Civil Suit No. 223 of 1973 was filed by Karim Bakhsh, Nurang and Plara for pre-empting the sale of agricultural land in favour of Pir Bakhsh and other appellants. Muhammad Rafi, respondent No. 1 herein, also filed Suit No. 229 of 1973 for pre-empting the same sale. The two suits were consolidated. The rival pre-emptores were impleaded in the respective plaints and the proceedings were held in Suit No. 223 of 1973 filed by Karim Bakhsh, pre--emptor/respondent No. 2.
2. During the course of proceedings in the Trial Court, the parties arrived at a compromise which was duly recorded on 19-3-1973 and a judgment and decree passed accordingly on 28-3-1973.
Under the compromise the pre-emptores admitted the sale price as Rs.7,000 and the vendees admitted the superior right of both the pre-emptores. The pre-emptores also agreed to share the land amongst each other by apportioning the sale price.
3. This decree was subjected to challenge before the District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan. The main ground taken was that the compromise was illegal, inasmuch as, two of the vendees, namely Ghulam Rasool and Khadim Hussain sons of Khan Muhammad, were minors and the Court did not look after their interests as required by law. After perusal of the record, the learned District Judge rejected the plea and dismissed the appeal of the vendees.
4. In support of this second appeal directed again the judgment and decree dated 2-7-1973 passed by the District Judge, the same argument has been repeated. I have examined the contention with reference to the records of the two suits. It transpired that Sohanra vendee, real brother of the two minors, was appointed as guardian by the Trial Court on 28-10-1972 in the suit filed by Muhammad Raft, pre-emptor. Even though there is no separate order for appointment of guardian at item in the other suit, but on account of the fact that the two suits were consolidated, the authority of Sohanra to conduct the proceedings on behalf of the minors cannot be questioned. Learned counsel for the appellants stressed the point that the Court must, before approving the compromise, record an express finding that the compromise was in the interest of the minors and, in the absence of such express finding, the compromise falls through and so does the decree. The argument may have weight but is not available in this particular case. The record shows that on 28-3-1973 separate application under Order XXXII, Rule 7, C.P.C. Was made for approval of the compromise on behalf of the minors also. The Court recorded an express order that the minor defendants were to benefit from the compromise. This finding takes away the wind out of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants who, it seems, had no knowledge of this application nor the order passed by the trial Court on the same. He confined his attention to the main order dated 19-10-1973 which of course does not record that compromise is also in the interest of the minors.
5. No other point has been urged. There is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.