The instant appeal calls in question the soundness of an order dated 4-4-1994, rendered by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore, rejecting the grievance petition filed by the appellant on 18-11-1993, assailing the order dated 28-8-1989, dismissing him from service of the respondent concern. The respondent had also submitted cross objections, challenging the maintainability and merits of the appeal. The same would be disposed of together with the appeal, being intimately inter--related. Learned representative of the respondent and the appellant in person have been heard at certain length.
2. The appellant was employed on 5-12-1968, as Invoice Clerk, by the respondent establishment, having its office, then, at 2-R Queens Road, Lahore, afterwards shifted to 92-A, New Muslim Town, Lahore. For alleged acts of misconduct, having instigated the other employees to proceed on an illegal strike on 5-6-1989, he was charge-sheeted on 18-6-1989 and was removed from service on 28-8-1989, which order was described by him as patently illegal, arbitrary, mala fide and malicious, liable to be set aside. He sought his reinstatement in service, with full back benefits. His plea did not find favour with the learned Labour Court, and his grievance petition, as already said, was dismissed on 4-4-1994.
3. Actually the Labour Court was not the first forum, he had approached for achievement of his object. A perusal of the cross objections filed by the respondent, as also the impugned order, reveals that he had initially invoked the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Relations Commission, but failed, as his petition was dismissed on 3-5-1990. Instead of filing an appeal, against the aforesaid decision before the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C., he filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court, which he withdrew on 30-1-1991. Thereafter it occurred to him that he could also avail of the remedy by having access to the N.I.R.C. Once again. His appeal was, however, dismissed by the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C. On 3-6-1991, being barred by the law of limitation. Thereafter he preferred a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before the Labour Court, which was dismissed by the impugned order passed on 4-4-1994, mainly on the ground of limitation. The appellant had also submitted an application for condonation of delay (on 18-11- 1993). The learned lower Court, however, found it difficult to cross the bar of limitation, the grievance petition having been filed more than four years after the appellant's ouster from service.
4. Relianc6~by the learned counsel for the respondent has been placed on 1984 SCMR 890, Mst.
Mahmooda Begum v. Major Malik Muhammad Ishaq etc., 1985 SCM R 333/903, Bashir Ahmad v.
Government of the Punjab and others, and Fazal Karim v. Government of Pakistan and others. It was pronounced by the Honourable Supreme Court that ignorance of law on the part of the counsel did not afford to the litigant a ground for urging that he had been ill-advised by his counsel and that had prevented him from coming to the right forum in the. Faulty pursuit of a cause before an incompetent forum was held not to be a sufficient ground for condoning the delay caused in consequence.
5. The grievance notice emanated from the appellant on 14-10-1991, and he filed the grievance petition on 18-11-1993, which were palpably the-- barred, beyond any shadow of doubt, the appellant's dismissal from service having been effected on 4-9-1989. The appellant, it appears, had filed a 2nd writ petition in the High Court. On behalf of the respondent it has beers submitted that the appellant had with-held the said information and not made it known to his erstwhile employer that he had again approached the High Court and met failure there, his 2nd writ petition having been dismissed on 14-3-1993. That development, however, could also not be availed of by the appellant for pleading that there was any justification for ignoring the delay that had occurred, in having recourse to the competent forum, several years after accrual of cause of action. As such, the learned lower Court was wholly justified in holding that the grievance petition was hopelessly the-barred, liable to dismissal on that ground alone. I would uphold the decision and dismiss the appeal, with costs, being devoid of substance and merit.