1. M.L. SHAHANI, J.---On 17-9-1996 in presence of the learned counsel for the parties it was ordered by consent-that the matter will be heard on adjourned date It will be heard and positively disposed of on the same day. It was to be taken up at Serial No. 1. This matter was taken and heard and is being disposed of accordingly.
2. Petitioners who are a banking company have impugned the orders of Labour Court, Hyderabad by virtue whereof the grievance petition of respondents Nos. 3 to 43 in Constitutional Petition No. 687 of 1995 and respondents Nos. 3 to 36 in Constitutional Petition No. 688 of 1995 were allowed.
3. Appeals filed by the Bank before the Labour Appellate Tribunal were dismissed on 7-9-1995. Both these orders have been assailed by the petitioners bank.
4. The grievance of the respondents before the Labour Court was that they have been employed without an order of appointment as casual worker and their services were terminated without any order in writing. Their allegations were that their termination from service was illegal and they may be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. According to them they have been working for several years and months together. They were employed on a permanent post but they were termed as causal workers and there is no term like causal worker mentioned in any labour laws which has the applicability on the establishment of the petitioners. The Labour Court as a matter of fact came to the conclusion that their termination was illegal which was oral termination and their grievance petition was allowed with back benefits. The Labour Appellate Tribunal also dismissed their appeals. According to the Tribunal that it was mandatory on the part of the petitioners to give termination order under S.O. 12(3) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as Standing Orders Ordinance).
5. Mr. Abdul Inam, Advocate raised to-fold contention before us. His first contention was that the managers who have appointed the private respondents as casual employees were not authorised by the bank to do so and in support of his contention he has relied on the power of attorney executed in favour of the managers who employed the workers. In support of his above contention he has stated that if the agent exceeds the authority conferred on him by the Principal, to the extent that he has exceeded the authority will not be binding on the principal. He has relied upon (PLD 1973 SC 160), (PLD 1985 SC 341) and (1995 CLC 154). His other contention was that in spite of application given by worker which was allowed, Managers were not examined in the Labour Court, therefore, the certificates which were issued were not valid evidence.
6. Mr. M. Moosa Leghari, learned Advocate appearing for the private respondents in both these petitions stated that the power of attorney was never produced in the trial Court. He further stated that the principles of the authority conferred on agent by the Principal under the general law would not be applicable particularly in relation to the special law such as the Standing Orders Ordinance and has relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding interpretation of laws in the case reported as 1996 SCM R 826.
7. We have gone through the record with the assistance of the learned counsel and have seen the impugned orders and weighed the contention of the parties. In this case the admitted position is that the Standing Orders, 1968 is applicable to the establishment of the petitioners. It is an admitted position that the letter of appointment was not issued to the workers and obviously Standing Order 2-A was not followed which binds an employer to issue the letter of appointment while employing worker. We also find that no letter of termination was given nor any reasons were assigned for termination thereby provision of Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Order's Ordinance, 1968 were violated. That law specifically confers a right on the workers to challenge the termination in the Labour Court.
8. Employer has been defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance under section 2(c) which read: "Page 592: ... ... .... ' employer' means the owner of an industrial or commercial establishment to which this Ordinance for the the being applies, and includes--
(i) in a factory, any person named under clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934), as manager of the factory;
(ii) in any industrial establishment under the control of any department of the (Federal) or any Provincial Government the authority appointed by such Government in this behalf, or where no such authority is so appointed, the head of the department; (i.e) in any other industrial or commercial establishment, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of such establishment .. ... ... . .
9. The above definition includes any person responsible for the supervision and control of such establishment. It is not denied before us that manager who has employed these workers as casual employees is not responsible to the owner for supervision and control of the branch of which he is manager. Consequently we hold that the manager is an employer in terms of section 2(c) of the Standing Orders Ordinance. The employer was bound to issue termination letter with specific reasons which has not been done as such the order of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court and maintained by the Appellate Labour Tribunal does not call for any exceptions. Of late it has been that there is patent violation of Standing Orders 'Ordinance and the establishments are employing worker as casual labourers. The Legislature has not defined a category called casual labourers in' the Standing Orders Ordinance. Standing Orders Ordinance has specified classifications of workmen in S.O. 1 and that classification of workmen is conclusive. Consequently therefore, the workers were employed to do the job of permanent nature and as permanent employees could not be terms as casual employees/workers, the term which is non-existing.
10. Another confusion has been created about the period of payment of wages. It is stated that workers are daily wagers or weekly wagers as such could not be termed as permanent workers.
11. Period of payment of wages has nothing to do with the nature of job. As temporary worker can be given monthly wages and equally a permanent worker can be given daily wages. The nature of job is the only deciding factor regarding classification of worker as has been repeatedly ruled by the superior Courts.
12. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Muhammad Aqil v. Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1978 Kar.. 649 has held that even the Branch Supervisor or Branch Incharge is an employer. We repeatedly asked from the learned counsel for the petitioners/bank has any action been taken against the managers who employed those persons in contravention of the power conferred on them and he said that no action has been taken against the managers. The well- settled legal principle is that if the agent exceeds his authority and causes any loss to the property the principal can recover that loss from the agent but the principal shall be bound by the acts of the agent. These are the general principles of law but the acts of the agent cannot be annulled more particularly when third party interests are created.
13. Be that as it may, we came to the conclusion that under the special law such as Standing Orders Ordinance manager is an employer and such acts of the agent and the at of appointing the private respondents was valid in law and the principal cannot obviously have any grievance against the workers who were so employed. Moreover, Mr. M. Moosa Leghari, Advocate for the private respondent very rightly pointed out that the principle of general law could not be imported in dispensation of justice through a special law and general law cannot displace special law.
14. Moreover, wherever the Legislature wants to adopt the provisions of any other law it specifically mentions so, and for that matter S.O. 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance may be seen in which the provisions of section 25-A of I.R.O. Have been adapted.
15. After hearing the parties in the open Court we dismissed these petitions with no order as to costs for the reasons to be recorded subsequently and these are the reasons for passing such order.