SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 9-4-1996, whereby the appeal filed by the respondent, herein, was accepted and he was given extension of time for depositing the pre-emption money till 30-4-1996.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a pre-emption suit was filed by respondent in the Court of Sub-Judge, Kotli, alleging that in fact the land was sold for a consideration of Rs..16,500 but a fictitious amount of Rs.25,000 as consideration for suit land had been entered in the sale-deed. The trial Court, after the trial of the suit, passed a decree in favour of plaintiff-respondent on the payment of Rs.25,000 as price of the land plus Rs.850.50 as costs incurred on the execution of the sale-deed. The plaintiff was directed vide its judgment dated 18-2-1988 to deposit the aforesaid amount in the trial Court till 10-3-1988, failing which the suit would have stood dismissed. The pre- emptor, Anwaar Anwar, preferred an appeal to the District Judge, Kotli, for the reduction of the consideration amount and also applied for the extension of time fixed by the trial Court for depositing the pre-emption money. The learned District Judge extended the time for depositing the pre-emption money till the decision of the appeal. The appeal filed by the respondent was dismissed by the District Judge on 17-7-1990 but the District Judge did not fix any fresh date for depositing the pre-emption amount. The pre-emptor went up in appeal before the High Court but the same was also dismissed; the judgment of the High Court also did not contain any direction with regard to the depositing of pre-emption amount. Subsequently, the pre-emptor filed an application before the Additional Sub--Judge, Kotli, on 31-5-1992 for accepting the pre-emption money as required by the decree of the trial Court. The Clerk of the Court of Additional Sub-Judge made a report on the application and finally the said application was returned to the pre-emptor on 17-6-1992 by Additional Sub-Judge with the direction that he should produce the copy of the order of the High Court suspending the time for depositing the pre-emption amount. Consequently, the respondent filed an application on 5-8-1992 before the District Judge seeking extension in the time for depositing the pre-emption amount. The learned District Judge dismissed the application and expressed the view that in the circumstances of the case he was not competent to extend the time. Consequently, an appeal was filed in the High Court against the order of District Judge which was accepted and the time was extended for depositing the pre-emption money till 30-4-1996. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court which has been challenged before this Court.
3. We have heard the arguments and perused the record. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, Advocate, that no appeal was competent before the High Court against the order of the District Judge and as such the impugned order of the High Court extending the time is not sustainable. The learned counsel has further argued that if the Appellate Court while extending time for depositing the pre-emption money etc. Does not fix a fresh date for depositing the pre-emption amount at the time of the disposal of the appeal, the pre-emptor must approach the relevant Court within a 'reasonable time' for depositing the amount in terms of the pre--emption decree. According to the learned counsel, in the instant case the High Court decided original appeal of the pre-emptor on 23-5-1992 but he made the application for the extension of time to the District Judge on 5-8-1992, after more than 2/1-2 months. Thus, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the pre-emptor promptly took steps for the compliance of the terms of the decree. The learned counsel has relied upon the following cases in support of his contention:-- 1983 CLC 1912), it has been held that if the trial Court fixes a specific date for the payment of the purchase money and costs but the Appellate Court suspends the time till the decision of the appeal and at the time of disposal of the appeal does not fix a fresh date for depositing the pre- emption money, the plaintiff-decree-holder must approach the Court within reasonable time for depositing the amount. It was opined as to what would be 'reasonable time' for depositing the amount would generally depend upon the general practice of the Court in such cases and also the time which was originally allowed by the trial Court for depositing the pre-emption money. It was held that generally one month would be deemed to be a 'reasonable time' for doing the needful.
4. Raja Imdad A.I Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondent, controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on all scores. He has argued that the plaintiff-respondent could not be punished for the mistake of the District Judge by omitting to fix the time for depositing the pre-emption money. He has argued that in the instant case, the pre- emptor-respondent first approached before the trial Court and tendered pre--emption amount but the same was not accepted and the application was returned to him by the Additional Sub- Judge. Thereafter, he applied to the District Judge for extension of time for depositing the pre- emption money. The learned counsel has argued that the plaintiff was neither at fault nor he was negligent.
5. We have given due consideration to the matter. So far as the point that no appeal was competent to the High Court against the order of the District Judge is concerned, it may be stated that the High Court also possesses the revisional jurisdiction and. Even if it is assumed that no appeal was competent, the High Court was competent to pass the order extending the time for depositing pre-emption money in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Besides, the point regarding incompetency of the appeal before the High Court was not raised before it and, thus, there are no findings on this point in the High Court. However, as the impugned order could be passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that order of the High Court is not sustainable because no appeal lay to it, has no substance and is hereby repelled.
6. The next point which needs resolution is as to whether the plaintiff-- respondent approached the Court within the reasonable time for depositing the pre-emption amount. The perusal of the record shows that the time originally fixed by the trial Court for depositing the pre-emption money was about one month. After the dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, the plaintiff---respondent submitted an application before the Additional Sub-Judge, Kotli, on 31-5-1992, i.e., after eight days of the disposal of the appeal by the High Court, meaning thereby that he tendered the money to the trial Court within the period of one month which was originally fixed by the trial Court for doing the needful. The authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, referred to above, also lay down the principle that normally the 'reasonable time' for depositing the pre-emption money would be the period which was originally fixed by the trial Court for the compliance of the pre-emption decree. It may be stated here that the learned Additional Sub-Judge passed an order on the said application on 17-2-1992 that the amount could be deposited only if the pre-emptor- respondent produces the 'stay order' of the High Court with regard to depositing of the pre- emption money. It is correct that thereafter, the respondent approached to the District Judge on 5- 8-1992 for the extension of time, i.e. After about 48 days: but the fact remains that originally he appeared before the Additional Sub-Judge, as indicated above, well within one month. Therefore, his subsequent application before the District Judge would not brush aside his earlier effort for depositing the pre-emption ,amount in the Court of Sub-Judge, especially so when according to the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the mount was to be deposited in this trial Court and not in any of the Appellate Courts. Under these circumstances, we do not subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that as the respondent did not promptly seek the redress of his grievance from the District Judge after his application was returned to him by the trial Court, the time for doing the needful should not have been extended. It may be also observed that this is the basic principle of law that a litigant should not be made to suffer for any mistake of the Court or Clerk of the Court. Taking into consideration the provisions contained in Rule 14 of Order XX, C.P.C., this Court has opined in case reported as Muhammad Akbar v. Mst. Faziha Begum (1983 CLC 1912), referred to above, that the District Judge was legally bound to fix the new date at the time of the disposal of the appeal, on or before which the pre-emption money were to be deposited by the pre-emptor-respondent; and that by failing to fix a new date he committed an illegality.