1. ' This appeal has been preferred by M/s. Munda Apparel against the decision passed on 5-6-1994.
2. ' The facts of the case are that under wrong impression they had paid contribution to the institution on 11-4-1990 but after consultation with his counsel they have been advised that appellant company is not liable to pay Social Security Contribution as it is not applicable to the establishment because Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers is applicable on 50 or more workers whereas there are only 35 workers in the appellant's establishment.
3. ' In reply to it learned counsel for respondent has pointed out appellant's own letter dated 4-6-1994 as Annexure A/24 written by them in reply to the respondent's letter dated 28-5-1994 Annexure A/23. In Annexure A/24 appellant themselves has given the figures of workers working in their establishment as 70. To show that Ordinance 1969 for unskilled workers is not applicable on them it is contended by learned counsel for respondent that only 09 workers are the original workers of the contractor of the appellant's factory/company. It is further argued by him that all the three contractors Ilyas, Alam, and Shah Alam are paying contribution of their employees at their own therefore, these employees cannot be termed as workers of the appellant's company. But these arguments advanced by learned counsel for appellants are in contrary to the decision passed in 1989 SCMR 888 wherein it has been observed that the workers though engaged by the contractors are to be termed as employees of the owner of the company as such employees work for the factory therefore, they cannot be excluded from the term workers of the factory.
4. ' It is further argued out by learned counsel for appellant that the demand has been made by the respondent without checking of record as in the Schedule of Contribution name of workers for whom contribution had been demanded has not been shown. But this plea taken up by learned counsel does not find support from the statement of his own witness where it has been admitted by him that he has not produced the record before the Commissioner for checking the same though such directions were given to him by the Director of Social Security Institution. Even before filing of the case on 28-5-1994 vide Annx. A/23 direction to produce the record for checking were given. However so far as the ground taken up by learned . Counsel for appellant so far as the applicability of West Pakistan Minimum Wages for unskilled workers is concerned it is contended by him that the such Ordinance is not applicable on other categories of workers besides unskilled workers as the amendment came in 1993 and so also the Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers is only in respect of unskilled workers and not for any other category therefore, demand of contribution on the basis of Amendment Act, 1993 is contrary to law.
5. ' In reply to it is argued out by learned counsel for respondent that section 1, clause (4), West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969, does not differentiate in-between skilled and unskilled workers and in support of his arguments he has referred numbers of ruling but section 1, clause (4) if read in combination to each other makes it clear that sub-clause (4) of section 1 clarified applicability of Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers on every industrial and commercial establishment wherein 50 or more persons are employed, or were employed on the day during the preceding 12 months but it does not speak that it is also applicable on skilled workers. In the citations referred in this connection as PLD 1990 Lahore 451 wherein it has been observed that: "preamble cannot extend, control, qualify or add to the statute when it is expressed in clear words- --Preamble is key to the statute to offer a clue to its scope if the words used therein, when construed without aid of the preamble, are capable of more than one meaning".
6. ' But while referring the citation learned counsel for respondent has failed to consider applicability of Unskilled Workers Ordinance on the establishment, because beside Preamble of the Ordinance it has also been specified in the Ordinance that it is for unskilled workers. In the same way in PLD 1996 W.P. Baghdad-ul-Jadid page 30. PLD 1992 Lahore 34, PLD 1976 Karachi 116 it has been observed that heading of chapter or section not to be taken into consideration where language of section is clear but in the referred case of PLD 1996 Baghdad-ul-Jadid page 30 such observation was made with reference related to the interpretation of statutes and applicability of section 251-A, Cr.P.C. That whether it applies only to warrant cases or does it also apply to the commitment proceedings and the summons trial. The question of such reference arose as chapter 21 of Cr.P.C. Which deals with the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates starts with section 251 and end with section 259 Chapter 20 deals with the trial of summons cases by Magistrate and it start from section 241 and end with section 250 whereas Chapter 22 which deals summary trial have sections 260 to 265 therefore, the question arose that section 251(a) appears in Chapter 21 under the heading of "trial of warrant cases" ordinarily the provision of this section should apply only to the warrant cases because heading do constitute important parts of the Act and the title of the chapter certainly throws light upon the meaning of the section, and it is because of that reference it was observed that the heading, therefore, is not in all case a determining factor. In PLD 1992 Lahore 34 the question arose that whether under section 18 of Electoral Rolls Act, 1974 made a restriction on the person to include his name in the electoral for the time being is concerned, it has been observed that:-- "There is nothing in the body of this section which prohibits the filing of an application during the time of annual revision."
7. It is further observed in the same citation that:--- "It is well-settled that heading of section cannot control the meaning of the statute nor curtail or restrict its scope and working."
8. ' Whereas in PLD 1976 Karachi 116 same observation have been made in case filed under section 38, C.P.C. That whether bill of exchange is a negotiable instrument or non-negotiable instrument. So in all these citations referred above it has been observed that the heading of section of statute cannot control the plain words of the statute but in West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969 I found no ambiguity to raise a question of interpretation to the statute of workers on whom it is applicable.
9. ' In order to show the applicability of Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers to other categories of class also learned counsel for respondent has taken a plea that the words used in the Act or Ordinance, should be given ordinarily dictionary meaning unless defined in statute and given wider meaning in the Act. In support of his arguments he has referred PLD 1976 Karachi 600. It is correct that it has been observed in the cited case that golden rule of interpretation of statute is that in construing the meaning of any words used in any Act, normally, it must be given the ordinary meaning in Dictionary. Though the words defining unskilled workers has been specifically specified in the Ordinance, 1969 as a worker employed to do unskilled labour and section 4 of the Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers further makes it clear that the responsibility for payment of minimum wages is on the employer who shall within 30 days of the promulgation of this Ordinance pay "such workers" the difference between the amount actual paid to him and the amount to which he entitled under this Ordinance. But besides this definition and clarification made in the Ordinance, the word "unskilled" as shown at page 1276 of Consise Oxford Dictionary means not having or needing skill or special training whereas the word 'worker' at page 1345 of Consise Dictionary means employed specially in commercial or industrial work. So if these ordinary meanings of 'workers' and 'unskilled' are taken into consideration then also the workers includes both skilled and unskilled persons as clarified in section 2(i) of West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, whereas the term 'unskilled' has been separately defined to make a separate category of worker from the skilled workers.
10. ' Learned counsel for respondent has further taken a plea that in the Schedule of Ordinance, 1969 for unskilled workers there is no specific word of unskilled therefore, it is applicable also on skilled workers and so also other categories of workers as in clause (i) of section 2 of the Ordinance, term ' worker' has also been defined but if this schedule is read with section 3 of the Ordinance, 1969 it will make it clear that this Schedule is for unskilled workers and not for other category of workers.
11. ' For ready reference section 3 of Ordinance, 1969 is reproduced is as under:-- "Minimum wages in commercial and industrial establishment.---Ever unskilled worker, other than an apprentice, employed in a commercial or industrial establishment situation in an area specified in column I of the Schedule, shall be paid wages at a rate not lower than the minimum wages per month specified against such area in column 2 of the Schedule: ' Provided that where an employer provides housing accommodation to a worker, he may deduct from the wages of such a worker, an amount not exceeding that specified in column 3 of the Schedule, and where the employer provides a worker with transport to and from the place of work he may deduct from the wages of such a worker an amount not exceeding that specified in column 4 of the Schedule.
12. ' Explanation.--- In this section-
(i) . Month' means a normal working period of twenty-six days calculated at the rate of forty-eight hours of work per week; and
(ii) ' wages' include cost of living allowance as admissible under the Employees' Cost of Living (Relief) Act, 1973 (I of 1974) dearness allowance and special allowances announced by the Government, from time to time, before the commencement of the West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers (Amendment) Act, 1993)."
13. ' Learned counsel for respondent has also referred 1973 SCMR 589, 1991 SCMR 1055, and 1976 SCMR 202 wherein it has been observed that it is well-established principle of interpretation that remedial statutes should be construed in manner so as to advance remedy and suppress mischief or else it would frustrate legislative internment. In order to give move support to his arguments learned counsel for respondent has referred 1991 SCMR 1055 wherein it has been observed by the superior Court that: ' Unfortunately we cannot help making an observation that the petitioner, in order to deprive a section of labour class employed by them, of due benefits under the Ordinance, took up untenable pleas and adopted such positions which it was difficult to establish. In such a situation under the Islamic dispensation, even if the case for both the sides had been equally balanced, in order to advance the command regarding social justice as contained in the Objectives Resolution, the decision to be rendered by this Court would have gone in favour of upholding the workers, right to the Social Security Cover."
14. ' Being on the same principle of social justice, the main theme of Islamic Jurisprudence is to do justice with all classes irrespective of the facts that whether he belong to the industrial or to the labour class because it has ordain in Holy Qur'an that:--- ' And when ye judge ' Between man and man.
15. ' That ye judge with justice: ' Verily from excellent ' Is the teaching which He giveth you: ' For Allah is He who heareth ' And seeth all things... (Sura Nisa, 4:58)
16. ' In view of above discussion I am definite that West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969, as amended by Act 1993 is not applicable on the other categories of workers, besides A unskilled workers and thus the demand of Social Security Institution without specifying that for whom contribution is demanded by them taking all skilled or unskilled workers in parallel is not just and proper.
17. ' In Appeal No,3 of 1994 a further plea have been taken that special allowance is not form/part of wages therefore the same cannot be included in the wages for the purpose of contribution. In support of this argument learned counsel for appellant has referred Sindh Employees' Special Allowance Act, 1988 where in section 87 it is stated that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or another law for the time being enforced, Special Allowance (two additional Special Allowances) will not form part of wages of a worker for the purpose of another law including the purpose of contribution to Provident Fund, Gratuity, Bonus, and calculating wages for overtime work.
18. ' In reply to it is argued out by learned counsel for respondent that the word "another law" used in this section does not mean Social Security Ordinance, as the word "wages" used in West Pakistan Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961 means remuneration payable to a worker. It also included other.
19. Benefits provided it is so accordingly or payable as wages under the law. Basing on the same analogy that: "Provided it is so according or payable as wages under the law."
20. ' I will like to refer section 3 of West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, wherein special allowance announced by the Government from time to time before commencement of West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Amendment Act, 1993 have been included as wages. Beside this it has also been observed in 1996 PLC 373 that wages.
21. "Punjab Employees Special Allowance (Amendment Act 1988) being a Provincial Law cannot override the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 and West Pakistan Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969, which are Federal Laws mentioned in Concurrent Legislative List of the Constitution of the Pakistan."
22. ' Hence I am of the view that the Special Allowance is a form/part of In view of above discussion I hereby set aside the impugned order passed on 30-4-1994, 4-1-1994, 15-2-1995, 26-4-1995 and allow the appeals of the appellant accordingly.
23. ' Order announced in the open Court on this 25th day of August, 1996.