cases to the Central Board of Revenue with the direction to decide the respondents' aforesaid applications for the benefit of S.R.O. Afresh after notice to them and after providing them opportunity to produce evidence in support of their claims. The Central Board of Revenue may also issue notice to the representative of the department. The matter shall be decided by the Central Board of Revenue within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The guarantees furnished by the respondents shall not be encashed till the decision on their applications for the benefit of S.R.O. But they shall keep the above guarantees validated till the decision on their applications. The appeals stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.