On 7-2-1979 the petitioner filed suit . For permanent injunction restraining the respondent from recovering arrears of land revenue as nothing was due from him. It was stated in the plaint that the petitioner was a ' Tahveeldar'was receiving the land revenue and depositing it in the treasury and that all the land owners who did not pay, he endeavoured to recover the same from them. In para. 2 it was stated that the respondent-defendant was attempting to recover some amount as arrears of land revenue for which it has no authority. The basis for calling in question the recovery measure, was that the petitioner was never appointed as 'Lambardar' of the 'Mauza'. He was only a 'Tahveeldar' and he did not fall within the definition of a 'village-officer'. In the written statement the suit was contested by raising objections inter alia to the jurisdiction of the Court on the strength of section 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 referred herein as the Act. The maintainability was also challenged on the strength of section 91 of the Act.
2. On facts it was admitted that the petitioner was a ' Tahveeldar' and has been receiving 'Dhal Bach' from Rabi 1969 to Rabi 1978. It was urged that a sum of Rs.1,78,879.84 was due from the petitioner. It was also averred that the petitioner/plaintiff did not file any list of defaulters which shows that the petitioner has received all the revenue from the land owner. The divergent pleadings gave rise to various issues, which were duly tried. Vide judgment dated 24-1-1980 the Trial Court dismissed the suit holding the same to be not maintainable. Under issue No.3 it was held that the petitioner was a defaulter. On appeal the judgment was affirmed on 16-3-1980. This is a revision by the plaintiff under section 115, C.P.C., calling in question the judgments and the decree.
3. In support of! The: revision the learned counsel has mainly reiterated the point, rejected by the two Courts below. It is urged that the petitioner is not a 'Village-Officer' anal there fore, the respondent could not recover the amount of land revenue due by using coercive process. Reliance for this purpose is placed on Jim Gul Muharnmad v. Government of West Pakistan through Collector PLD 1975 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 1, Malik Abdullah Karim v. West Pakistan Province through Collector, Rahimyar Khan and another PLD 1978 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 22, Subedar Muharramad Fayyaz Khan v. Raja Akhtar Zaman Khan and others PLD 1956 W.P. Peshawar 27. The learned counsel also relied on Hamid Hussain v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1974 SCM R 356 and Abdul Rauf and others v. Aodul Hamid Khan and others PLD 1965 SC 671 to show that where the order gar action does not fall within the four comers of given law, the Civil Court her` jurisdiction.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent has on the other hand relied on Muhammad Mureed v. Government of Punjab and 2 others 1979 CLC. 151 to contend that the petitioner could only challenge the recovery by firsh paying the amount, under protest. He also referred to section 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 to claim ouster of the jurisdiction of Civil Court.. It was further contended that the finding/judgment being concurrent, this Court should not interfere in the same, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction.
5. The Village Officer as defined under section 4(28) of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 reads as under:- -- "Village Officer" means any person appointed under this Act whose duty it is to collect, or to supervise the collection of, the revenue of an estate and includes Kanungos, Patwaris, Zabits, Kotars or Tapedars Peons, Arbabs, Rais and Headmen (Lambardars)."
It will be seen that the definition of the 'Village Officer' is large enough to include any person who is appointed or entrusted the duty of collection or supervise the collection of the revenue of the estate and further includes persons mentioned therein to be 'Village Officer'.
6.Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised the point probably under the impression that the word ' Tahveeldar' is not mentioned in the definition, but A the naming of the persons mentioned therein, is only explanatory and elaboratory. The list is not exhaustive. Any person who is appointed, even if, temporarily and is entrusted with the duty of collection of revenue of the estate, would fall within the definition of 'Village Officer'. In the plaint, filed on 7-2-1979, the petitioner clearly averred that he was a 'Tahveeldar' and has been collecting the revenue on behalf of the Government since the year 1972. The petitioner will therefore, be held to have been entrusted with the duty of collecting revenue on behalf of the Province-defendant. Learned counsel for thepetitioner has not produced any direct decision/precedent case to show that ' Tahveeidar' or any person otherwise entrusted with the duty to collect the revenue,, by the Collector, does not fall within the expression 'Village Officer'. Keeping in view the nature of duty having been performed, there: is no room for insisting that in order to be a 'Village Officer' there has to be a specific order of appointment.
Entrustment of 'Dhal Bach' with a direction to recover the revenue, on the assurance of payment of remuneration, would be deemed, to be an appointment within the meaning of 'Village Officer' specified in section 4(28) of the Act,. And such person could be proceeded against under A section 113 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and the recovery of the amount due could be made as arrears of land revenue from him.
7. Assuming that the petitioner strictly does not fall within the meaning of `Village Officer', even then the petitioner's suit would be barred under section 172 of the Act. In specific, the Civil Courts will have no jurisdiction in matters falling within clauses (ix) and (xv) of subsection (2) thereof. A bare reading of the plaint shows that the case of the petitioner falls within these two clauses, inasmuch as the petitioner was disputing the amount assessed to be due from him, on account of the petitioner having made the recovery of the same, from the landowners and having failed to deposit it in the Government Treasury.
8. Once again assuming that section 172 did not operate as a bar, and that the petitioner could challenge monetary demand on the ground of same being unlawful, or the result of miscalculation, the suit would still be barred under section 91 of the Act. For-reference the same is reproduced:--- 91.Remedies oven to person denying his liability for an arrear.---(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 79, when proceedings are taken under this Act for the recovery of an arrear, the person against whom the proceedings are taken may, if he denies his liability for the arrear or any part thereof and pays the same under protest made in writing at the time of payment and signed by him or his agent, institute a suit in a Civil Court for the recovery of the amount so paid.
(2) A suit under subsection (1) must be instituted in a Court having jurisdiction in the place where the office of the Collector of the District in which the arrear or some part thereof accrued is situate."
It will be seen that under section 91 of the Act the expression is " ....The person against whom ...." and not a 'Village Officer'. In other words, unless the petitioner was to deny that he was a 'person', he cannot get out of the rigour of section 91. The petitioner has to deposit, under protest, before challenging the monetary demand in the Civil Court. This having not been done tie suit will have to be dismissed.
9. There is another objection to the maintainability of the suit and that is that the simple suit for declaration does not lie to determine the monetary or pecuniary relationship between the parties.
Such a declaration cannot be granted under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. It is clear that without granting this declaration, the petitioner could not be granted permanent injunction as prayed for, by him. Permanent injunction could only follow the determination of pecuniary relationship between the parties.
10. The perusal of the plaint shows that the draftsman is clever enough to C avoid the mentioning of actual amount being demanded, by the defendant --Province. It was not even vaguely suggested as to how much was due. In spite of this attempt, the fact remains that substantially the plaint proceeds on the averments that the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount .To the defendant Province and therefore, the defendant be restrained from recovering the same as arrear of land- revenue. I am afraid this cannot be done and if at all it could be done, the petitioner had to deposit the demanded amount, under protest, as required under section 91 of the Act.
11. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner -are all distinguishable. The first judgment namely Jam Gul Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan through Collector PLD 1975 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 1 decides only an injunction application and it is settled law that determination of injunction applications is tentative. Even otherwise, in this judgment the Court proceeded on the premises that there was nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff in the case, was admitted as 'Headman'. In the present case the petitioner admits to be ' Tahveeldar' and Incahrge of recovery of revenue since 1972. In the second judgment namely Malik Abdullah Karim v: West Pakistan Province through Collector, Rahimyar Khan and another PLD 1978 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 22, the .Plaintiff was merely an agent of the 'Headman', and not as a person directly entrusted with the ' Dhal Bach' by the Government/Collector. The third judgment namely Subedar Muhammad Fayyaz Khan v. Raja Akhtar Zaman Khan and others PLD 1965 W.P. Peshawar 27 is also distinguishable inasmuch as in that judgment the plaintiff being son of a Lambardar, sought setting aside the attachment, on the ground that the property of the deceased Lambardar was attached, for failure to deposit the amount falling due after the death of the Lambardar. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent namely Muhammad Mureed v.
Government of Punjab and 2 others 1979 CLC 151 on the other hand, is appropriate and is respectfully followed.
12. It is correct that the Civil Courts being Courts of plenary jurisdiction have the power and jurisdiction to grant relief in matters which are mala fide coram non judice and otherwise beyond the scope of law. This is an age-old p principle. Reference to Hamid Hussain v. Government of West Pakistan and others 1974 SCM R-356 and Abdul Rauf and others v. Abdul Hamid Khan and others PLD 1965 SC 671 is correct. However, the principle is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case. As shown and held above, the petitioner can be lawfully proceeded against, for recovery of dues as arrears of land revenue.
13. For the reasons stated above this revision has no merits and is dismissed with costs.