' The relevant facts for the decision of this Constitutional petition are that the vehicle of the petitioner was seized. The respondent No,1 after adjudication vide order, dated 15-10-1996 gave the petitioner an option to redeem the vehicle on payment of redemption fine equal to 100% of the value of vehicle in addition to payment of duties and taxes leviable thereon. The petitioner filed an appeal with the Collector of Customs (Appeals) Central Zone, Lahore. The same was dismissed on 21-1-1997, which order was assailed before the Customs, Central Excise and Sales Taxes, Appellate Tribunal. The appeal was partially accepted by the judgment, dated 17-12-1997 with the result that the redemption fine was reduced to 30%. The order has been assailed by the department through an appeal in this Court. In the meanwhile respondent No,3 issued instructions on 24-10-1997, according to which the Customs Authorities were informed that C.G.O. 4 of 1993, was not applicable to smuggled vehicle. The petitioner has challenged these instructions through this Constitutional petition, which came up for limine hearing on 25-2-1998, when it was admitted for hearing and notices were issued to the respondents, who are represented by Mr. A. Karim Malik, Advocate.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the instructions were violative of sections 25 and 80 of the Customs, Act, read with C.G.O. 4 of 1993, and concession granted by the C.G.O. 4 of 1993 could not have been withdrawn through this executive order. It is added, that the redemption order for the vehicle of the petitioner was passed long before the issuance of these instructions, therefore, the same are not applicable to the case of the petitioner.
3. The learned counsel for the department submitted that the C.G.O. 4 of 1993 was only applicable to the vehicle imported and not to the smuggled vehicle. It is added that respondent No,1 vide order, dated 15-10-1996 only decided the question of imposition of the fine and did not proceed with the assessm ent of the duty which is to be made now. It is added that the impugned instructions, dated 24-10-1997 are simply clarification and not withdrawal of any concession granted by C.G.O. 4 of 1993.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record and various provisions. The C.G.O. No,4 of 1993 notified on 7-7-1993 reads as under:--- "In supersession of Customs General Order No,6 of 1979 and all previous orders issued on the subject, the Central Board of Revenue is pleased to pass the following orders for the assessment of vehicles imported into Pakistan:---
(1) Definitions:
(i) 'Vehicles' for the purposes of these orders shall mean all vehicles falling in Chapter 87 of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969.
(ii) 'F.O.B. Value' means the value certified by the manufacturer to be the price applicable to a particular vehicle at the time of its manufacture and shall include the agent's commission.
(2) Depreciation on used vehicles.
(a) The F.O.B. Value of second hand vehicles (except motor cars of engine capacity up to 1800-CC) shall be depreciated at the following rates, subject to a maximum of 50%:---
(i) 4% per month for the first 3 months.
(ii) 2% per month for the subsequent months.
(b) The F.O.B. Value of motor cars of engine capacity up to 1800-CC shall be depreciated @ 10% per month subject to a maximum of 25%.
(c) A fraction of a month shall count as one complete month if consisting of 15 or more days, and shall be ignored if consisting of less than 15 days.
(d) The above depreciation shall be allowed for the period between the first registration abroad and the date of shipment (in case of vehicles imported through a Customs port) or the date of entry into Pakistan (in case of vehicles imported through a land Customs station).
(e) The date of first registration abroad shall be determined from the registration book or a certificate issued in lieu of the registration book. In case of loss of documents, the Depreciation shall be calculated from the 1st day of January of the year subsequent to the manufacture of the vehicle.
5. It is clear from the portion underlined of the opening paragraph, clause (2) and particularly sub- paras. (c) and (d) that the C.G.O. Is applicable only to the imported vehicle not the vehicle smuggled into Pakistan. This is not all. The impugned letter, dated 24-10-1997 is only clarification of the C.G.O. No,4 of 1993 and it cannot be any stretch of imagination, be spelled out that through this letter the concession granted by C.G.O. No,4 has been withdrawn.
6. It is clear from the above discussion that in the first instance the question of imposition of fine was only decided vide order, dated 15-10-1996. This is not solitary instance but in score of cases the same procedure was followed. This not only caused inordinate delay in the recovery of Government revenue in the shape of fine etc. But it also multiplied the litigation on account of which on one hand agony of the citizens was prolonged while on the other hand department has to spend huge amount on defending this litigation. This is criminal wastage of time and money.
This practice in legal parlance is called as 'piece meal' or ' fragmentary' decisions'. The same was always deprecated by the Superior Courts. The respondent No,1 should have imposed the fine and proceeded to assess the duty vide order, dated 15-10-1996. This way he could have avoided another round of litigation which is now to follow after he makes the assessment of duty etc. In this behalf I may refer to the cases reported as Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1975 Supreme Court 457), Bashir Ahmad and 8 others v. Aftab Ahmad and 2 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 1433) and Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali and 4 others (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 629). The relevant portion of the judgment in case of Ibrahim reads as under:--- "Reference has been made to these dates to underline the unfortunate fact that it has taken almost 10 years to bring the matter to this Court for its decision on a purely preliminary point, leaving the main controversy about the liability on the respondent for ejectment to be determined in the fresh round of litigation between the parties. Fragmentary decisions of this character have been described by their Lordship of the Privy Council in Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh AIR 1931 PC 33 "as most inconvenient (which tend to delay administration of justice").
It is duty of C.B.R. The respondent, to ensure that this practice of piece meal adjudication is stopped at once.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed with no order as to costs.