1. MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.---Petitioner Mst. Mahmudi Begum has sought leave to appeal against dismissal of her Civil Revision No. 10 of 1994/BWP by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, under the judgment dated 7-5-1996.
2. The petitioner filed a suit for pre-empting sale of the land in litigation measuring 20 Kanals situated in village Goth Mehru, Teshil and District Bahawalpur, by her husband Abdur Rehman in favour of Muhammad Saeed Khan. The said suit ended in a compromise between the parties on 21-7-1992, when it was decreed in favour of the petitioner, on her depositing in Court by 22-9-1992 Rs.2,80,250 minus the amount already deposited in Court. The suit was to be dismissed if the petitioner failed to deposit the said amount, the said date. The petitioner could not manage the balance amount viz Rs.1,96,910 by the said date and hence she approached respondent Malik Muhammad Ashraf for a loan. As a result of her approach, there was a sale agreement between her and respondent Malik Muhammad Ashraf on 21-9-1992. According to the said agreement, the petitioner agreed to sell the suit land to the respondent for Rs.3,00,000 out of which Rs.2,50,000 were received by her, as earnest money, while balance of Rs.50,000 was payable to her at the the of registration of the Sale Deed or sanction of mutation in case the sale was oral. In any case the registration of Sale Deed or sanction of mutation was to take place by 22-tU-tv92. After realizing Rs.2,50,000 the petitioner deposited the amount due in the Court which granted her the decree in the pre-emption suit. On petitioner's failure to honour the agreement dated 21-9-1992, respondent Malik Muhammad Ashraf filed suit against the former for specific performance of the sale agreement dated 21-9-1992. Said suit ended on 13-5-1993 into a compromise, by which the petitioner was to deposit in Court Rs.3,37,500 by 30-8-1993 and on such deposit suit of the respondent was deemed to have been dismissed, but on failure of the petitioner to deposit said amount by said date, respondent's suit was to be deemed to have been decreed in terms of the compromise. On petitioner's failure to deposit said amount by the said date, the respondent filed an Application bearing No.65 of 1993 for execution of the consent decree passed on 13-5-1993. In the execution Court the petitioner moved on 30-8-1993 an application for extension of the to deposit in Court Rs.3,37,500 on the ground that she, being a lady, had been able to manage only Rs.1,75,000 and for the balance she needed a few days' the.
3. Said application was dismissed on 23-9-1993. The Court ordered the petitioner to ensure completion of the sale-deed in favour of the respondent by 14-10-1993. Instead of executing the sale deed in favour of the respondent, the petitioner on 28-9-1993 filed in the trial Court an application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. For setting aside of the decree passed on 13-5-1993. In said application the petitioner alleged that the compromise date 13-5-1993 was fraudulent and the decree passed on 13-5-1993 as result of the said compromise, was liable to be cancelled for being based on fraud, deception and misrepresentation and for being incompetent and contrary to facts. Said application was contested by the respondent. Under an order dated 23-12-1993, learned Senior Civil Judge, Bahawalpur dismissed said application. Said order was assailed by the petitioner in the Lahore High Court under Civil Revision No. 10 of 1994, which was dismissed under the impugned judgment. Hence this petition.
4. Chaudhry Muhammad Ashraf Azim, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the application moved under section 12(2) of Code of Civil Procedure raised controversial points of fact, which could be decided only after framing of proper issues and recording of evidence, but this was not done. In respect of the happenings of 13-5-1993, it was argued that the petitioner was told to appear in the Court and give statement as security for return of ,the loan taken by her from the respondent. That the petitioner was never told that her statement was about compromise in the suit. That on 13-5-1993 her Advocate Malik Abdul Ghafoor did not appear in the Court. That Malik Muhammad Ishaq Joya. Advocate, who appeared on her behalf in the Court on 13-5-1993 was not her counsel and was not authorised to enter into any compromise on her behalf. It was added that the petitioner was an illiterate, uneducated and Purdah observing lady of a village and was not conversant with Court proceedings.
5. The Lahore High Court under the impugned judgment has reproduced the view taken by a Bench of the same Court in the case of Alam Ali and another v. District Judge, Multan and 3 others (PLD.
6. 1983 Lah. 278), that since the provisions contained in section 12(2) of Civil Procedure Code appear to be an exception to the general rules of appeal, revision and review, they have to be construed and applied strictly and as such, he onus would lie on the applicant to prove the application, strictly within the scope and premises of said provisions. The High Court also referred to another observation made in the said case that the trial Court shall not set aside or interfere with the decree under section 12(2) of C.P.C. Unless a strong and clear case is made out within the corners of section 12(2) of C.P.C.
7. Under the impugned judgment, the High Court has taken note of the fact that the sale agreement in favour of the respondent was witnessed by husband of the petitioner. That the petitioner had not disowned the compromise between her and the respondent, or her statement in Court. In the circumstances, it does not lie in mouth of the petitioner to say that fraud was played upon her.
8. Had the decree dated 13-5-1993 been obtained by fraud or deceit, the petitioner would not moved an application on 30-8-1993 through her counsel Mr. Muhammad Sharif Bhatti for extension of the to pay Rs.337,500 payable under the decree dated 13-5-1993 by 30-8-1993. Moving of such application shows that the petitioner relied on the decree, now challenged to be fraudulent. The High Court after taking note of petitioner's application dated 30-8-1993 took view that no fraud was played upon the petitioner and that the Senior Civil Judge had passed a valid order, while dismissing petitioner's application under section 12(2) of C.P.C.
9. No different view appears permissible. Leave to appeal is, therefore, declined and this petition stands dismissed.