This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 10953 and 10954 of 1994 as common question of law is involved.
2. In both the cases the petitioners were employees of respondents serving on different posts. Vide orders passed on about 7-9-1994 the services of the petitioners were terminated on the ground that they were no longer required. The terminations have been subjected to challenge in these Constitutional petitions on the ground of mala fide on the part of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who became incharge of the Board under the fresh arrangement and absence of prior notice. Both in the report as well as written statement, the petitions are resisted inter alia on the ground of maintainability as the services of the petitioners with the respondent Board were not governed by any statutory rule. Absence of prior notice is admitted but it is contended that no such notice is required inasmuch as the services have been simply terminated without any stigma to the conduct of the petitioners.
3. Since the respondents have been represented and heard, these to petitions are being finally heard and disposed of as Pacca matter.
4. Respective arguments have been repeated in the course of hearing. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while admitting that the services of the petitioners with the respondent Board is not governed by any statutory rules and as such the law of master and servant applies, has relied on the cases of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. And another (1994 SCM R 2232) and National Bank of Pakistan and another v. Malik Manzoor Ahmad (1995 CLC 267) to contend that even where the employment is not governed by any statutory rule, an employee is entitled to a prior show-cause notice. It is further contended that since no notice has been issued in these cases, the Constitutional petitions are not maintainable. The arguments have been refuted by the learned counsel for the respondent Board and by relying on 1994 SCM R 2232 (ibid) it is urged that the Constitutional petitions are not maintainable and that if at all, the petitioners could sue for damages in Civil Court and it is in those proceedings that the plea of absence of prior notice would be relevant. It is contended that in no case where the employment is governed by the law of master and servant, an employee can be restored to the employment.
5. In the face of admission by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the employment of the petitioners with respondent-Board was governed by law of master and servant as there are no statutory rules, the answer to the question of maintainability is provided in the same judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners namely Mrs. Anisa Rehman's case. It is held therein that a contractual employee cannot seek restoration to the office by invoking either Constitutional jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of Civil Court. The only remedy left for such employee is an action to in damages.
6. It is correct that the judgment in Anisa Rehman's case makes applicable the rule of natural justice to the employees of statutory corporation and it has been provided that any action adverse to the employee can only be taken after prior notice. In my view the above dictum is not applicable in these to cases for the reasons (i) the respondent Board cannot be said to be a statutory corporation in the sense in which P.I.A. And WAPDA are, as the Board has been constituted by a notification under section 3(1) and section 4 of the Sports (Development and Control) Ordinance, 1962 (XVI of 1962) by the Federal Government and (ii) the petitioners' services have been simply terminated without any adverse remarks or stigma whatsoever. This termination, it is not disputed, is in accordance with the letter of appointment, which provided termination after one month notice or pay in lieu thereof. In my view in cases of termination simpliciter where the services of the employees are to be dispensed with without a word against his conduct, efficiency, discipline and integrity, the rule of prior hearing/notice is nor attracted.
7. There is another fact to the argument. Assuming the rule of privy notice/hearing is attracted to these cases, the same can be urged and relief sought on the ground of absence of notice in properly constituted proceedings viz. Action for, damages. For claiming relief of damages, the petitioners will have to prove the illegality of termination orders and illegality urged will be the absence of prior notice/hearing.
8. For the above noted reasons, these to petitions are dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
M.A.K./M-342/L