AJMAL MIAN, J.---By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above to appeals as they involve common question of law. The above appeals are with the leave of the Court against the common judgment dated 19-7-1978 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind in Constitution Petitions No.D-913 of 1977 and No.D-444 of 1974, respectively, filed by the appellants, dismissing the same and maintaining the impugned orders of the respondents for seizure of the goods etc. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the import of the word "Port" used in section 14 of the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973 (Act No.XVIII of 1973), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
2. The brief facts of the above to appeals are as follows:-
(a) Civil Appeal No. l 17-K of 1978 On 27-8-1975 the field staff of the Pakistan Narcotics Board interrupted truck No.RIB 7294 on Super Highway, Karachi, and upon search, they found that the same was loaded with foreign cloth and betelnuts instead of narcotics. The truck containing the seized goods was handed over to the Coast Guards in view of the contents of the same. Thereupon, the Deputy Collector initiated adjudication proceedings by issuing a show cause notice dated 2-10-1975 addressed to seven persons named therein. Pursuant thereof he passed order dated 30-3-1976, whereby he held that the offences charged were established beyond doubt. He confiscated the seized cloth and betelnuts under section 156 (89) of the Customs Act 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1969.
He also imposed a personal penalty of Rs.10,000 each on Munir Muhammad S/o Faqir Muhammad, Fazal Amin S/o Shah Afzal, Shahad Khan S/o Bismillah Khan and of Rs.1,000 on Masoom S/o Shahzad under the above provisions of the Act of 1969. He also ordered that since truck No.RIB-7294 was used for the transportation and removal of the seized goods, the same be confiscated under section 157(2) of the Act of 1969. He further imposed penalty of Rs.10,000 on the owner of the truck, namely, the appellant. Against the above order, an appeal was filed by the appellant before the Collector of Customs, which was dismissed by an order dated 3-8-1977. Thereupon, the appellant filed the above Constitution Petition No.D-913 of 1977 in the High Court of Sind.
(b) Civil Appeal No. 13-K of 1981 In the above appeal, the Coast Guards filed an application before the City and Additional District Magistrate, Karachi under section 162 of the Act for obtaining a search warrant on the ground that the shop bearing No.101 situated in Jamia Cloth Market, Karachi, owned by the appellant, contained smuggled foreign cloth which was liable to be confiscated. Thereupon, the City and Additional District Magistrate, Karachi, issued a search warrant dated 30-3-1974 valid up to 7-4-1974 in favour of Subedar Muhammad Akram, Pakistan Coast Guards, Karachi. Upon the execution of the above search warrant, a formal F.I.R. Bearing No.5 of 1974 on 30-3-1974 at 2230 hours was lodged at the headquarters Pakistan Coast Guards by said Subedar MuhammadAkram, the copy of which was also submitted to the City and Additional District Magistrate, Karachi. The appellant was also arrested on the same day and the requisite remand order was obtained from the City and Additional District Magistrate, Karachi. However, he was bailed out by an order dated 5-4-1974 passed by the City and Additional district Magistrate Karachi, in the sum of Rs.8,000. After completing the investigation, the officer investigating the case, submitted charge-sheet inter alia against the appellant in the Court of the Special Judge (Customs & Taxation), Karachi. It appears that upon report, the Deputy Collector of Customs, Karachi, had also initiated adjudication proceedings, which culminated in confiscation of the seized foreign cloth and imposition of penalty. The appellant filed aforesaid Constitution Petition. The main ground urged was, that the Pakistan Coast Guards had no authority or jurisdiction to exercise functions and powers of officers of Customs under section 14 of the Act in Jamia Cloth Market.
3. The above to petitions were taken up alongwith six other Constitution petitions. During the arguments, the only ground which was pressed was about the territorial jurisdiction of the Coast Guards, as is indicated in the judgment under appeal. However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the Coast Guards had territorial jurisdiction at the places involved and, therefore, dismissed all the petitions. After that, the appellants filed the above petitions for leave to appeal, which were granted to consider the above question
4. In support of the first appeal, Mr. Ali Akbar, learned Advocate-on-Record appearing for the appellant has submitted that though a number of other grounds were urged but the High Court confined its judgment to the question of territorial jurisdiction and, therefore. It would be in the interest of justice if he is allowed to urge the other points.
In this regard, it may be pertinent that the High Court, after narrating the facts of the Constitution petition filed by the above appellant in para. 6 of the judgment made the following observation: "But only one ground has been pressed before us, that with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Coast Guards to at within the area of the Super Highway Karachi "
In presence of the above observation in the judgment, we cannot conclude that factually the appellant had pressed the other grounds, particularly when Mr. Ali Akbar had not appeared for the appellant before the High Court. Additionally, at the the of arguments of the petition for leave to appeal, the appellant had urged some other points. Namely, the violation of the principle of natural justice, but the same did not find favour with the learned Judges who granted the leave, which is confined on the point of territorial jurisdiction of the Coast Guards. We are, therefore, not inclined to allow Mr. Ali Akbar to urge any other point.
5. As regards the territorial jurisdiction, the submission of Mr. Ali Akbar was that the Super Highway, Karachi, cannot be treated as a part of the coastal area in terms of section 14 of the Act. Mirza Abdur Rashid, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant in the second appeal also urged that Jamia Cloth Market, which is situated on M.A. Jinnah Road, cannot be treated as a part of coastal area in terms of the above provision of the Act.
6. Before touching upon the above question, we may observe that in the above Civil Appeal No. II7- K of 1978, the staff of the Narcotics Control Board had interrupted the truck under the belief that the truck, which had come from the up-country, contained narcotics but upon search, they found that foreign cloth and the betelnuts were concealed below the bags containing fodder and, therefore, they handed over the case to the Coast Guards. Mr. Ali Akbar is unable to point out that the staff of the Narcotics Control Board had no jurisdiction at the place where the truck was interrupted.
Be that as it may, we may now revert to the above submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. In this regard, it may be pertinent to refer to section 2(i), section 14, and First Schedule to the Act, which read as follows:-- Section 20) of the Act "Coastal area" means the area specified in the First Schedule:"
Section 14 of the Act Powers of the officers of the Force.--(1) The officers and members of the Force shall perform such functions of officers of customs as may be entrusted to the mand exercise such powers under the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), as may be delegated to then under section 6 of that Act for the purposes of prevention of smuggling along the coastal areas of the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan, excepting the limits of the various ports in those areas. ,
(2) In addition to the powers conferred under subsection (1), the officers and junior commissioned officers of the Force shall exercise all the powers conferred on the officer-in-charge of a Police Station under the Police Act, 1861 (V of 1861), and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898)."'
First Schedule to the Act "FIRST SCHEDULE (See Section 2(i))
Southern, strip of the Province of Baluchistan along and astride the existing road emanating from the Pak-Iran border connecting the towns of MAN-TURBAT-HOSHAB-BAZADAR-BELA-UTHAL to HUB RIVER (BUNDMURAD) and also the southern area of the Province of Sind along and astride the line and road from HUB RIVER (BUNDMURAD) GADAP-SARI SING-THANO BULAKHAN--BANO-MIRPUR BATARO-JATTI to the Arabian Sea but excluding the limisof any port in those areas."
7. A perusal of the above quoted definition of the term "coastal area" indicates that it means the area specified in the First Schedule. It may further be noticed that subsection (1) of section 14 of the Act provides that the officers-and members of the Force shall perform such functions of officers of Customs as would be entrusted to them and exercise such powers under the Customs Act, 1969 as may be delegated to them under section 6 of that Act for the purpose of prevention of smuggling along the coastal areas of the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan excepting the limits of the various ports in those areas. It may also be noticed that under subsection (2) of the above section, it has been provided that the officers and junior commissioned officers of the force would exercise all the powers conferred on the officers incharge of a police station under the Police Act, 1861 and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It may also be pointed out that the First Scheduledefines the boundaries of the coastal area with reference to the places mentioned therein.
8. From the above-quoted provisions of the Act, it is evident that the officers and members of the Coast Guards have jurisdiction under the Act of 1969 over total areas as defined in the First Schedule excluding various ports in those areas. Under S.R.O. No.30(1)73, dated 3-1-1973, the Central Board of Revenue, in exercise of powers conferred on it by section 6 of the Act of 1969 entrusted the functions of officers of Customs under sections 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 16'2, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, subsections (1), (3) and (4) of sections 168, 169 and 171 of the Act of 1969 to all the officers of the Coast Guards not below the rank of Junior Commissioned Officer within their respective jurisdiction.
9. The thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties is that the coastal area cannot extend up to the Super Highway or the Jamia Cloth Market, and that actually the same would be part of the Karachi Port. In reply to our query Mirza Abdur Rashid submitted that according to him, the coastal area will be the area abutting sea water and at the mot 100 or 150 yards in depth towards the land. This submission is unfounded and is contrary to the provisions of the Act. As pointed out hereinabove, as per section 2(i) of the Act, coastal area means, the area specified in the First Schedule. The above First Schedule with reference to Province of Sind defines coastal area as area long and astride the line and road from Hub River (Bundmurad) - Gadap-Sari Sing-Thano Bulakhan-Bano-Mirpur Bataro-Jatt to the Arabian Sea excluding the limits, of any port in those areas. None of the counsel has been able to demonstrate that Super Highway or the Jamia Cloth Market are not situated within the above limits nor they were unable to manifest that the above to places are within the limits of Karachi Port or Port Qasim. However, Mirza Abdur Rashid has referred to section 3 of the Ports Act. 1908, which defines "port" by providing that "port" includes also any part of a river or channel in which this Act is for the the being in force". The above definition does not, in any way, advance the case of the appellants. As a matter of fact, it has no bearing on the point in issue. Then, he referred to the judgment in the case of Muhammad Mahfooz v. Collective of Customs (Preventive), Customs House; Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1986 Kar., 28), in which a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind headed by Naimuddin J. (as his Lordship then was), has referred to the various notifications with reference to the question whether the Customs Officers had jurisdiction in Federal 'B' Area. Karachi, from where 96 ingots of refined tin of Malaysian origin each weighing 42 Kgs. And 102 ingots of refined or refined in "Wattan Metal" each weighing 29/30 Kgs.
With marks of Bunder Khomeini, were seized under section 168 of the Act of 1969, and held that neither the Collector of Customs nor any other officer could have jurisdiction beyond their territorial jurisdiction and that at the relevant the they had no such jurisdiction, though by a subsequent notification dated 12-2-1983, the Customs Officers were appointed for areas mentioned therein.
10. The above case has no relevance for the purpose of determining, whether the Karachi Port would include the area where Super Highway and Jamia Cloth Market are situated. Mirza Rashid has candidly conceded that if the areas in dispute do not fall within the limits of the port of Karachi, in that event, the same would be covered by the boundaries given in the First Schedule to the Act.
The High Court has dilated upon the above aspect very succinctly as follows:- "12. In its popular meaning, the word 'ports' has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 3rd Edition page 1631 as:- 'the place by the shore where the ships may run in for shelter from storm or a load and unload a harbour a haven a town possessing a harbour which vessels resort to load and unload, from which they start or at which they finish their voyage; specifically a place where customs officers are stationed to supervise the entry of goods.'
Stroud's 'Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases' 4th Edition 1974 Volume 4 page 2053 gives various meanings of the word port. In its natural meaning, it is a place where ships may conveniently come for safety against storm or a place where ships may load and unload cargo or take passengers. The word also includes something that is artificial such as docks quays. Whereas, warehouse, sheds. In the case of Sailing-ship 'Garston' Co. v. Hick & Co., Q.B.D. 580, it was held that the word port in a charter party is to be understood in its popular, or business, or commercial sense, it does not in such a document necessarily mean the port as defined for revenue or pilotage purposes. I am, therefore, of the view that the Word 'port' in section 14(1) of the Coast Guards Act, is to be interpreted in its ordinary popular sense as meaning the place intended for loading and shipment of goods and passengers. Had the Legislature intended to give a different meaning to the word 'port' in the Coast Guards Act, nothing could have been easier -dean to define the word 'port' to mean 'Customs-port' as defined in the Customs Act, 1969 or even a port as defined in the ports Act, 1908. Similarly, the words 'limits of the port' in their ordinary popular or commercial sense mean (part from waters across the shores or river, with which we are not concerned, the land comprised within the boundary of the port area and includes the docks, quays, sheds, open spaces, warehouses, etc. Which are usually and customarily used in connection with loading and unloading of goods or passengers or for customs purposes. It would be unreasonable to suggest that the places in dispute in these petitions in Karachi such as Garden East, P.E.C.H.S. Area, Jamia Cloth and Noor Market and the Super Highway, which nave no connection with ships and shipment of goods or passengers, are within the limits of the port area. "
11. We do not find any infirmity in the above reasoning as to warrant interference by this Court. We would, therefore, dismiss the above appeals, but there will be no order as to costs.