1. ' This is a direct application for bail filed in this Court on 9-6-1996. According to F.I.R. No,98/96 of P.S. Orangi (Extension), Karachi West, registered on 10-5-1996 at 15-40 hours by A.S.-I., Ali Haider Shah of such Police Station, the said A.S.-I. Was on patrolling duty with a police party that at 15-00 hours they found the applicant accused concealing himself. The applicant was apprehended in the presence of P.Cs. Hidayatullah and Abdul Aziz, disclosed his name to be Nadeem Hamid Balwai son of Hamid Hussain and upon his person was found a .30 bore pistol, without number with two live bullets in the magazine for which he failed to produce due licence. It is claimed on behalf of the applicant that the accused continues in custody ever since, no challan has been submitted so far and there is little evidence in the case, exclusively consisting of police personnel, which would furnish reasonable grounds for his conviction in due course of law. The learned counsel for the applicant for seeking grant of bail directly in this Court relies upon Sareed Khan v. State PLD 1989 Peshawar 80 and Muhammad Ali Khan v. The State PLD 1991 Peshawar 66. - ' For reasons to be recorded separately, we had on 27-6-1996 admitted the applicant to bail in the sum of Rs,50,000 with P.R. Bond in like amount to the satisfaction of the Nazir of this Court. Recorded below are the reasons for that order.
2. ' It is now well-settled that the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court to grant bail to persons arraigned or indicted under such Act. The enactment merely regulates or controls such grants. Even where the Special Court under the special law is seized of a case bails, including bails before arrest, can be granted in this jurisdiction.
3. Inter alia, Mumtaz v. The State 1995 PCr.LJ 297 and Imdad Khan v. The State 1996 PCr.LJ 272 may be referred on the point.
4. ' Now the applicant, as seen, has been under detention since 10-5-1996 and there is nothing in the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 which precludes the applicability of sections 61, 62 and 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to such arrests. These provisions in the Code have also been elevated to the status of Constitutional guarantees under Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution, Article 9 conferring a fundamental right whereunder no person can be deprived of life or liberty, save in accordance with law and Article 10 ensuring that every person arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the nearest Magistrate and that no person so arrested may be detained in custody beyond such period without due authority of a Magistrate. As to section 167 of the Code, that provision postulates the rule of inviolability of personal liberty in such manner that in cases wherein investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours, as fixed by section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded the Magistrate concerned may authorise the detention from time to time not exceeding a period of 15 days but in so doing reasons for the remand are to be recorded. It needs little application of mind to conclude that the foregoing mandates have not been adhered to, rendering the detention illegal as, inter alia, found by this Court in Asma Khatoon v. Syed Shabir Hussain and others C.P. No,D-517 of 1996 decided in the Court on 25-4-1996 (PLD 1996 Kar. 517).
5. ' In so far as taking cognizance of the case by the Special Court is concerned, the requirement of section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appear to have been merged in section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, which enjoins that the officer incharge of police station shall complete the investigation and forward directly to the Special Court a report under section 173 of the Code within 14 days in respect of a case triable by such Court, the Special Court being correspondingly empowered to extend the time within which such report is to be forwarded in a case where good reasons are shown for not doing so within the period prescribed and a default on the part of the officer incharge of the police station, etc, resulting in delay in the investigation or submission of the report, being termed a willful disobedience of an order of the Special Court to be dealt with accordingly. The implications are obvious and such are that whereas the simultaneous, prohibitory and enabling provisions in sections 61, 62 and 167 of the Code, as upstaged by Articles 9 and 10 of the Constitution, remain in place, it is only from the point of applicability of section 173, Cr.P.C. That the Special Court takes over a matter falling within its purview (Allied Bank v. Farooq 1991 SCM R 599, 619) and it is only upon taking over that the jurisdictions under the Code upon taking over that the jurisdictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure stand bypassed. For obvious reasons, the act of taking seizin of a case under section 173 of the Code as read with section 5 of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, is a conscious act. In situations where the Special Court does not become seized of a proceeding, section 5 of the special law being disregarded, this Court, having been conferred appellate and supervisory jurisdiction under the 1975 Statute can also step in if so moved by an aggrieved person.
6. ' Examining the present application on the basis of the foregoing enunciations of law, we reached the conclusion that the liberty of a person having been violated under the cover of a statute, which is clearly subject to the Constitution a case for grant of bail was made out and the applicant was duly enlarged. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.