' SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA, J.---The services of Mr. Ali Gohar son of Abdul Qayyum Khan Sales Officer, Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited were terminated by an order dated 24-2-1997 which happens to be challenged before this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution; against Managing Director, Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited, Lahore, Regional Manager, Peshawar and Chief Sales Officer, Peshawar.
2. The short history of the petitioner's service is that he was appointed as Sales Officer on 12-2-1996 the charge whereof he took over on 25-2-1996. Required to be on probation for one year and having remained on probation, his services were terminated on the last date of his probation on the ground that "his performance during probationary period had not been satisfactory".
3. Mr. Samiullah Jan, learned counsel for the petitioner claimed at the very outset that the employment of the petitioner fell within the ambit of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act LIII of 1952 and that the employer could not discontinue the employment of the petitioner without reasonable excuse and that, if so done, it constitutes an offence under section 5 of the Act aforesaid. The learned counsel added that the petitioner was removed from service without any notice.
4. Mr. Saleem Baig, learned counsel for the respondents-company, contended that under section 3 of the aforesaid Act, no service can be deemed as Essential Service unless a notification by The Federal Government is issued to that effect. He stated at the Bar that no notification exists in the field to the effect that the service of Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines Limited is an Essential Service at the moment, was so on the date of the passage of the impugned order and ever had been after 1993-
95. This challenge at the Bar' was not met and no notification could be shown by the learned counsel for. The petitioner, having ever been issued under section 3 of the Act declaring the service of the Company to be Essential Service at least during the period of termination order. The question of Essential Service is, therefore, not very material.
5. It was further alleged that there was a specific charge leveled against the petitioner that his service during probationary period was not satisfactory and thus in the presence of a charge, the issuance of notice before termination was an essential legal requirement. It was also added that the charge leveled against the petitioner amounted to be misconduct and so also, the issuance of notice was mandatory. Capt. Muhammad Azhar v. Commissioner of Karachi etc. (PLD 1966 SC 253) was relied upon by the learned counsel in support of the argument that on charge of a misconduct even the services of a temporary employee could not be terminated unless a notice is given to the employee. In the aforesaid case the service of the employee therein was temporary and terminable at 15 days' notice yet the issuance of show-cause notice was considered necessary because the service was going to be terminated on grounds of misconduct.
6. A close appreciation of the case would indicate that the removal does not fall within the mischief of misconduct. It is nowhere mentioned in the order of termination that the petitioner had ever been guilty of misconduct. The simple reason was that during probationary period his performance was not satisfactory. Whether someone's service being not satisfactory is a misconduct or whether it operates as a stigma on his career, we are of the view that it does not.
The services of the petitioner could have been terminated any time without assigning any reason during his probationary period and satisfaction of the employer remains always the ultimate consideration for retention in service beyond the period of probation. When the performance is not satisfactory, the services can be terminated without notice. The very purpose of probationary period is to assess the performance of an employee during a specified period in which the service remains purely temporary.
7. We have already noticed that there has been no charge of misconduct against the petitioner.
The only reason for his removal was the unsatisfactory performance. Such performance is not a stigma on the career of an employee and there is a plenty of case-law where the issuance of notice was considered not necessary, (1991 SCMR 1998). A probationer is taken into service subject to the ultimate satisfaction of the employer for which a period is fixed to keep his performance under observation. No show-cause notice is, therefore, necessary before termination of the service of a probationer unless it is on the charge of misconduct or on the basis of some serious allegations for which the employee must be given an opportunity of being head. In the instant case no such situation is involved.
8. The last defense taken by the learned counsel for the respondents was that Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines is a limited Company wherein the terms and conditions of service of an employee are not governed by statutory rules and hence the relationship between them is that of master and servant and no remedy could be sought through the writ jurisdiction of a High Court. The learned counsel relied upon (PLD 1984 SC 170), (1971 SCMR 568), (PLD 1992 SC 531), (1993 SCMR 346) and (1995 CLC 1662).
9. From the memorandum and articles of association of the company it appears beyond doubt that the affairs of the company are governed by a Board of Directors and the company cannot be subjected to any interference by the Federal Government except for regulatory control and except for the share of the Federal Government and that too to the extent of 36%. The company is a creation of statute but it does not have any statutory rules specially to regulate the affairs of the employees and to determine the terms and conditions of their service. It brings us to two conclusions. Firstly, that the employment of the petitioner was contractual and secondly, that the relationship of master and servant existed between the employer and the employee.
10. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are constrained to observe that no indulgence should be shown by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution especially when the termination was ordered on the basis of unsatisfactory performance and that too during probationary period. The writ petition is hereby dismissed in limine along with C.M. No, 397 of 1997.
1998 PLC (C.S.) 832 [Lahore High Court] Before Karamat Nazir Bhandari, J MUHAMMAD AKRAM TAHIR versus SECRETARY EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB, LAHORE and others Writ Petition No, 23307 of 1997, decided on 16th April, 1998. (a) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----S. 9---Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966, R. 19---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.
240, 199 & 212---Transfer and posting of civil servants---Interference or exerting influence by M.N.As./M.P.As./ Ministers/Chief Minister/representatives and office-bearers of ruling political party for transfers and postings of civil servants was not only prohibited but any such person interfering in such matters would be subverting provisions of law and such subversion would render him liable to be disqualified-- Competent Authority is to ignore such interference and influence and must act in accordance with dictates of law. [p. 835] A
(b) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VDT of 1974)- ----S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 199 & 212---Transfer of civil servants---Jurisdiction- --Question of transfer/posting being matter pertaining to terms and conditions of service, even in cases where transfer had taken place under the influence/dictation of M.N.As./M.P.As., bar contained under Art. 212(2) of the Constitution, would remain intact---High Court, thus, would have no jurisdiction in matter pertaining to transfer/posting of civil servants. [p. 836] B Zahid Akhtar v.
Government of Punjab and others PLD 1995 SC 530; Muhammad Anis and others v. Abdul Haseeb and others PLD 1994 SC 539; Province of the Punjab through Secretary Health Department v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari PLD 1997 SC 351; Miss Rukhsana Ijaz v. Secretary Education, Punjab and others 1997 SCMR 167 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 121; Ayyaz Anjum v. Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department and others 1997 SCMR 169 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 123; Hafiz Khalid Irshad v.
Ahmad Khan Wattoo and others 1997 SCMR 1124; Malik Irshad Ahmad v. The Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore and others 1994 PLC (C.S.) 836; Mst. Naseem Saddique v. District Education Officer (W)
Sahiwal and others '1991 MLD 2214; Muhammad Shafique v. Director Education (S.E.) and others 1997 PLC (C.S.) 197; Munshi Muhammad Azam v. A.C. And others 1996 PLC (C.S.) 415 and Pir Sabir Shah v.
Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1994 SC 738 rel.
(c) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)- ----S. 9---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 199 & 212---Jurisdiction of High Court in matters relating to transfers/postings---Article 199 was subject to other provisions of the Constitution including Art. 212 of the Constitution---Where Constitution had barred jurisdiction of High Court by another provision of the Constitution, High Court could not assume that 4urisdiction---Remedy having been provided by the Constitution in terms of Art. 212, petitioners must seek the same by invoking jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. [p. 837] C .
Ikram-ud-Din Khan for Petitioner.
Khawaja Muhammad Sharif, Advocate-General, Punjab assisted by Muhammad Amin Lone, Assistant A.-G. Punjab, Ch. Abdur Rashid Munan and Muhammad Amir Sohail for Respondents.
Syed Faiz-ul-Hassan Naqvi for Respondent No, 3.
Date of hearing: 6th April, 1998.
' This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 23307, 22789, 25041, 28021, 27898, 27746, 28199, 27944,28133, 28235, 28369, 28898, 28851, 28852, 29319 of 1997, 379 of 1998, 28065 of 1997, 721, 487, 457, 1279, 906, 920, 734, 546, 703, 1040, 1168, 1633, 1843, 2218, 2325 of 1998, 29095 2485 of 1997, 2609, 2803, 2808, 2856, 3169, 3180, 3759, 3508, 3747, 4328, 5123 of 1998, 28342, 24100 of 1997, 22764 of 1997, 5699, 6197, 4909, 4872 of 1998 and 28122 of 1997 as the common question of law is involved.
2. In all these petitions the petitioners are admittedly civil servants and are aggrieved against the orders of their transfer/posting. The major ground of attack on the validity of the orders in that the same has been passed not in the exigency of service nor for the purpose of the relevant law like Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 read with the relevant rules/instructions/policy but for appeasing the M.N.As/M.P.As./Ministers/Chief Minister/Local Office-Bearers of the ruling party namely Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group). It is stated that the impugned orders are rendered void in these circumstances and such void and dishonest orders can be validly challenged 'in the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the Establishment of Service Tribunal under Article 212(1) of the Constitution and the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution. Most of the cases relate to the Education Department of the Province of Punjab and majority of the petitioners are primary school teachers. To support plea of political interference, the petitioners have annexed copy of the writing/letter from the M.N.A./M.P.A. Etc. Under the orders of the Court all such M.N.As./M.P.As. Were impleaded as parties so that they could show to the Court the writing was or was not in their hands and they enjoyed the authority in law to issue such directions either, written or oral.
3. In some of the cases the affected Government servants impleaded as party filed reply contested the maintainability of the petitions and further justifying the passing of the impugned orders on merits. Some of such affected parties got themselves impleaded by applying. Learned Advocate- General also entered appearance to assist this Court on important question of law.
4. The first question to be decided is whether the M.N.As./M.P.As/Ministers/Chief Minister/representatives and office-bearers of the ruling political party can inter fere influence the transfer and placing of posting of the civil servants. The next question is what is the effect of such interference? Whether the order would be illegal and irregular, liable to be challenged in the Service Tribunal or such an order would be void and coram non juice inviting action under Article 199 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the bar contained in Article 212 of the Constitution?
5. Neither the learned Advocate-General nor learned A.A.-G. And nor 6.
7. Any other learned counsel appearing from the respondents side has attempted to justify interference by M.N.As/M.P.As. Etc. In the matter of transfer and place of posting of the civil servants.
In few cases where M.N. As./M.P.As. Were represented, even their learned counsel did not attempt to justify the interference. I have on my own attempted to survey the provisions of the Constitution and the other relevant laws and I have not been able to notice any provision which would directly or even in directly authorise the members of the Parliament or Provincial Assembly to intermeddle in such matters. In fact in the working of the relevant Service Laws, such Members are not even mentioned much less being conferred any power. The position is in fact to the contrary. Under Rule 19 of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966, a Government servant has been prohibited from directly or indirectly approaching any Member of the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly or any other non-official person to intervene on his behalf in any matter. Logically therefore, any interference by Members of National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly or any other non-official person like office-bearer or a representative of the ruling political party will have to be deemed to be prohibited. In fact I would go further and hold that any such Member or non-Official person interfering in these matter will be subverting the provisions of law and such subversion may render him liable to be disqualified. The State of Pakistan is governed according to Constitution and fixed set of rules and no person much less representatives of the people can assume themselves the power to act against such set of rules and the Constitution. I, therefore, conclude that interference in all these petitions by the respondents-M.N.As/M.P.As/non-Official persons like officer-bearers of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) is without legal sanction. The competent Authority ought to have ignored the same and in blindly following the dictates of the M.N.As/M.P.As.
Etc. They have not served the purpose of law nor have worked for the rule of law.
6. This takes me to the next question regarding the maintainability of these petitions. It has vehemently been contended by learned Advocate-General/A.A.-G. That in spite of interference by M.N.As./M.P.As. The aggrieved person will have to approach the Service Tribunal for redressed and not to this Court. Reliance of course is placed on Article 212, in particular sub-Article (2) which ousted the jurisdiction of all other Courts in matters which fall to be determined by the Service Tribunal. It is emphasised that the question of transfer/posting is a matter pertaining to the terms and conditions of the civil servants and in view of the fact that Service Tribunal in Punjab is working, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 212(2) of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on a large number of cases including Zahid Akhtar v. Government of Punjab etc. (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 530), Muhammad Anis and others v. Abdul Haseeb and others (PLD 1994 Supreme Court 539), Province of the Punjab through Secretary Health Department v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 351), Miss Rukhsana Ijaz v. Secretary Education, Punjab and others (1997 SCMR 167 = 1997 PLC (C.S. 121), Ayyaz Anjum v. Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department etc, (1997 SCMR 169 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 123) and Hafiz Khalid Irshad v. Ahmad Khan Wattoo and others (1997 SCMR 1124). Reliance is further placed on through Single Bench judgments of this Court, namely, Malik Irshad Ahmad v. The Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore etc., 1994 PLC (C.S.) 836; Mst. Naseem Saddique v. District Education Officer (W) Sahiwal etc. (1991 MLD 2214); Muhammad Shafique v. Director Education (S.E.) etc. (1997 PLC (C.S.) 197). Reliance is also placed on D.B. Judgment of this Court reported as Munshi Muhammad Azam v. A.C. Etc. (1996 PLC (C.S.)
415). On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have mainly relied on the case of Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1994 SC i38). It has been strenuously urged that in cases of absence of jurisdiction, coram non judice and mala fide, this Court retains power of judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution notwithstanding the ouster clause like Article 212(2) of the Constitution.
7. The review and analysis of the cited case law leads me to the inference that the pre-ponderance of view is that even in cases where transfer B has taken place under the influence/dictation of M.N.As./M.P.As. Etc., the bar contained under Article 212(2) of the Constitution remains intact. In Mst.
Naseem Saddique v. District Education Officer (W), Sahiwal etc. (1991 MLD 2214), the learned Single Judge of this Court extensively reviewed the legal position and came to the conclusion that the petitions were not maintainable. This was also the view taken by a D.B. Of this Court in Munshi Muhammad Azam v. A.C. Etc. (1996 PLC (C.S.) 415). In the judgment reported as Hafiz Khalid Irshad v. Ahmad Khan Wattoo (1997 SCMR 1124), it was urged in the Constitutional petition that the transfer of the petitioners-civil servants was cancelled at the behest of M.N.A., who had no jurisdiction in the matter. This Court admitted the petition to regular hearing and suspended the impugned order.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court converted the petition for leave to appeal into an appeal and allowed the same by holding that the High Court must first decide the question of its jurisdiction in view of Article 212(2) of the Constitution. This was also the view taken in Miss Rukhsana Ijaz v. Secretary, Education Punjab and others (1997 SCMR 167 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 121) and Ayaz Anjum v. Punjab (1997 SCMR 169 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 123).
8. The above analysis almost clinches the issue as regards the maintainability of these petitions.
The statement of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on this Court. I am further bound by the view taken by the learned D.B. Of this Court in Munshi Muhammad Azam v. A.C. Etc. 1996 PLC (C.S.) 415. Some of the learned counsel for the petitioner have, however, urged this Court not to ignore the reality that such interference is mostly whimsical and arbitrary and if the remedy of approaching this Court is also barred, it will lead to tyranny aS petty civil servants like P.T.C.
Teachers will be thrown at the mercy of the M.N.As. And M.P.As. To fortify the arguments, it has been pointed out that in some cases such teachers have been posted at a distance of some 50 to 100 K.Ms: away from their homes and if they were to suffer such postings, the entire pay will be consumed in meeting the transportation charges. It is emphasized that this Court must maintain a check on such arbitrary, whimsical and void transfer which cannot be said to be countenanced under law.
9. The argument is quite appealing. However, there are difficulties in accepting the same. As noted, the issue seems to have been settled by the Supreme Court and D.B. Judgments and sitting in Single Bench I am bound to follow the same. It is also well-settled that the provisions of the Constitution have to be given effect to. Article 199 is subject to other provisions of the Constitution and Article 212 is one such provision. If the Constitution bars jurisdiction of this Court under Article 212(2), it cannot be assumed by this Court on premises that denial of jurisdiction will lead to oppression and arbitrariness. It is for the law maker to attend to such arguments. In any case the petitioners and other aggrieved civil servants will not be without any remedy. The remedy is provided by the Constitution and it is available in the shape of a Service Tribunal.
10. For the above reasons all these petitions will have to be dismissed as not maintainable. I order accordingly. The parties will bear their own costs.