MUHAMMAD ASLAM, MEMBER-I.- The appellant, Miss Huma Naseeb, L/SI has appealed against the order dated 28.6.1994, received by her on 29.11.1994, whereby her representation for confirmation as S.I. w.e.f. 15.6.1985, the date of her appointment, and for further promotion was rejected. The instant appeal was filed on 13.12.1994.
2. The appellant has submitted that she qualified the prescribed training course and was placed at Sr. No. 8; that she had been granted 57 commendation certificates alongwith cash awards and had been reported well in the ACRs but was confirmed as L/SI w.e.f. 24.5.1992 instead of 15.6.1985, the date of her initial appointment, vide orders dated 24.5.1992 passed by respondent No. 2; that the order of rejection of her representation is not a speaking order and therefore, independent mind has not been applied to the fats and circumstances of her case; that the impugned order is violative of principles of natural justice as she had not been given opportunity of personal hearing before her representation was rejected; that her initial appointment not being an ad hoc appointment is to be considered as probation, therefore, the date of confirmation on successful completion of probation is to be the date of initial appointment and not any other presumptive date as she had fulfilled the condition of qualifying the prescribed training course; that the case of her confirmation was first considered in 1990 but was deferred due to nonavailability of ACRs for which the appellant was not responsible; that a number of persons were promoted as SI on 1.7.1985, later than the appointment of the appellant, but have been confirmed as S.I. From a date prior to the confirmation of the appellant and. Were also promoted as Inspectors in 1991 whereas the appellant is still working as SI. It has been contended that the appellant has been discriminated against and that her rights as a lady are to be protected under the special provisions of Constitution and no discrimination could be shown against her. She has requested for her confirmation as Sub Inspector w.e.f. 15.6.1985 and placement in List "F" on the basis of the said confirmation/seniority and for further promotion as Inspector.
3. The respondents in their written objections have stated that the appellant was appointed on temporary basis and her claim for confirmation from the date of her appointment would have been logical only if she had been enrolled on permanent and direct basis; that her confirmation w.e.f. 24.5.1992 was correctly made and that it was not necessary to afford an opportunity of personal hearing as the subject matter of the appeal was a law point. It is further contended that the case of the appellant is distinguishable from the cases mentioned as precedents as each case is to be decided on its sown merits. It is further contended by the respondents that the previous good record cannot be considered as guide-line for the determination of the case of the appellant.
4. Arguments were heard and record perused. The respondents admitted that the appellant had a good record of service; is well qualified and has earned commendation certificates and cash awards and never earned any adverse report in her career. It was also admitted that the appellant fulfilled the requisite condition of passing the prescribed training course which is a prerequisite for confirmation as SI. The learned D.A. As well as the representative of the respondents strongly argued that confirmation is not a matter of right; that no guide-lines are available for determining the date of confirmation and that it is purely a matter of discretion of the competent authority. It was also argued that the appellant was appointed as temporary SI and therefore, could not claim confirmation w.e.f. The date of appointment.
5. The appellant was appointed as temporary L/SI on 25.6.1985 w.e.f. 15.6.1985. According to Rule 12.2
(3) all the appointments of enrolled Police Officers are on probation and the seniority is to be determined from the date of appointment and then from the date of confirmation, seniority inter se of serval officers confirmed on the same date being that allotted to them on first appointment. The appellant was confirmed vide order dated 24.5.1992 alongwith four other L/SIs. The said order also stipulates that the confirmations were made after counting the officiating period of the officers towards probation. The date of seniority was assigned the same as the date pf order of confirmation i.e. 24.5.1992. It is clear that, contrary to the contention of the respondents, the appellant was not appointed on ad hoc basis. The contention of the appellant is that a number of persons promoted as Sis on 1.7.1985, after appointment of the appellant, were confirmed as SI w.e.f.
7.2.1990 and also admitted to List F: and promoted as Inspectors on 6.4.1991, although the letter for such confirmation was issued on 7.2.1990. There is, therefore, no reason to assign such date of confirmation to the appellant as was the date of issue of the order of her confirmation i.e. 24.5.1992.
Still further, D.I.G. Multan (respondent No. 2) issued an order dated 30.8.1992 whereby another person, lady SI Saadia Saeed was confirmed in the rank of A.S.I, from the date of appointment i.e. 1.5.1988. It is, therefore, clear case of discrimination against the appellant who has been wrongly treated as an ad hoc appointee and deprived of her right to be confirmed w.e.f, the date of appointment, as was done in the case of Saadia Saeed, particularly when the service record of-the appellant was admittedly good and carried no adverse element.
6. The contention of the respondents that a temporary S.I. Could not be confirmed from the date of appointment has also been shown to be incorrect as per aforementioned precedent.
7. The contention that the appellant was not entitled to personal hearing as the matter involved interpretation of law point is also not tenable. In any case, even if the personal hearing could not be granted, the law points, as noted above, relating to confirmation have not been correctly interpreted by the respondents, lt has not been shown how the case of the appellant is distinguishable from the rest of the cases mentioned as precedent above. One fails to understand what criteria for belated confirmation was followed if admittedly previous good service record and fulfilment of conditions for confirmation/promotion by the appellant were not to be followed.
Decision for confirmation has certainly to be taken on the basis of record other wise it would. Be a matter of conjecture. No criteria for rejecting the appellant's claim has been stated to have been followed. The only explanation for assigning 24.5.1992 as the date of confirmation to the appellant is that the service record was not available on the first occasion in 1990 when her case was first considered for confirmation. Clearly, the appellant cannot be deprived of her right for confirmation w.e.f., the due date as the deferment of her case was not due to her own fault. When the respondents confirmed the appellant after considering the officiating period towards probation it will have to be presumed that her probation period has been considered to be taken into account for the purposes of confirmation, and actually no reason was left for the respondents to deny confirmation to the lady from the date the probation started i.e. The date of appointment.
8. During the course of arguments it was pointed out that there is no separate cadre for lady Officers.. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant produced a copy of letter dated 9.4.1996 issued by the Inspector General of Police, Punjab clarifying that the lady police officers are part of the general cadre and that all rules and regulations applicable to the general cadre would be applied to the lady police officers also. The respondents have not shown any rule under which the date of confirmation cannot be the date of appointment or it could be any date which the competent authority could fix in its own discretion without assigning any reason.
9. In the light of the above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned orders dated 8.6.1994, 19.7.1994 and 29.11.1994 are set aside and the appellant is declared entitled to be confirmed from the date of her appointment in the light of rules, the precedents mentioned above as well as the past service record.