MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order dated 16-4-1995 passed by the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Baluchistan, dismissing a revision petition filed by Saffar Khan, petitioner, against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Quetta, whereby the amount of surety bond in the sum of Rs.50,000 which had been forfeited, was reduced to Rs.40,000 and directed to deposit it on or before 30-4-1995.
2. Facts in the background of the case are that the petitioner and another stood sureties for Muhammad Ayub and others who were accused of offences under sections 302, 307, 147 and 148 read with sections 149 and 212, P.P.C. And executed bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000 each.
Muhammad Ayub accused, however, jumped the bail and absconded. In consequence, the petitioner was served with a notice under section 514, Cr.P.C. By the learned Sessions Judge (Adhoc), Quetta, Despite the petitioner's best efforts he could not produce the accused. The reply put into the notice under section 514, Cr.P.C. Was not found satisfactory by the learned trial Court, therefore, the entire amount of Rs.50,000 was forfeited with the direction to deposit it on or bef6re 30-4-1995.
3. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved, filed a revision petition in the High Court for "blending justice with mercy" and "reduction in the penalty of the bond. " The learned Chief Justice, who was seized of the petition, found that "apparently there was no justification for non-appearance of the absconding accused. " He also noticed that the "relaxed attitude of the sureties in imposition of penalty is promoting tendency of absconsion of the accused by abusing bail facilities granted to them." Nonetheless, considering the only aspect that the petitioner was not a professional surety coupled with the concession made by the learned Additional Advocate-General, the amount of penalty of Rs.50,000 was reduced to that of Rs.40,000. Still not satisfied with the above reduction the petitioner seeks leave to appeal in order to assail the impugned order.
4. Mr. S.A.M. Quadri, learned Advocate-on-Record, appearing on behalf, of the petitioner, contended that the petitioner stood surety for the accused on what has been oft-quoted "humanitarian grounds without any ulterior motives." In this context, it was urged that the petitioner was neither related nor otherwise had any caste fellowship with the accused, in that, the former belongs to Quetta whereas the latter is a Baloch and resident of village Zamran near Pak-Iran Border; that the petitioner had not gained anything materially or otherwise by standing surety for the said accused and; lastly that as a Muslim the petitioner had obliged the old father of the petitioner who was crying for help. The impugned order was thus termed as unjust and inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. The learned Advocate-on-Record also invited our attention, besides the case of Dildar and another v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 47), to Muhammad Sharif v. The State (1990 SCR 1300) and few other authorities and contended that the petitioner has not stood surety for monetary consideration and that it was his sheer benevolence, therefore, he ought to have been dealt with rather leniently.
5. We have already distinguished the ratio in Dildar's case PLD 1963 SC 47 in a recent authority of a Full Bench of this Court in Sher Ahmad Khan v. The State (1996 SCM R 244) authored by one of us (Muhammad Bashir Khan Jehangiri, J.). In this context, it would be appropriate to quote the reasoning in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the judgment in Sher Ahmad Khan's case. It reads:-- "4. No doubt the sureties in the case of Dildar (supra) stood sureties out of what has been described as 'fellow-feeling' because they did not belong to the province of residence of accused Amir Jan and, therefore, they did not know his antecedents. Again Amir Jan was stated to have died in Multan and had remained untraceable. On these considerations a lenient view was taken by this Court in Dildar's case."
5. In the instant case the petitioner is the Lambardar of the village to which Suleman accused belonged. He would be presumed to have had the knowledge of the credentials of Suleman accused. He was so dare devil that soon after his release on bail, he committed the murder (perhaps of his rivals) and had become fugitive from law. The case before us is thus clearly distinguishable from that of Dildar's case. "
6. We are inclined to approve the observations of the learned Chief Justice in this case that the attitude of the accused on account of leniency exhibited by the Court in imposition of penalty on the sureties is encouraging the accused to misuse the concession of bail by their abscondence. It is disquieting to note that the Courts seized of the matters in awarding the penalty on the forfeiture of bail bonds are not exercising the discretion equitbaly and justly. They are discharging this responsibility, to say the least, without much care and caution often leading to misuse of the concession of bail by the accused by their abscondence and in most of the cases repeating, during that period, the commission of the same offences with impunity. It is with dismay to observe also that the Law Officers representing the interest of the State are also making undue concession without any hesitation thereby strengthening the sad trend of reducing the amount of penalty with shocking leniency.
7. In the instant case, the learned Chief Justice in exercise of his discretion has already remitted a sum of Rs.10,000 to the petitioner. We are convinced that in the instant case further leniency is not called for.
8. For the above reasons, we find no merit in this petition which is dismissed and the leave is accordingly refused.