RAJA FAYYAZ AHMAD, J.---Through this Constitutional petition order dated 20-6-1996 of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Quetta made persaunt to the order of the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority Quetta, directions contained in letter dated 26-11-1996 of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority and order dated 23-12-1996 made by the official respondent No.9 have been challenged being not sustainable under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and the Rules made thereunder whereby the timing of the departure of the petitioner's Mini bus has been rescheduled.
2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner is the holder of stage carriage permit for his mini bus en-route i.e. Pishin to Barshore-Shina K. Nasir Chungi granted in his favour by the respondent No.8, Secretary, Regional Transport Authority on 5-6-1996. Consequent upon the prior approval of the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, the respondent No.8 (Secretary R.T.A.) vide his order dated 19-6-1996 rescheduled the departure timings of the buses plied on the said route by the existing transporters and to accommodate the new entrant/permit - holders and as .Per this time table the mini bus of the petitioner appearing at section No. It of the time table scheduled to depart from Pishin at 3-10 p.m. On the granted route.
3. Persuant to the order of Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, the respondent No.8 withdrew the time table earlier allocated to the petitioner vide order dated 19-6-1996 for the departure of his mini bus from Pishin and instead as per desire of the respondent No.7 (Chairman, R.T.A.) the previous time table dated 6-11-1995 of the departure of the buses from terminal has been restored providing departure timings for the petitioner's bus to be 6-00 p.m. From Pishin and 9-00 a.m. From Chungi.
4. With a view to resolve various disputes between the transport Union and Transport Federation operating in District Pishin, a meeting with the representative of Transport Union and Federation was held on 24-7-1996 chaired by the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin. The disputes between the transporters were categorized itemwise including the one pertaining to the time table of the buses.
The disputes of the transporters appear to have been settled by the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin as is evident from the proceedings finalized on 3-9-1996 by the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin wherein besides, other matters the timing for the petitioner's bus from Pishin has been fixed at 6-00 p.m. The learned Assistant Commissioner, Pishin simultaneously decided that the petitioner's bus will depart from the terminal subsequent to the departure of the bus of the respondent No.5.
5. Subsequent thereto vide Memorandum No. 1188/RTA dated 26-11-1996 addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Pishin issued by the respondent No. 8 (Secretary R.T.A.) conveyed the desire of the Chairman; Regional Transport Authority that the petitioner to be bound down to observe the old time table issued by his office order dated 20-6-1996 as the delegation of transporters of the route complained against him, to the Chairman of violating the said time table'.
6. The petitioner feeling himself aggrieved of the impugned orders/directions dated 20-6-1996 and 26-11-1996 filed an appeal under section 66 subsection (1)(G) of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 before the Senior, Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan-cum-Chairman, Provincial Transport Authority. The learned appellate Authority (respondent No.9) vide its order dated 23-12-1996 partially accepted the appeal of the petitioner to the extent that the departure timings of the petitioner's bus on the route was fixed as 5-30 p.m. In the winter being the last bus to depart from its terminal point, with the further observations to the Regional Transport Authorities to introduce two different timings of the transporters of the area one for the summer and the other for winter season to avoid any inconvenience to the transporters and passengers. Persuantto order dated 23-12-1996. The respondent No.8 vide his order dated 30-12-1996 fixed the winter and summer timings of the buses operating on the route and the departure timing of the bus of the petitioner fixed at 5.30 p.m. In winter and 6-00 p.m. In summer.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the order dated 20-6-1996 made by the respondent No.8 (Secretary R.T.A.) persaunt to the directions of the respondent No.7 whereby the departure timings of the petitioner's bus fixed by order dated 19-6-1996 at 3-10 p.m. To be withdrawn and the previous time table dated 6-11-1995 restored, has been made without notice to the petitioner and he has been condemned unheard which is against the principles of natural justice and moreover, the order dated 20-6-1996 virtually stood non-existing on account of the fresh. Timings fixed for his bus by the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin by his verdict dated 3-9-1996.
The learned counsel further submitted that the order/directions contained in Memo. No. 1188 dated 26-11-1996 issued by the Secretary, R.T.A. Requiring the petitioner to be bound down to observe the old time table issued vide office order dated 20-6-1996 is also not sustainable in view of the aforementioned grounds and is against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance. The learned counsel assailed the order dated 26-12-1996 passed by the learned appellate Authority/respondent No.9, to be contrary to law and thus not tenable. It has been specifically argued by the petitioner's counsel that the verdict of the/Assistant Commissioner, Pishin holds the field as none of the concerned transporter filed any appeal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the observation recorded by the respondent No.9 in his order dated 23-12-1996 whereby it has been suggested to the Regional Transport Authorities to introduce two different timings for the transporters of the area one for the summer and the other for the winter season to avoid inconvenience to the transporters as also to the passengers, is contrary to the spirit of the Motor Vehicle Ordinance.
8. Mr. K. N. Kohli, Advocate representing the respondents Nos. l, 2, 3, 5 and 6, inter alia contended that the petitioner has been observing the allocated time table of departure for his bus fixed at 6- 00 p.m. And 9-00 a.m. From Chungi for the last about six months, which has been reduced to 5-30 p.m. In the winter for departure whereas; the time table earlier allocated to the petitioner of 3-10 a.m. On 19-8-1996 was immediately challenged and 'was withdrawn by the respondent No.8 on the next day. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner has been granted stage carriage permit not from Pishin via Barshore Shina Nasiran and assertion of the petitioner for having such a route permit is not correct. The time table is always granted to a permit holder on the basis of first come first serve basis and the petitioner being a subsequent entrant had to be accommodated keeping in view the said principle and practice. The learned counsel in view of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents further contended that the opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the competent authority and that the order of the Assistant Commissioner was without jurisdiction and of no binding effect. Mr. K.N. Kohli, the learned counsel relied on a case reported in 1987 M LD 2759 and contended that the Constitutional petition claiming particular time schedule for a stage carriage permit, in absence of statutory provisions/Rules cannot be maintained. According to the learned counsel, as the petitioner gave an undertaking on 23-11-1996 that he will not contravene the route permit, therefore, he is estopped by conduct even to question the timing fixed by the authorities.
The learned counsel for the parties appearing on their behalf have been heard and the documents available on the record perused in the light of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and the Rules made there under. The admitted position on the basis of record remains that vide order 19-6-1996 passed by the Secretary R.T.A. Persaunt to the directions of the respondent No.7 (Chairman, Regional Transport Authority) the departure time of the buses operating on the route was rescheduled according to which the petitioner's bus was to depart for the destination at 3-10 p.m. And on the very next day the allocated time for the bus of the petitioner was withdrawn by the respondent No.8 persaunt to the directions of the respondent No.7 and the previous time table dated 6-11-1995 restored on the complaint of certain transporters, directing the petitioner to depart his bus from Pishin at 6-00 p.m. And 9-00 p.m. From Chungi. No doubt the Authorities functioning under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 have the ample powers and the discretion, in absence the statutory provisions regulating the timings of the transport but A simultaneously it is their obligation to exercise the powers and authority justly and equitably keeping in view the public interest and convenience, which should not in any way be arbitrary or capricious. The exercise of discretionary powers by the functionaries under the Motor Vehicles Ordinance has been dealt with in the case reported in PLD 1991 SC 14 Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance Co. (Ltd.) Rawalpindi. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the excercise of statutory discretion in the words reproduced hereunder:- PLD 1991 SC 14 "(b) West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance (XIX of 1965), Ss.49 & 67---Conferment of powers on the Regional Transport Authority under section 49, relatable to the requirement of section 67--- Nature and duties appurtenant to its excerise---Wide worded conferment, of discretionary powers of reservation of discretion, without framing Rules to regulate its exercise, was taken to be an enhancement of the power and gave that impression in the first instance, but where the Authorities failed to rationalize it and regulate it by rules, or policy statements or precedents, the Courts would intervene more often than was necessary apart from the exercise of such power appearing arbitrary and capricious at times---Defects in exercise of discretion by the Regional Transport Authority pointed out by Supreme Court. (P.26) E&F
(c) Discretion--- --- Structuring of discretion---Meaning---Conferment of wide-worded discretionary powers by statute---Need and desirability to structure the discretion.
A public office is a public agency or trust created in the interest and for the benefit of the people, and since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and. Charge with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised on behalf of the Government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of the duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people and not their rulers. A public officer is amenable to the rule which' forbids an agent or trustee to place himself in such an attitude toward the principal or cestui que trust as to have his interest conflict with his duty. Where a statute is silent with respect to the time within which an official act must be performed, the law contemplates that the duty must be performed within a reasonable time. A public official who undertakes to , perform an act, even an act which is completely discretionary, must do so reasonably and in complete good faith without such delay as would frustrate its ultimate objective.
One who accepts a public office does so cum onere, or with the burden and is considered as accepting its burdens and obligations with its benefits. He thereby subjects himself to all Constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto and undertakes to perform all the duties of the office, and while he remains in such office the public has the right to demand that he performs such duties. The acceptance of every public office implies an agreement on the part of the officer that he will execute his duties with diligence and fidelity. The duty of a public officer to fulfil the obligations of his office should take precedence over all other matters. Eveq public officer is bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of his official duties, particularly where rights of individuals ma~ be jeopardized by his neglect. In other words, he is bound, virtue officii, to bring to the discharge of his duties that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their own affairs.
Wherever wide-worded powers conferring discretion are found in a statute, there remains always the need and the desirability to structure the discretion.
Structuring discretion means regularizing it, organizing it, producing order in it, so that decisions will achieve a higher quality of justice. The seven instruments that are most useful in the structuring of discretionary powers are open plans, open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open precedents, and fair informal procedure. When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time, and then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion through principles and rules. The movement from vague standards to definite standards to broad principles to rules may be accomplished by policy statements in any form, by adjudicatory opinions, or by exercise of the rule-making power. When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful standards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time; and then, as circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion through principles and rules.
9Obviously the order dated 20-6-1996 has been passed by the respondent No.9 whereby the departing time of the petitioner's bus has been fixed at 6-00 p.m. Is against the earlier one allocated just and day before it giving departure time 3-10 a.m. Has been withdrawn without notice to the petitioner. The necessity, if any was to be met with; it was incumbent for the authority to have had passed the required order after hearing the parties which would have been in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The ground for the exercise of! Such a discretion by the authority is as well-wanting. Though there is no provision in the Ordinance and the Rules made there under on the subject in hand, of giving personal hearing, yet the principles of natural justice shall be deemed to have been treated to be existing in such a Statute creating any legal right in favour of any person or property unless its application excluded expressly in the Statute. In the instant case specific time was allocated to the petitioner by the competent forum in the exercise of its statutory discretionary powers but was withdrawn on the next day by refixing the same at 6-00 p.m. Against the timing of 3-10 p.m. Being the last bus to depart. Consequential impugned order/directions dated 26-11-1996 were also made by the respondent No.8 in his letter addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Pishin on the subject referring to a complaint of transporter made to the respondent No.7, with the directions that the petitioner to be bound down to observe old time table issued vide order dated 20-6-1996 to avoid resentment of the existing transporters. The order dated 20-6-1996 passed persaunt to the directions of the respondent No.7 by the Secretary, R.T.A. Has been made without notice to the petitioner, in our view is patently illegal and a nullity in the eye of law, for having been made in violation of the principles of natural justice also on the ground that it does not disclose/indicate any reasons or necessity calling for the withdrawal of the timing allocated to the petitioner only a day before. Consequently the order dated 23-12-1996 passed by the respondent No.9 in appeal against the impugned orders and directions of the respondent Nos.7 and 8 is also set aside. As the learned Appellate Authority did not take into consideration the gross violation of the non-adherence to the .Principles of natural justice by the subordinate forums while passing the impugned orders, hence the order passed by the learned Appellate Authority dated 23-12-1996 is also set aside, consequently re--secheduling of the time table by the respondent No.8 persaunt to the order of Appellate Authority is of no legal effect. The order dated 26-11,1996 in fact are the directions contained in the letter addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Pishin by the respondent No.8 wherein it has been mentioned that the Chairman, R.T.A. (respondent No.7) after hearing the patties desired that the petitioner may be bound down to observe the old time table issued vide order dated 20-6-1996 abundantly shows that hearing, if any was made by the respondent No:7, was afforded subsequent to the impugnedorder dated 20-6-1996. The subsequent hearing if any cannot be treated to be proper and legitimate one. PLD 1964 SC 410 Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan v. Fazul Rehman, PLD 1966 SC 536 Abdus Saboor Khan v. Karachi University and another referred.
10. The decision dated 3-9-1996 made by the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin regulating the timing of vehicles operating under the stage carriage permits on the route is totally void and without jurisdiction whether consented to by any party or objected to by any party or otherwise. The consent or participation of any party or group of transporters in the proceedings does not confer any jurisdiction to Assistant Commissioner which he, did not possess under the Motor Vehicle Ordinance 1965. Consequently the verdict of the Assistant Commissioner, Pishin is declared to be of no legal effect.
11. The contention of the counsel for the contesting respondents that the stage carriage permit of the petitioner was not granted for the route claimed in the petition has some force, as in the petition it has been stated that the route permit has been granted to the petitioner for Pishin via Shina Nasiran, the mentioned route in our estimation most probably been not exactly mentioned in the petition. The petitioner has based his case on the granted route permit, which is an undisputed document and the route specified in the permit is i.e. Pishin-Barshore Shina-Killi Nasiran, accordingly the petitioner has the right to ply his bus strictly in accordance with the specified route of the permit. The undertaking of the petitioner that he will not contravene the route permit, has no bearing whatsoever to the maintainability of the petition or on its merits.
12. The case-law relied upon by the petitioner's counsel reported in 1987 M LD 2759 Super High Way Bus Owners Association (Ltd.) v. Government of Sindh and 13 others, is of no avail to the petitioner being distinguishable on facts of the case as in this petition no particular timings have been claimed to be fixed in absence of the statutory provisions.
While parting with this judgment we may observe that functionaries under the Motor Vehicle Ordinance, 1965 if as per necessity or exigencies of certain conditions deem it proper and expedient to regularize, reschedule the E timings of the route for the buses operating thereon, in the interest of 4aw or public convenience could do so after hearing the parties in accordance with law in a very just and reasonable manner.
For the foregoing reasons the impugned order dated 20-6-1996 and 26-11-1996 passed by the official, respondents are set aside and declared to be of no legal effect. The petition consequently is allowed, with no order as to costs.