The contents of the present writ petition have been perused and the learned counsel heard at length in respect thereof.
2. The Court was constrained to point out to the learned counsel that the impugned order herein dated 20-12-1995, particulars whereof have not been stated in the main writ petition, but a perusal of the copy thereof i.e. Annexure "B" has highlighted the fact, has been passed by invoking the provisions of section 3/4 of the West Pakistan Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1958) read with Secretary to Government of Punjab, Industries and Mineral Development Department Notification No.SOF-IV---CS(2)74-11, dated 10-4-1995, prohibiting the movement of wheat and wheat products (i.e. Atta, Suji, Maida) by means of transportation outside the revenue limits of Rahimyar Khan District, whereas the entire thrust and emphasis of the contentions raised herein, is to the effect that the prohibition thus imposed is in violation of the provisions of Article 151 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) granting the freedom of inter-provincial trade, and with special reference to clause (a) of sub- Article (3) of the said Article, reproduced hereinbelow, which is to the effect that the Provincial Assembly or Provincial Government shall not have power to-- "make any law, or take any executive action, prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or the export from the Province of goods of any class or description, or. "
3. Therefore, the learned counsel was duly confronted in that respect by pointing out that the impugned order was in respect of restriction imposed regarding the essential commodity outside a district of a Province and as such was in consonance with sub-Article (4) of the said very Article 151 of the Constitution, which is reproduced hereinbelow for reference:--- "An act of a Provincial Assembly which imposes any reasonable restriction in the interest of public health, public order or animals or plants from disease of preventing or alleviating any serious shortage in the Province of an essential commodity, shall not, if it was made with the consent of the President, be invalid. "
4. The learned counsel, at first, nevertheless, tried to argue by submitting that the restriction imposed by the impugned order in any case will prevent the commodities stated therein from going to other Provinces, but when called upon to deal with the provisions of sub-Article (4) stated above, the learned counsel came up with the flimsy argument that the said Act of 1958 did not have the consent of the President and as such was not a lawful enactment, but gave up the said argument on being pointed out that the said Act had been duly notified in the Gazette and reported in PLD 1958 W.P. Statutes 171, and that, therefore, no other presumption can be drawn except that the said law has been lawfully enacted and enforced.
5. Thereupon, the learned counsel abandoning his entire case, as stated in the present writ petition, contended for permission to amend the present writ petition so as to call in question the said Act of 1958 to be of without lawful authority and of no legal effect and as such, contending, that all acts done or proceedings taken pursuant to the provisions of the said Act of 1958, were liable to be set aside. The said request for amendment of the writ petition was refused and it was pointed out to the learned counsel that, firstly, allowing his request shall amount to the present writ petition being replaced by totally different arguments in respect of an entirely different case, which can only be undertaken by a proper case made out in that respect through a proper petition and not by allowing an amendment.
6. Therefore, it is hereby held that the restriction imposed through the impugned order on the movement of the essential commodity stated therein, out of the limits of District Rahimyar Khan, was pursuant to the lawful authority exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1958 and as such no interference therewith is called for under the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
7. It has been further taken notice of that the learned counsel had forcefully referred to the two orders of this Court passed in two different writ petitions i.e. Writ Petition No.6104 of 1995 titled Hilal Flour Mills v. Province of Punjab etc. And Writ Petition No.193/M of 1996 titled Messrs Hiial Flour Mills v.
District Magistrate, Dera Ghazi Khan, dated 2-10-1995 and 11-1-1996 by my learned brothers Amir Alam Khan, J. And Rana Muhammad Arshad, J. Respectively, while holding Court at Multan Bench of this Court, whereby the directive/order, impugned in the said two writ petitions, was suspended, by being emphasised by the learned counsel, that the nature of the directive/order impugned, the grievance agitated and the relief sought in the said two writ petitions, was same as herein, and was based on the same contentions as stated in the present writ petition. In that respect, it may be pointed out, with utmost respect that in view of what has been discussed above, the Court is unable to follow the said two orders and to suspend the operation of the order impugned herein.
8. At this stage, after afore stated proceedings had taken place and duly recorded, the learned counsel requested that the present writ petition may be disposed of as withdrawn.
9. However, for the afore stated reasons, the present writ petition is hereby dismissed in limine.