1. The petitioners have assailed judgment of Wilt Sind Labour Court dated 14-5-1996 accepting grievance Petition No. 137 of 1994 allowing application under section 25-A preferred by respondent No. 1 and the decision of Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 18-8-1996 dismissing appeal.
2. The sole grievance of the petitioner before us was that respondent No.1 was a temporary employee and had no legal right to approach the Labour Court and seek relief regarding his non- employment or refusal of employment by the petitioner. His connected argument was that since no industrial dispute was raised because of termination of service of respondent No. 1, therefore, he was not a worker under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and therefore, the application filed by him was not maintainable. In relation to the temporary employment he has relied upon the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sind Labour Court No. 5 and others reported in PLD 1980 SC 323, where their Lordships were pleased to hold that temporary employment can be for any period and interpreting the words likely to last in relation to the second point he has relied upon the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem reported in 1994 SCM R 2213. On our enquiry that concurrent findings cannot be assailed he has relied upon the Division Bench Decision of this Court reported in 1993 PLC 303.
3. We had given anxious consideration to the pleas urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. On our enquiry the learned counsel for the petitioner admitted that the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable to the establishment of the petitioners.
5. The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, is a Legislature which provides minimum guarantees in relation to the employment in an industrial and A commercial establishment. It provides safeguard to the workers in relation to the terms and conditions of employment. It is procedural law as well as substantive law, and in short a welfare Legislation. Standing Order 1 defines about the classification of workers while Standing Order 2-A places embargo on the employer and every order for appointment, transfer, termination is to be given in writing. Standing Order 12(3) deals with the termination of employment and again clips the powers of employer to state the reasons for the action taken and it will be noticed that the words employed by the Legislature are that the services of a workman shall not be terminated without assigning any reason and reads as follows:- "
12. Termination of employment.---(3) the services of a workman shall not be terminated or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may (take action in accordance with the provisions of) section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance. "
6. In Standing Order 12(2) categories/classification of .The workers have been mentioned but in Standing Order 12(3) such categories such as temporary workman and other categories as mentioned in above-quoted classification are absent and only word mentioned is a workman. It can be temporary, it can be probationer, daily-rated, monthly-rated or piece rated. I Standing Order 12(3) also allows workers that in case if they are aggrieved, they may approach the Labour Court in the manner provided under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance which is adopted Legislation for the purpose of redress of rights guaranteed under Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Therefore, there is no embargo for a temporary worker that he cannot approach the Labour Court. It is well---settled that the welfare Legislation is to be liberally construed and the Courts do not supply the words in welfare Legislation which have been deliberately not mentioned by the Legislature. The judgment of Supreme Court reported as 1980 PLD 323 also does not place any embargo on the temporary workers that they cannot approach the Labour Court. The judgment of honourable Supreme Court has interpreted the term temporary worker with reference to the words likely to last as mentioned by the Legislature is Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance.
7. Coming to the second limb of arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner wherein he has relied upon the judgment of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCM R 2213) it may be noticed that K.P.T. Is statutory organisation and has statutory rules of service, therefore, Standing Orders Ordinance .Of 1968 was not applicable. Since Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable by virtue of its exclusion of such establishment in terms of proviso to section 1, subsection (4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, the worker concerned could not invoke the jurisdiction under section 25-A which has been adopted and referred in Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance. In the reported case under reference the shelter was taken under Industrial Relations Ordinance. The definition under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, no doubt prescribes the condition of industrial dispute to be raised in accordance with the said law in relation to the termination of the employment and therefore in that background it was held by the Supreme Court that since no industrial dispute was not raised regarding his termination, therefore, the worker in the cited case ceased to be a worker in terms of section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but such is not the case here. In this case the worker has invoked the jurisdiction because Standing Orders Ordinance is applicable and under Standing Order 12(3) such right has been expressly conferred by the Legislature on the worker to approach the Labour Court after performing procedural requirement mentioned in section 25-A. In the case of Abdul Razzaq v.
8. Messrs Ihsan Sons Limited and 2 others reported in 1992 PLC 424, Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled as follows:-- "21. It may, be pertinent to point out that Standing Order 12 deals with the termination of employment. Clause (3) of the same provides that 'The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said action shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance'.
22. The above clause in fact incorporates section 25-A of the I.R.O. By reference for the purpose of the breach referred to therein and not for the purpose of enforcement of other provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance. As a corollary, it must follow that if the services of an employee are terminated in breach of above clause (3) of the Standing Order 12; he should fall within the ambit of the definition given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and need not fall within the purview of the definition of 'worker' and 'workman' provided for in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the I.R.O. However, if an employee wants to press into service section 25-A of the I.R.O. For enforcing any other right granted under the Standing Orders Ordinance other than the right covered under clause (3) of Standing Orders 12, he should also fall within the definition of the worker' and 'workman' provided for in above clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the I.R.O., which is somewhat different from the definition given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, inasmuch as it excludes an employee who is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity and who is employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages exceeding Rs.800 per mensem or performs either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the power vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature as pointed out hereinabove. "
9. Consequently, therefore, in view of above legal position in relation to the workman covered under Standing Orders Ordinance the cited judgment by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a D.B. Decision of this Court reported in 1993 PLC 303. No doubt the Division Bench of this Court has held that even the concurrent findings of the Labour Tribunals can be questioned in writ jurisdiction but the condition which has been mentioned for exercise of writ jurisdiction in the said judgment is that the findings should be erroneous.
11. Again in the case of Abdul Razzaq v. Messrs Ihsan Sons Limited and 2 others 1992 PLC 424, Honourable Supreme Court has defined the broader contours for the High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction in relation to the findings of fact which are reproduced: "The High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction could not have sat as a Court of appeal on the question of fact. The finding of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal can be interfered with by a High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction if the same is based on no evidence or is founded on misreading of evidence or is recorded by ignoring material evidence on record.
12. However, a finding of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction merely on the ground that a different view on the basis of same evidence was possible:"
13. Following the view expressed by the Supreme Court we hold that findings of fact recorded by the Tribunals could not be questioned before this Court in every case. In this case the Labour Court found that the respondent No. 1 was working from 1985 till March, 1994 which fact stood proved from the documents produced by the petitioner and the Court held that the petitioner was not justified for not employing the respondent No. 1 during the crushing season of 1994-1995. The learned Tribunal also found that there was no ground for non-employment of worker during 1994- 1995 and 1995-1996 and dismissed the appeal in limine. We agree with the view expressed on the question of facts and do not find that the findings were erroneous as such, we dismissed this petition in limine.