ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J.---This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court dated 26-1-1993 allowing Civil Revision No. 1873-D of 1983 filed by the respondents against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below and dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs, petitioners herein.
2. Facts relevant for the purpose of this petition briefly are that the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners were the occupancy tenants of the suit land which they had mortgaged to Sadullah and Abdullah, 1/3rd in favour of the former vide Mutation No.221 and 2/3rd to the latter vide Mutation No.222, both sanctioned on 17-8-1911. Later on, the said to mortgagees transferred their mortgagee rights to the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents on 27-5-1934 vide to Mutations Nos. 1910 and 1911. It may be stated that the occupancy rights were extinguished by operation of law and the petitioners became the owners of the land in 1960. On 1-3-1972, the petitioners filed an application under section 10 of the Punjab Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964 seeking the restitution of possession of their mortgaged land. The Collector by his order dated 29-8-1973 accepted the application.
3. The mortgagees, respondents herein challenged the Collector's order in a civil suit contending that their mortgage was more than 60 years old; they had become full owners of the suit land by prescription and the Collector had acted illegally in ordering the restitution of its possession. The suit was decreed by the Civil Court vide judgment dated 7-7-1977 holding that the land having been mortgaged in 1911 and the mortgage not having been got redeemed during the limitation period prescribed for redemption, the mortgagees after the lapse of sixty years became full owners of the suit land; the mortgage was no more subsisting at the the of the filing of the application under section 10 of 1964 Act and consequently the impugned order of the Collector dated 29-8-1973 was unlawful and ineffective qua the rights of the mortgagees, the plaintiffs therein. It is an admitted position that the present petitioners who were the defendants in that suit and which they had contested did not appeal against the decree dated 7-7-1977 which thus attained finality. They, however, brought a suit in the year 1979 seeking a declaration that the decree dated 7-7-1977 was without jurisdiction.
The suit was contested by the respondents on the ground, inter alia, that the impugned decree of the Civil Court operated as res judicata and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to set it aside.
The learned Civil Judge decreed the petitioners' suit on 27-4-1982 and the appeal of the respondents was dismissed by the Additional District Judge vide judgment dated 13-10-1983. Both the Courts proceeded on the premises that the mortgages though created in the year 1911 were for a period of five years and, therefore, the period of limitation for the purpose of redemption would be recknoned from 1916 and as such the right of redemption which was to be extinguished after the lapse of 60 years had not yet extinguished and the mortgage was still subsisting when the application for restitution of possession was brought before the Collector on 1-3-1972. The application was accordingly within the and the Collector was fully competent to order the restitution of possession. Taking this view of the matter, the Courts below proceeded to hold that the decree of the Civil Court dated 7-7-1977 impugned before them was "without jurisdiction and, hence, it was a nullity and the same could be ignored". Such a decree, it was held, could not operate as res judicata.
4. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents preferred a revision petition (C.R. 1973-D of 1983) in the High Court which as stated above was accepted by a learned Single Judge vide the impugned judgment. The learned Judge in the High Court held that the Civil Judge who had passed the decree dated 7-7-1977 had the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the mortgage was 'subsisting usufructuary mortgage' falling within the purview of sections 10, 11 and 12 of 1964 Act and whether the Collector in passing the order dated 29-8-1973 acted ultra vires these provisions. It was observed by the learned Judge that it is settled proposition of law that when there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction. It was accordingly held by the learned Judge that assuming that the Civil Judge who had passed the decree dated 7-7- 1977 was wrong in law in taking the view that the period of 60 years was to be reckoned from 1911 and the application for restitution of possession under section 10 was not within the would not make his decree without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge held that the Courts below were wrong in treating the decree of Civil Court dated 7-7-1977 as a nullity which could be ignored. The learned Judge also held that the mistakes of law, if any, made by the Judges of Civil Courts being the Courts of general jurisdiction could only be corrected by means of an appeal to the Appellate Court and that no such appeal having been filed against the decree dated 7-7-1977, it became final and the matter stood concluded which could not be re-opened by the petitioners through a fresh action brought in Civil Court. It was finally held by the learned Single Judge that "the decree dated 7-7-1977 was competently made and, therefore, operated as res judicata".
5. Learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners contended that section 17 of Act XIX of 1964 barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any claim or enforce any right under a mortgage which has been extinguished under the said Act or to question the validity of any proceedings thereunder. Relying on this provision, the learned counsel argued that the Collector having ordered the restitution of the mortgaged land under section 10 of 1964 Act, it was not open to the Civil Court to question the validity of the Collector's order and the respondents, if aggrieved, could have sought remedy from the higher forum created under the Act. Precise contention of the learned counsel was that in view of the bar contained in section 17, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. We find no merit in this contention as it is an accepted proposition of law that despite the jurisdiction-ousting provision, the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to examine whether the statutory tribunals have complied with the provisions of the Act or they have acted ultra vires or assumed jurisdiction not vested in them. If it is shown that the order passed by the statutory functionary cannot be accommodated within the ambit of the relevant provisions, the Civil Court has the power to interfere and declare such order beyond the scope of the statute. To put it differently, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted only where it is found that the statutory functionary has acted within the ambit of his powers or within the four corners of his jurisdiction.
Now in the instant case, the Civil Court having found in the suit of the respondents that owing to the lapse of sixty years, the mortgage was no more subsisting and the respondents had become the owners of the suit land, the matter did not fall within the purview of sections 10 and 11 of the Act. The Civil Court, therefore, certainly had the jurisdiction to declare that the Collector had no power to direct restitution of possession of the suit property to the petitioners/mortgagors. In the circumstances, the High Court has taken correct view in holding that the decree dated 7-7-1977 was competently passed by the Civil Court and it could not, therefore, be challenged to another suit. Petitioners could well have assailed it in an appeal if it suffered from any legal infirmity but it is conceded that they filed no appeal That being so, the decree in question became final and. Would operate as res judicata.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable.
This petition has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed and the leave sought is refused.