1. ' The applicant has preferred this revision under section 115, C.P.C. Against the judgment and decree dated 23-2-1996 passed by the learned District Judge, Malir (Mr. Sultan Ahmed K. Siddique) in Civil Appeal No,4 of 1995 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Malir in Suit No,90 of 1994 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the learned trial Court with the following directions: "To afford the respondent an opportunity to prove her case by bringing on record the original documents/receipts annexed with the plaint and she may also be allowed to lead further evidence to establish her claim, if she so choose. The trial Court to give an opportunity to the respondent to lead evidence and the appellant will also be at liberty to cross-examine her as well as her witnesses if so examined by her and he will also be at liberty to lead evidence of his choice in rebuttal."
2. ' Briefly stated the respondent/plaintiff filed suit for recovery of Jahez articles of the value of Rs,70,000 against the applicant/defendant, They were married on 17th April, 1992 but after two months the applicant allegedly turned her out from the house and kept the Jahez articles with him, Thereafter, reconciliation efforts also failed and he did not return the Jahez articles. The applicant also filed suit for restoration of conjugal rights which is still pending. The applicant contested the suit of the respondent and filed his written statement wherein he denied all the adverse allegations.
3. The learned trial Court settled the following issues:-- "(1) Whether the parties contracted love marriage and the parents of plaintiff bent upon her wishes and provided nominal formal articles of routine use to her at the time of Nikah?
(2) Whether the parents of plaintiff given Jahez articles as claimed by her, if so, of what cost?
(3) Whether Jahez articles are lying with the defendant as alleged?
(4) Whether since separation the defendant shown his willingness to keep the plaintiff with him and tried so?
(5) Whether suit of plaintiff is maintainable as framed and what should be the decree?"
4. ' In support of her claim the respondent/plaintiff examined herself and her learned counsel closed the side on 7-9-1994. Thereafter, the applicant/defendant examined himself and his learned counsel closed his side on 28-9-1994. The learned trial Court ultimately decreed the suit as prayed.
5. However, in appeal the judgment and decree was set aside and while remanding the case to the learned trial Court the learned District Judge, Malir observed as follows:-- "In the instant case the respondent has placed her claim regarding the dowery articles on the basis of a photostat copy of list of dowery articles allegedly given to her by her parents duly signed by one Mustafa Kazmi but he has neither been cited as a witness by the respondent nor was examined in Court to corroborate her claim. She has also filed photostat copies of receipts of purchase of certain articles, which according to her were purchased either by her or by her parents and were given to her in Jahez. However, during her examination-inchief before the trial Court neither the originals of these receipts were brought on record nor their photostat copies. Thus the trial Court while decreeing the suit of the respondent, arrived at the conclusion that the respondent had left the Jahez articles valued Rs,70,000 in the house of the appellant on the mere statement of the respondent made by her in the trial Court on oath in the witness-box. No reliance whatsoever was placed either on the list of the Jahez articles or on the photostat copies of the receipts of the purchase of articles, annexed with the plaint. Thus, the findings of the trial Court regarding receipt of Jahez articles valued at Rs,70,000 by the appellant is based on mere assumptions and presumptions. It was incumbent upon the trial Court to have based its findings regarding the value of Jahez articles on the basis of documentary evidence which was produced before it. As it was not done, hence the impugned judgment appears to be bad in law and liable to be set aside. Though the respondent has relied her claim upon the list of Jahez articles annexed to the plaint alongwith the photostat copies of the receipts of the purchase of articles, yet the valuation of these articles has not been mentioned therein. The photostat copies of the receipts of Air-Conditioner, Washing Machine, Gold Ornaments are also issued to different persons with different dates ranging from the year, 1991 to 1992. The person who received the Jahez articles for and on behalf of the appellant has neither been cited as a witness nor he was examined so. The parents of the respondent, who gave her Jahez articles valued at Rs,70,000 or above were also not examined in the trial Court to corroborate the version of the lady.
6. ' Thus, the findings of the trial Court regrading the exact valuation of the Jahez articles at Rs,70,000 is not based on any material produced before it by the respondent."
7. ' I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record. The points urged in this revision require consideration. Therefore, it is admitted for regular hearing.
8. ' Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondent was given full opportunity to bring her evidence on record particularly when in para.4 of the written statement the applicant/defendant had denied the delivery of Jahez articles and had also alleged that list of Jahez articles and receipts etc. Were bogus and forged documents. He further submitted that findings of the learned trial Court are based on mere assumption and presumptions and is liable to be set aside. Therefore, according to him the order of remand with directions to re-open the entire evidence amounts to giving another opportunity to the respondent to fill up the gaps/lacuna and short comings etc. Which is unwarranted by law. In support of his submission learned counsel for the applicant cited Khushi Muhammad and 3 others v. Abdul Hameed and 4 others 1987 CLC 1246.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and submitted that production of some documents, copies of which had already been filed alongwith the plaint is vital and essential for coming to a just conclusion of the case. It is evident from the record that the respondent relied upon copies of documents and made no attempt to produce their originals.
10. Similarly she did not call any witness in support of her claim. It is not her case that she was denied the opportunity to lead evidence of her choice. It was, therefore, not proper for the learned Appellate Court to have remanded the case which would have enabled the respondent/plaintiff to produce additional evidence to cover up the insufficiency of evidence. I find it useful to refer to a judgment reported as Kalika Pande v. Ram Autar Pande and another AIR 1938 Allahabad 621 wherein it was held that the Appellate Court could not remand the case to allow the plaintiff to produce additional evidence on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to establish his case. The Appellate Court under such circumstances should come to its conclusion on the basis of evidence available on record and decide the appeal either for the appellant or for the respondent in accordance with its conclusion.
11. Accordingly on careful examination I find considerable force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant. Whatever evidence was available with the respondent/plaintiff that has been produced and she had been given reasonable opportunity to produce all her documents but if she has chosen not to bring on record any document it is not the function of the Court to allow the parties to produce additional evidence as and when he or she desires on the ground that his or her evidence was not sufficient to establish the case. In such circumstances the Appellate Court is required to come to its conclusion on the evidence which is brought on record by the parties and decide the appeal in accordance with law instead of remanding the matter to the trial Court unnecessarily to provide one of the parties to fill up the lacunas or the gaps. Therefore, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in my humble view the learned Appellate Court by passing the impugned judgment has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction. Hence this revision is allowed and the learned Appellate Court is directed to dispose of Appeal No,4 of 1995 which shall be deemed to be pending on his file, on merits in the light of observation made hereinabove.