SALAHUDDIN MIRZA, J.---The petitioner Insurance Company had issued a policy of fire insurance in favour of respondent No.1 (Collector of Customs Dry Port, Lahore) for a sum of Rs.2,25,00,000 in respect of customs duty, sales tax and other charges and bond interest against the stock of packing/wrapping material, chemicals, essences and flavours and machinery spares only whilst stored and/or lying in the public bonded warehouse situated at 137-Industrial Estate, Kot Lakhpat Lahore. The police was issued in early 1989 and on 11-9-1989 fire broke out in the bonded warehouse whereupon respondent No. l lodged claim with the petitioner on 26th December, 1989 claiming a sum of Rs.1,98,27,996, being the amount of duty and taxes payable in respect of the insured goods which were destroyed by fire. The petitioner company appointed surveyors (M/s. Ghafoor Associates (Pvt.) Limited of Karachi and M/s. United Enterprises of Lahore). They however, could not inspect the bonded warehouse and submit their report because respondent No. l allegedly did not furnish the necessary documents and information even though approached by the surveyors through letters dated 19-9-1989, 5-10-1989 and 20-1-1990. While the matter was thus pending, respondent No.3 (Assistant Collector (Bond) Customs Dry Port Mughalpura, Lahore served a demand notice dated 1-2-1990 upon the petitioner-company for the payment of Rs.1,98,27,996 demanding payment within 14 days and threatening action under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969. The claim of the petitioners is that the demand of respondent No. l and the contemplated action are illegal and mala fide. According to the petitioner, the liability for payment of customs duty, taxes and other charges in respect of the consignment imported into Pakistan arises when a bill of entry is filed for clearance of goods for home consumption or, in the case of goods lying in a bonded warehouse, when a bill of entry is filed for clearance of the goods from bond for home consumption and since in the present case no such eventuality has arisen, the demand of respondent No. 1 is unwarranted. It was also claimed that there was 'no incurable interest in favour of respondents Nos. l to 3 in respect of the goods insured. The petitioners, therefore, prays as follows:----
(a) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant a declaration that the demand and proposed action of respondent No. l contained in the demand notice dated 1-2-1990 (Annexure 'D') to the petition is illegal, unlawful, mala fide, arbitrary and without lawful authority and jurisdiction.
(b) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to restrain the respondents Nos. l to 3 from taking any coercive action or measures under section 202 of the Customs Act, 1969 or otherwise for recovery of the amount demanded vide demand notice dated 1-2-1990 Annexure 'D' to the petition.
2. Mr. Jarar Ahmed, Assistant Collector (Bonds) Customs Dry Port, Lahore has tiled counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents. It was stated that alternate remedies in the form of appeal and revision had not been availed by the petitioners and therefore the petition was premature.
Territorial jurisdiction of the Court was also challenged on the ground that the respondents are located at Lahore, the cause of action had accrued at Lahore and the policy of insurance was also executed there. As for the letters of the surveyors seeking certain information and documents, it was stated that all necessary information and documents had been provided to them and they were merely protracting the matter. It was counter-alleged that the petitioner insurance company had failed to meet its obligations under the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy' and therefore the respondents were justified in preferring demand under section 202 of Customs Act.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. We shall first take up the objection of the respondents as to the failure of the petitioners to avail them-under the law and effect of their failure to do so. Admittedly, section 193 of the Customs Act provides for appeals against any decision or order under the Customs Act and section 195-A provides for revision before the Federal Government against an order passed in appeal under section 193 of the Customs Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners remedies provided by way of appeal and revision under section 193 and 195-A respectively are a myth and a farce and are not what are termed under Article 199 of the Constitution as "adequate remedy".
According to him, it was not necessary for the petitioners to resort to the remedies provided under sections 193 and section 195-A of Customs Act. He placed reliance on the judgments reported as PLD 1971 SC 205 (M/s. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Chitagong v. Sales Tax Officer Chitagong), PLD 1982 Kar. 244 (Sky Rooms Ltd. Karachi v. Assistant Collector Central Excise and Land Customs, Karachi). In the first judgment it is held that when a dispute arises between the parties in respect of a fiscal right based upon a statutory instrument, then the respective rights and liabilities of the parties can be determined by the High Court in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. At that time 1962 Constitution of the country was in the field and Article 98 thereof provided writ jurisdiction of the High Court. What was at issue was the payment of sales tax. The argument that alternative departmental remedies were available but had not been resorted to by the petitioner was repelled the second judgment lays down the law that if am appeal has to be filed before a person who has already expressed himself adversely towards the petitioner, a Constitutional petition under Article 199 cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the alternate remedy has not been availed of. It was further held that Constitutional jurisdiction, pa nature of certiorari can be exercised under special circumstance alternate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise being available and not availed of, specially when interpretation of an important provision of an Excise Law calls for an authoritative pronouncement by a superior Court. It appears to us that none of these two judgments is applicable to the facts of the present case. The first judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case because the dispute between the parties is not in respect of a fiscal right based upon a statutory instrument. On the other hand, the dispute between the parties. Is based on a policy of insurance which is not a statutory instrument. As for the second judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner could not show us that the officers who were to hear appeal under section 193 or revision under section 195-A of the Customs Act had already expressed themselves adversely to the view-point of the petitioner. Nor the petitioner involves interpretation of an important provision of an Excise Law which might require authoritative pronouncement by a superior Court. As against this learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment reported as 1993 SCM R 1108 (Income Tax Officer v. M/s. Chappal Builders) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "When after considerable arguments we had already reached the above conclusion and had also announced it and the consequential dismissal of the appeals was yet to be announced, the learned counsel for the appellants brought to our notice that the respondent in this case approached the High Court in its writ jurisdiction without seeking and exhausting the statutory remedies. In several of the very recent judgments we have not approved in loch situation the interference by the High Court in tax matters, when the normal course being adopted by almost all the High Courts in matters other than tax, rule of alternate remedy is being followed."
5. It appears to us that the petitioners unnecessarily, and rather prematurely, invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court when adequate alternate remedies by way of appeal and revision were available to them. The petitioners cannot be suffered to say that the departmental remedies were nothing but a myth and a farce. If this line of argument is accepted, there would be no end to such precipitated invoking of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court without resorting to the remedies provided under the law. We are of the view that the Constitutional petition is not maintainable on this ground.
6. We are also of the considered view that the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is also barred in the matter. It is an admitted position that the respondents are located at Lahore, the Insurance Policy which is the basis of the claim of the respondents and of the dispute between the patties, was executed at Lahore, the insured goods were at Lahore and it was there that they were destroyed by fire. The mere fact that respondent No.1 served the impugned notice dated 1-2-1990 upon the Managing Director of the petitioner at Karachi does not confer upon this Court territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of this dispute under Article 199 of the Constitution. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a judgment reported as 1985 SCM R 758 (Al-Blagh Limited, Lahore v. Copy Right Board, Karachi) in which it was held that the orders made or proceedings taken by a department of Federal Government in connection with the affairs of the Central Government but having effect on parties in East Pakistan would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of High Court of that Province. In the said case, the rights and obligations of a party under the Copyrights Ordinance, 1962 were agitated before the Court whereas in the present case what is agitated before Court is a contractual obligation arising out of the policy of insurance issued by the petitioner company and as such the principle laid down in the reported judgment is not attracted to the facts of the present case. If territorial jurisdiction in the present matter is conceded to this Court, that would mean that in all cases in which a private party located at Karachi has grievance against a functionary of the State located in Punjab or N.W.F.P. Would be entitled to institute writ petitions at Karachi even though the cause of action accrued outside the territorial limits of this Court and the contract on which it was based also executed outside such territorial limits. In our view this Court has no territorial jurisdiction in the matter.
7. Since we have held that the petition was premature for the failure of the petitioners to have first resorted to the remedy by way of appeal under section 193 and revision tinder section 195-A of the Customs Act and that this Court has also no territorial jurisdiction in the matter, we refrain from commenting upon the merits of the case lest our comments would prejudice the case before the competent Court having jurisdiction in the matter. We would, I therefore, not comment upon the merits of the case. The Constitutional petition is accordingly dismissed.