The appeal is directed against the decision dated 18-1-1996, rendered by learned Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, dismissing the appellant union's petition filed under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 as being incompetent. Respondents in appeal were the respondents in the petition before the Labour Court.
2. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3, allegedly, at the instance of respondent No. 4, the establishment, had moved the Registrar of Trade Unions, respondent No. 1, for registration of their union, P.S.I.C. Staff Union. Claiming to be the C.B.A., the P.S.I.C. Workers' Union approached the Registrar, with a request that the rival union (P.S.I.C. Staff Union) should not be registered, especially as there were already in existence to trade unions. According to the appellant, petitioner before the Labour Court, as C.B.A.
The P.S.I.C. Workers' Union had served upon the establishment a demand notice for recognition of certain rights and fulfilment of certain demands of the workmen; and the establishment had projected their pocket or pupper union, the P.S.I.C. Staff Union, to seek registration, so that they could serve the interests of the establishment and indulge in activities prejudicial to the cause of the working class. The petition was filed on 15-5-1994 and was presented before the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, on the following day, i.e. On 16-5-1994, when the Registrar was directed not to pass any final orders. The Registrar, however, is said to have taken up the plea that the orders of the Court were conveyed to him at 10-00 a.m., whereas he had already at 9-45 a.m.
Passed final orders as regards registration of the P.S.I.C. Staff Union, of which Mukhtar Awan and Muhammad Ilyas Chaudhry claimed respectively to be the President and the General Secretary.
Registration of the latter union was sought to be declared as illegal. It was pleaded that the rights of the petitioner union had adversely been affected, the P.S.I.C. Staff Union having acted at the instance of the Corporation, with a view to defeat the 'Demands Notice', pending with the Management, having been served upon the same by the petitioner union as C.B.A.
3. Main grievance of the appellant union is that while dealing with its application for ad interim injunction, the learned lower Court has chucked out the ='main petition, although its decision was not possible without appraisal of evidence (which the parties would have led before the Labour Court) and without hearing full-dress arguments. Summary disposal of the petition, under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, by the Labour Court is stated to have occasioned miscarriage of justice, inasmuch as the express provisions of the Ordinance have been bypassed and legitimate interests of the working class have been trampled, in accord with the wishes of the establishment.
4. Learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has pointedly referred to the verdict rendered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as 1992 SCM R 36, and has maintained that no guaranteed or secured rights of the C.B.A. Have been infringed, and the body, therefore, was not entitled to have invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in the matter. It is, however, urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that an illegally registered union would infringe the rights of the C.B.A. Under section 22 (ibid), adding that another union could not be registered, unless it fulfilled all the requirements under the law, as envisaged by section 3 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, providing that no worker would be entitled to be a member of more than one trade unions at one the. Submission is that had the Registrar allowed the existing unions to participate in the inquiry, it could be shown to him that the third union had, on its rolls, not even the minimum required strength of workers and certain opportunists had ventured to become members of more than one trade, unions simultaneously. Because of non-association of the C.B.A.
With the exercise, the at of registration of the upcoming group, a 'pseudo trade union, would be rendered null and void, and the Registrar was duty-bound to have inquired into and scrutinized all these aspects of the issue. It was alleged that the Registrar had proceeded with the process of registration of the union, in question, in disregard of the prohibitory order having been passed by the Court, on entertaining the petition under section 34, I.R.O., 1969.
5. Question of availability of a secured or guaranteed right has elaborately been discussed in the judgment, 1992 SCM R 36. In an earlier ruling of the Lahore High Court, reported as 1983 PLC 1256, it was held that a Labour Court/Appellate Tribunal was not competent to examine the validity of registration of a trade union and its certification as C.B.A., since these forums did not enjoy all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. 1n another case, 1992 PLC 23, the Karachi High Court expressed itself in more precise and comprehensive terms on the subject. It was pronounced that the Registrar, in view of section 10 of the Ordinance, was the sole authority to file a complaint before the competent Labour Court, soliciting cancellation of registration of a trade union. Such a move would lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar. However, a grievance or petition, urging him to lodge such a complaint could not be said to be un-maintainable or invalid. Once registration of a trade union is effected, the matter would travel beyond the Registrar's domain or control. On being duly moved, or suo motu, the Registrar can come to the Labour Court for de--registration of a trade union, if it is discovered that registration of a union I had been effected in contravention of law or was otherwise wanting in the mandatory requirements, prescribed by the Ordinance. Registration of a trade union, under section 8 (ibid), is not to assume a mechanical form, but has to be a conscious exercise, reflecting and satisfying test of objectivity. In 1988 PLC 637, it was held by this Tribunal that the Registrar only was competent to apply to the Labour Court for cancellation of registration of a Labour Union and that a trade union had no locus standi to make such a move directly to the Labour Court. This being the factual and legal position, it cannot be disputed that the petition, in the manner it was preferred before the Labour Court, was not proceed able; and it would have only been an exercise in futility, if, in its defective or incompetent form, the petition under section 34 of the Ordinance would have been proceeded with, by the Labour Court, calling upon the parties to produce evidence in support of their respective stand-points, after having stifled or stayed the at of registration of the rival union, P.S.I.C. Staff Union.
6. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has cited to support his contention 1991 PLC 841 (Karachi High Court) and 1991 PLC 207 (Lahore High Court). There cannot be any cavil with the principle enunciated and the view expressed in these cases. It is inevitable to hold an inquiry into the rival claims of trade unions existing and operating in a particular set-up; and if a workman has got himself enlisted as a member of to or more trade unions, he would be disqualified. A trade union cannot claim registration, unless it has membership of one-fifth of the total number of workmen employed by an establishment. It is so postulated by sections 3 and 7 of the Ordinance, An inquiry cannot objectively be undertaken, without associating with it the employer, as also all the unions in existence. Keeping them out, while considering the question of registration of a particular trade union, would also be violative of principles of natural justice. Question requiring determination in the present case, however, is a different one. It has to be examined if an establishment or a trade union can make a move to the Labour Court for de-registration of another trade union. The answer plainly is in the negative.
7. I would endorse the impugned order, finding it to be unexceptionable. The appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs. The exercise of holding the referendum shall be initiated and concluded within a maximum period of to months.