The respondents on 10-9-1984 filed a suit for declaration that the suitland was reserved for common Eid Gah and Graveyard for the use of all theeligious sects of the village and that the petitioners belonging to Barailvi Sectere not entitled to build shops and Madras over the same. In the writtentatement, it was admitted that the land was reserved for public welfare. Duringhe pendency of the suit, the parties on 3-4-1985 made a statement that the Judgehould himself inspect the site and decide the case which decision would betable to all the parties. Accordingly on 8-10-1985, the learned Judgeisited the Eid Gah and prepared his detailed notes. On 20-10-1985, the trial Court finally decided that the place shall be used only for the purposes of Eidmosque or shop or any structure will be built by any person exceptWiththe concurrent consent of all the Abadi and that the place shall remain in the joint possession of all the sects. Certain other directions were also made. This decision/decree was appealed against by the present petitioners separately against Talib Hussain also who had filed a similar suit and vide judgment dated 4-6-1986, both the appeals were dismissed. The Appellate Court held that this being a consent decree could not have been appealed. This revision is directed against the above judgments and the decree.
2. It may be noted that Civil Revision No. 1819-D of 1986 was also filed by the presentetitioners arising out of the suit filed by Talib Hussain. According o the learned counsel for theetitioners the said revision was compromised as a result of which the judgment and decree passed in the suit was set aside.
3. In support of the present revision, learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously argued that under Order 18, Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 the inspection notes prepared by a Judge on his visit of the site is no substitute to evidence and by deciding the case on the strength of the inspection notes, the trial Court has committed an illegality. In the same line it is emphasised that, in fact, the petitioners have been denied the opportunity of leading evidence. The contention has been refuted by the learned counsel who has contended that, in fact, the procedure adopted voluntarily by the parties constituted the Judge as arbitrator and his decision amounts to a consent decree which cannot be impeached. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1934 Lahore 176(2) titled Ganga Ram and others v. Jagu and another and AIR 1929 Allahabad 577 titled Baijnath v.
Dhani Ram. This argument has.Been refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioners by relying on 1986 CLC 798(2) titled Hatim and another v. Mir Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others. `'--- 4.It is clear that the statement of the parties to the effect that the learned Judge should visit the site and decide the case after inspection, amounts to an agreement by which the Judge is relegated to the position of an arbitrator and his A decision amounts to a consent award/decree which could not be impeached as laid down in section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents do support the above proposition. Even the Quetta judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners does not lay'down any contrary principle as it holds "inspection being no substitute for evidence, judgment based merely on it to be not binding unless parties agree to it". The proposition that inspection notes are no substitute for evidence is correct as a general principle of law but this principle is not g applicable in the present case. In the instant case the parties agreed to consider the trial Court as the arbitrator and further agreed to be bound by his decision which he was required to give after inspecting the site. This having been done, no objection can be taken to the same. Even* otherwise the perusal of the decision made by the trial Court as upheld in appeal, makes it clear that the order is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Apart from the technical .Plea that the decision being a consent decision and no appeal or revision would be competent against the, same,, the decision is so proper and just that it hardly calls for interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.
5.For the above reasons, this revision is dismissed with costs.