' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---We propose to dispose of the abovementioned two criminal appeals by a common judgment as they arise from the same impugned judgment. Criminal Appeal No, 84 of 1995 is filed by Amjad Mehmood while Criminal Appeal No, 119 of 1995 is filed by Shah Jehan and Farooq. The appellants in both the appeals were convicted under section 365-A, P.P.C., by the Special Court No,11, (Suppression of Terrorist Activities), Sargodha and awarded death penalty with fine of Rs,1,00,000 each and in default to suffer R.I. For 2 years. Their conviction under section 365-A, P.P.C., was upheld in appeal by the High Court but keeping in view their young ages, their death sentences were converted into life imprisonment with benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. And directing forfeiture of their properties maintained the sentence of fine. Leave was granted in these appeals to consider the following contentions:-- "3. The learned counsel for the petitioners in Petition No, 70-L of 1994 contended that the parties were known to each other, and therefore, it is highly unnatural and improbable that persons known to the victim will abduct him and release on receipt of ransom money. He further contended that there was a long delay in lodging the F.I.R., and the witnesses being interested their testimony ought to have been corroborated by cogent and clear evidence. It was also contended that recovery made by the police from the petitioners was illegal and not according to law, and therefore, it could not be relied upon and cannot be treated to be a corroborative piece of evidence.
4. Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Petition No,80-L of 1994 contended that P.W., Shahzad complainant has been disbelieved qua Muhammad Nawaz the acquitted accused, and therefore, there should have been some corroboration for his conviction.
He further contended that the recovery of Rs,16,982'could not form a corroborative evidence to support the conviction. According to the learned counsel the search carried out and the recovery shown is illegal and not according to law. He further contended that Din Muhammad the only independent person to prove the recovery was not examined nor Abdul Rasool A.S.I. Was examined.
The learned counsel contended that Muhammad Nawaz had been acquitted who had kept watch on the complainant and Amjad's case being at par with Nawaz there was no reasonable ground to convict him.
5. Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar contended that as the petitioner and the complainant have compromised the conviction should be set aside. He has shown us photo copy of the settlement but it has not been included in the record either in the High Court or in this Court. Leave is granted to consider these questions.
' From the record it seems that Muhammad Nawaz is alleged to have played partly the same role attributed to Amjad while Farooq son of Amin is alleged to have received ransom money. However, they have been acquitted. As the entire evidence. Has to be appraised let notice be issued to these two acquitted accused why their order of acquittal may not be set aside."
' We have heard Mr. Sardar M. Latif Khan Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court for appellants, Shah Jehan and Farooq, Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for appellant Amjid Mehmood and Mr. Javed Masood Bhatti, ASC for the State.
2. According to F.I.R. Which was lodged on 5-8-1991 at Police Station (P.S.) Jauharabad, District Khoshab, by Shahzad Ahmed (P.W.9), the complainant had appeared in B.A. Examination. On 26-7- 1991 at about 9 p.m. While the complainant was present in his house with his family members, someone called him from outside the house. He responded the call and went outside. He found Abid Chaudhry, who had called on him about 10 days before and told him that he (Abid Chaudhry) can arrange passing marks in his (complanant's) English paper, if he accompanied him. At that time complainant's father was also with him and they refused the offer. Abid Chaudhry, thereupon, left saying that they may consider the matter and he will call on them again. Abid Chaudhry, at that time, represented himself as a worker of Islami Jamiat Tulaba. Abid Chaudhry told the complainant at the gate that he had some friends with who are sitting in the car and if he could accompany him, he would introduce them to him. A maroon colour car was standing near the gate of complainant. When complainant approached the car with Abid Chaudhry, Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain, caste Kundan resident of Kundan, armed with revolver, was standing outside the car. He came running towards complainant and at pistol point forcibly pushed him inside the car where Shah Jehan son of Muhammad Younas, by caste Awan, resident of Kundan was already seated, who overpowered the complainant, blind folded him and also put tape over his mouth.
Shah Jehan and Farooq occupied seats on the two sides of the complainant on rear seat and Abid Chaudhry started driving the care. They threatened the complainant that if he raised alarm, they would kill him. The car travelled for about 1/1-2 hours and then stopped at an uninhabited 'Haveli' where Shah Jehan accused recorded the interview of complainant and enquired about the condition of his family. At that time the complainant came to know that the real name of Abid Chaudhry is Amjid son of Muhammad Hanif by caste 'Shaikh' resident of Rawalpindi. Shah Jehan and Amjid left, thereafter, leaving the complainant under the care of Muhammad Farooq. They asked Farooq to keep strong vigil over the complainant and they will release the complainant after taking ransom money from the father of complainant. The complainant was kept in confinement there until morning of 29-7-1991. During this period, the complainant was guarded by Farooq and another unknown person, whom he could identify on seeing. On 29-7-1991 at 3 a.m. Shah Jehan and Amjid came to the Haveli and put the complainant in a car and after driving for one hour, off loaded him by the side of road and threatened that if he raised any alarm or reported the matter to the police then the complainant and his family will be done to death. The complainant found Shahpur city stand nearby from where he took a bus and reached his house at Jauharabad. At his house, the complainant narrated the whole story to his father, his maternal uncle, Nasir Hayat and other relatives who were present in the house. The complainant's father then informed that the accused had demanded a sum of Rs,35 lacs for the release of complainant on telephone on the next day of his kidnapping and after protracted negotiation on telephone, the amount of ransom was fixed at Rs,2,00,000. Accordingly, as directed by the accused, the complainant's father went to the house of maternal uncle of complainant Muhammad Akram, with the ransom money where accused contacted him on telephone and told him to take the ransom amount to Rehmanabad Chowk, where a boy by the name Farooq son of Muhammad Amin on a red colour Kawasaki motor-cycle will come with the recorded cassette of the voice of complainant which the complainant's father was directed to receive after payment. The complainant's father accordingly delivered the ransom money of Rs,2 lacs to Farooq. The complainant's father was told by the accused that after payment of ransom amount, he should go back to his house where complainant will join him the next day. The complainant was kidnapped by the accused to receive ransom amount of Rs,2 lacs and was released after the ransom was paid. The complainant explained the delay in filing the F.I.R. By saying that for 5 days after his release, he had his family continued to receive threatening calls from the accused that in case he lodged the F.I.R., he and his family will suffer dire consequences. However, for the last two days these threatening calls were not received then he mustered up courage to lodge the F.I.R.
3. The police arrested all the accused and recorded part of ransom money from them and after usual investigation put up challan before the Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities). The trial Court convicted the appellants under section 365-A, P.P.C., and awarded them death sentence with fine of Rs,1,00,000 each and in default to undergo R.I. For two years. Accused Farooq son of Muhammad Amin was also convicted by the trial Court under section 365-A, P.P.C., read with section 120-B, P.P.C., and awarded death sentence with fine of Rs,1,00,000 and in default to undergo R.I. For 2 years. Out of fine a sum of Rs,2 lacs was ordered to be paid to the complainant by way of compensation. Out of the currency notes of the value of Rs,1,67,482 recovered from the accused, the trial Court directed that Rs,1,00,000 be returned to Malik Sarfraz while the remaining amount of Rs,67,482 was ordered to be forfeited to Government.
4. All the convicts preferred appeal against their conviction and sentences awarded by the trial Court. Malik Sarfraz also filed appeal against the order of the trial Court in so far it directed confiscation of Rs,67,482 by the State and claimed that this amount to be paid to him as part of the ransom money recovered from the accused. The complainant also filed revision challenging the acquittal of Muhammad Nawaz in the case.
5. A learned Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned order, allowed appeal of Farooq son of Muhammad Amin and acquitted him in the case. The appeal filed by Malik Sarfraz was also allowed and as the amount recovered from the accused was not claimed by them, the High Court directed that the sum of Rs,67,482 directed to be forfeited to the Government by the trial Court, be paid to Malik Sarfraz. The appeal filed by Shah Jehan, Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain and Amjid (appellants herein) was dismissed and their conviction under section 365-A, P.P.C., was maintained. However, death sentences awarded to them by the trial Court were converted into life imprisonment with benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. And their properties were ordered to be forfeited. Leave was obtained against the judgment of High Court as aforesaid.
6. Mr. Sardar Latif Khan Khosa, the learned Advocate Supreme Court has raised the following contentions in support of the appeal:-
(i) That there was inordinate delay in lodging the F.I.R. Which remained unexplained, and therefore, whole case was of a doubtful nature;
(ii) That the prosecution story is full of innumerable doubts and infirmities making it highly improbable that the incident took place in the manner suggested by the prosecution;
(iii) That the disclosure of the names of accused by the complainant with parentage and place of their respective residences was not only unnatural but supported by the defence theory that the matter was cooked up;
(iv) That the recovery of ransom money from the accused in the manner, it is described, is unbelievable and against the natural course of conduct;
(v) That the recovery of Rs,30 thousand from one accused bore no nexus with the ransom money which was said to be Rs,2,00,000;
(vi) That recovery of currency notes from the accused which are commonly available in the market, could not connect the accused with crime;
(vii) That the recovery of currency notes from the accused otherwise could not be relied upon as it was not made in accordance with the provisions of section 103, Cr.P.C. And (viii)That the plea raised by the appellants was consistent with the prosecution evidence, and therefore, benefit of doubt should have been extended to the appellants.
7. In addition to the above contentions of Mr Sardar Abdul Latif Khosa, the learned counsel for appellants Shah Jehan and Farooq, Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Amjid Mehmood, appellant, contended that his client was entitled to acquittal as the prosecution evidence was disbelieved by both the Courts below in respect of Muhammad Nawaz and the case of appellant Amjid being at par with that of Nawaz accused, he too should have been acquitted in the case. The learned counsel further contended that his client was not named in the F.I.R. And there was no reliable evidence on record to establish that Abid Chaudhry and Amjid Mehmood were the one and the same person, except the words of complainant whose evidence was not believed by the two Courts below in respect of two accused in the case namely, Nawaz and Farooq son of Amin. Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar lastly, contended that there was a compromise between the parties, and therefore, for this reason too, the appellants were entitled to acquittal in the case. In support of his last contention, the learned counsel relied on the Division Bench decision of Lahore High Court reported as Nazar Muhammad and others v. The State (1994 Pak. Cr.LJ 1829).
8. The prosecution case against the appellants mainly rests on the ocular testimony in the case and recovery of part of the ransom amount from the appellants. We will, however, first of all take up the case of two acquitted accused Muhammad Nawaz and Farooq son of Muhammad Amin, as at the time of grant of leave in the above appeals, this Court also directed issuance of notices to them to show cause why their acquittal should not be set side.
9. In the F.I.R., name of Muhammad Nawaz was not mentioned. The trial Court found identification parade of Muhammad Nawaz not confidence inspiring. It is also in the evidence that Muhammad Nawaz at the time of his identification parade, had objected to Khalid Mehmood, M.I.C. (P.W.1) that he was shown to the prosecution witnesses at the police station. The revision filed by the complainant against the acquittal of Muhammad Nawaz before the High Court was also not pressed. In these circumstances, we do not find any justification to interfere with the acquittal of Muhammad Nawaz, who was left off by the trial Court giving him the benefit of doubt.
10. In so far Farooq son of Muhammad Amin is concerned, the allegation against him was that he came on motor-cycle to collect the ransom of Rs,2,00,000 from Malik Sarfraz Khan and delivered him the cassette containing recorded statement of the complainant after receiving the ransom amount. There is no allegation that he was associated in the act of kidnapping the complainant or keeping him in confinement, after kidnapping. The High Court acquitted Farooq son of Amin on the following considerations:-- "11. The role of Farooq son of Amin appellant is that it was he who had come on the motor-cycle to Rehmandabad chowk, delivered the tape of the voice of Shehzad complainant and received the ransom money of Rs,2,00,000. Even if it be admitted that it was he who had come to receive the ransom money, we have no other evidence that he was in league and in conspiracy with his co- accused as to kidnapping for ransom. The charge under section 365-A read with section 120-B, P.P.C., therefore, cannot be said to be proved against him beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt."
' The above reasoning given by the High Court in acquitting Farooq son of Muhammad Amin are neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record. The complainant or the State has also not questioned the acquittal for Farooq son of Amin. We are, therefore, of the view that acquittal of Farooq son of Amin requires no interference by this Court.
11. We now take up the case of appellants. The learned counsel for the appellants firstly contended that the F.I.R. In the case was undully delayed which made the prosecution case doubtful. The trial Court found the explanation given by the complainant for not reporting the matter to the police earlier than 5-8-1991 as plausible as the complainant (P.W.9) was the only son of Malik Sarfraz Khan (P.W.8) who was receiving threats of dire consequences from the abductors from 27-7-1991 to 3-8-1991. The complainant was also extended similar threats by his abductor both at the time he was abducted and at the time of his release and even after that until 3-8-1991. P.W.8, therefore, was legitimately concerned more about the safety of his only son than to reporting the matter to the police. The F.I.R. Was lodged only after the return of complainant and when the threats by the abductors ceased to exist. The learned Judges of the High Court repelled the objection regarding delay in reporting the matter to the police, as follows:-- "It is in the statement of Malik Sarfraz that Shehzad was his only son. So, all the more anxiety to retrieve the son. Much stress has been laid that the F.I.R., has been delayed. But the circumstances for the delay have been well-explained by Sarfraz. It is in his statement that only when the threats on telephone were stopped for two days and he was pressed by the S.P. And the A.S.P. To report the matter them he reconciled himself to the idea of reporting the matter to the police. It seems that the complainant family were not inclined to report the matter and to let the things rest where they were but when pressed by the police the case was reported."
The reasons given by the two Courts below in accepting the explanation offered by the complainant for delay in reporting the matter to the police, in our opinion, do not suffer from any infirmity so as to justify interference by us.
12. Sardar Latif Khan Khosa, the learned counsel for Shah Jehan and Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain attempted to show that the involvement of Shah Jehan and Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain in the case was the result of a dispute regarding landed property between the families of complainant and the accused. We have not been impressed by the contention of learned counsel. According to Mr. Khosa, Mst. Naseem Akhtar, mother of accused Shah Jahan, is the only daughter of one Ahmad Khan, who is the real brother of Noor Muhammad. Noor Muhammad is married to sister of Ghulam Jillani (P.W.5) whose wife is the real sister of the wife of Malik Sarfraz (P.W.8). Ahmed Khan is said to have gifted all his property to his only daughter Naseem Akhtar which deprived Noor Muhammad to inherit from the property of Ahmed Khan on his demise and therefore, complainant family was aggrieved. We fail to understand how the complainant family which under no circumstances, could have inherited any share out of the properties of Ahmed Khan, felt aggrieved by the gift made by Ahmed Khan to her only daughter. The complainant family has no direct relationship either with the accused family or with Noor Muhammad, who is said to be aggrieved by the gift made by Ahmed Khan in favour of mother of the accused Shah Jehan. The contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the complainant family falsely involved Shah Jehan and Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain in the case because they felt aggrieved by the gift of properties made by Ahmed Khan in favour of the mother of Shah Jehan, accused, is therefore, devoid of any merit. The Courts below rightly rejected this contention of the appellant.
13. The three appellants were assigned specific roles in the abduction of the complainant. The part of ransom money was also recovered from them. The incident was reported to the police on 5-8- 1991. The S.H.O. Jauharabad, arrested appellant Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain from Katha Khoshab Chowk, on 6-8-1991 and on personal search recovered 60 currency notes of Rs,500 denomination each. The same day, Waqar Ahmed, S.I. Also arrested accused Shah Jehan and Farooq son of Amin in 'Nakabandi' in from of Police Station. Katha Sagral and recovered a brief case (P.11) containing Rs,1,17,000 (200 currency notes of Rs,500 denomination each, in two packets of 100 notes each (P.1/P.2) and 34 lose currency notes of Rs,500 denomination each (P.12/1-34) from Shah Jehan, Helmet (P.14) and motor-cycle (P.15) and Rs,3,500 from Farooq son of Amin (Seven currency notes of Rs,500 denomination each, P.13/1-7). Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain while in custody led to the recovery of Revolver (P.3) with three live cartridges (P.4/1-3) and a bandolier (P.5), Tape recorder (P.6), Bandage (P.7) from Haveli Kot Amir Chand. The same day, Amjid accused was produced before P.W.11, by one Asad Punoon and he was taken into custody. On personal search of Amjid accused a sum of Rs,16,982 (31 notes of Rs,500 denomination each, (P.16/1-31), 8 currency notes of Rs,100 each (P.17/1-8), four currency notes of Rs,50 each (P.18/1-4) 33 notes of Rs,10 each (P.19/1-33), 22 notes of Rs,5 each (P.20/1-22), five currency notes of Rs,2 each (P.21/1-5) and 32 currency notes of Re.1 each (P.22/1-32). On interrogation of Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain, Muhammad Nawaz was arrested by P.W.11 on 20-8-1991 and on 21-8-1991 he was sent to judicial lock-up.
14. P.W.5, Malik Ghulam Jillani, testified before the Court that on receiving information regarding abduction of Shehzad (P.W.9) he went to the house of Malik Sarfraz Khan (P.W.8) in the morning of 27-7-1991 and in his presence P.W.8 received telephone from abductors of P.W.9 After some negotiation, the abductors told P.W.8 that they would contact him again at 8 p.m. On 28-7-1991 P.W.8 tried to en cash the amount from National Saving Centre, Jauharabad, but could not get the same. P.W.8, therefore, requested the witness (P.W.5) to pay him a sum of Rs,2,10,000. P.W.5 accordingly withdrew a sum of Rs,2,10,000 from Mercantile Corporation, Khoshab, which consisted of 4 packets of hundred notes each of Rs,500 denomination and ten notes of Rs,1,000 denomination and made over to P.W.B. The four packets of 100 notes of 500 denomination each carried the stamp of Mercantile Corporation. The witnesses identified the two packets, P.1 and P.2, recovered from Shah Jehan in Court as the same notes which were handed over to him by Mercantile Corporation and which he handed over to P.W.8, P.W.S. Was subjected to lengthy cross-examination to establish some kind of dispute relating to landed properties between him and father of Shah Jehan accused but he denied. Similarly, his testimony regarding his claim that the money recovered from accused Shah Jehan was the same which he received from Mercantile Corporation and he gave it to P.W.8, remained unshaken. The prosecution story was also fully supported by the evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.9. The evidence of these two witnesses read as a whole was consistent and the minor contradictions pointed out in their evidence by the learned counsel for the appellants were insignificant. The evidence of P.W.8 and P.W.9 found substantial corroboration from the evidence of P.W.5 and other witnesses in the case, besides recovery of the part of ransom money from the appellants. Nothing could be brought on record to show that the prosecution witnesses had any motive to involve the appellants in the case falsely.
15. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the learned, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Amjid Mehmood has, however, contended that the case of Amjid Mehmood appellant being at par with that of acquitted accused Muhammad Nawaz and Farooq son of Muhammad Amin, the appellant was also entitled to acquittal in the case. We are unable to accept the contention. Muhammad Nawaz was acquitted in the case as his name was not mentioned in the F.I.R., and the identification parade held in the case was not found confidence inspiring. Muhammad Nawaz was only assigned the role of guarding the complainant with Farooq son of Ghulam Hussain when he was kept at the Haveli.
Besides this, no other role was assigned to him. Amjid Mehmood on the contrary was involved in the act of kidnapping from the beginning and he remained associated till the end. Similarly, Farooq son of Muhammad Amin was assigned the role of only receiving the ransom money passing on the cassette containing the recorded voice of complainant to P.W.8 The High Court found that besides this, no evidence was led to show complicity of Farooq son of Muhammad Amin in the case.
Therefore, case of Farooq son of Amin was also distinguishable from the case of Amjid Mehmood.
16. The next contention of Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar, is that there is no satisfactory evidence on record to establish that Abid Chaudhry, who was named in the F.I.R. As the person who participated in the kidnapping of P.W.9 alongwith others, is the same person as Amjid Mehmood. This contention too is not correct. P.W.8 had identified Amjid Mehmood as Abid Chaudhry and categorically stated that during his confinement at 'Haveli' he came to know that Abid Chaudhry was in fact Amjid Mehmood. This statement of P.W.9 could not be discredited in cross-examination. Amjid Mehmood was also identified by the father of abductee, Malik Sarfaz Khan (P.W.8) as the person who came to meet his son (P.W.9) ten days before the incident and introduced himself as Abid Chaudhry.
Therefore, in so far the identity of the accused Amjid Mehmood was concerned, there was neither any confusion nor any ambiguity. However, with regard to the correct name of accused Amjid Mehmood the explanation offered by P.W.8 was found satisfactory and convincing by the two Courts below and we find no reason in the absence of any misreading of evidence by the Courts below to take a contrary view. The learned counsel was unable to point out any material from the record before us which would have justified the inference that the complainant or his father (P.W.8 and P.W.9, respectively) had any motive against Amjid to involve him falsely in the case. Mr. Raja Muhammad Anwar also contended that there was compromise between the parties, and therefore, the appellants are entitled to acquittal on this ground alone.
17. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants that offence under section 365-A, P.P.C., is not compoundable. Since the offence is not compoundable, the compromise between the parties could not affect the culpability of the offence. However, the compromise may be taken as a mitigating circumstances for awarding lesser punishment in the case. The learned counsel relying on a Division Bench decision of Lahore High Court reported as Nazar Muhammad and others v.
State (1992 Pakistan Criminal Law Journal 1829) prayed that the sentence of the appellants be reduced to the period already undergone by the appellants. The learned counsel contended that punishment prescribed under section 365-A, P.P.C., is death or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years and shall not be less than three years, and shall also be liable to fine. It is contended that the High Court, therefore, could not award the sentence of life imprisonment while converting the death sentences of appellants into imprisonment for life. The book referred by the learned counsel for the appellants did not correctly reproduce the provisions of section 365-A, P.P.C., as they stood since March 1991 in the Statute. This fact was perhaps also overlooked by the High Court in the case of Nazar Muhammad (supra) when the Court reduced the life imprisonment awarded to the accused in that case to the period of imprisonment already undergone. The correct legal position is that section 365-A was introduced in the Penal Code after section 365, P.P.C., by Ordinance No,XVIII of 1988 promulgated on 13-10-1988. The original section 365-A, P.P.C., reads as follows:-- "365-A. Kidnapping or abduction for extorting property, valuable security etc.- -Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person for the purpose of extoring from the person kidnapped or abducted, or from any person interested in the person kidnapped or abducted, any property, whether movable or immovable, or valuable security, or to compel any person to comply with any other demand, whether in cash or otherwise, for obtaining release of the person kidnapped or abducted, shall be punished with death or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years and shall not be less than three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
' It appears that the above Ordinance No,XVIII of 1988 was not laid before the Assembly as required by Article 89 of the Constitution, and therefore, it lapsed. Thereafter, by Ordinance IX of 1989 promulgated on 3-9-1989 the following section 365-A was added after section 365:-- "365-A. Kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc.- -Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person for the purpose of extorting from the person kidnapped or abducted, or from any person interested in the person kidnapped or abducted, any property, whether movable or immovable or valuable security, or to compel any person to comply with any other demand, whether in cash or otherwise, for obtaining release of the person kidnapped or abducted, shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to forfeiture of property."
18. Ordinance IX of 1989 was converted into Act III of 1990 which was published in the Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinary, dated January 8,1990 which maintained the provision of section 365-A, P.P.C., in the same form as enacted by Ordinance IX of 1989.
19. By Act II of 1991 promulgated on March 28, 1991 section 365-A, P.P.C., was further amended by inserting the words "death or" in the section after the words "punished with". Therefore, the present section 365-A reads as follows:-- "365-A Kidnapping or abduction for extorting property, valuable security, etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person for the purpose of extoring from the person kidnapped or abducted, or from any person interested in the person kidnapped or abducted, any property, whether movable or immovable, or valuable security, or to compel any person to comply with any other demand, whether in cash or otherwise, for obtaining release of the person kidnapped or abducted, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to forfeiture of property."
20. It is, therefore, quite clear that under the present section 365-A, P.P.C., which came into effect from 28-12-1991 the punishment for abduction for ransom is death or imprisonment for life and forfeiture of property. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, while substituting the death sentence awarded to the appellants by the trial Court, rightly substituted the punishment for imprisonment for life and forfeiture of the property of the appellants with benefit of scction 382-B, Cr.P.C., No case for interference with the order of High Court is made out. The appeals are accordingly, dismissed.