1. RAJA AFRASIAB KHAN, J.---On 28th December, 1991, elections to the Punjab Local Bodies were held under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The members of the elected local bodies were given oath and, accordingly, they took charge of their offices on 9-2-1992. Their tenure commenced from this date onward which would come to an end on 9th of February, 1997 under section 26 of the Ordinance. On 15th of August, 1993, the Governor of Punjab issued Notification No. SOV (LG) 3-32/93 under section 26-A of the Ordinance with direction that fresh elections would be held in the month of January 1994. The said notification reads as follows:-- "In exercise of the power conferred on him under section 26-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to direct that fresh elections to the Local Councils in the Punjab will be held in the month of January, 1994 and as a consequence thereof the term of office of the said Councils stands curtailed with immediate effect.
2. The Governor is further pleased to appoint the persons and authorities shown in column No. 3 of the Schedule given below as Administrators of the Local Councils mentioned against them in column 2 thereof."
3. Mehar Zulfiqar Ali Babu etc. Instituted Constitution Petition No. 9009 of 1993 to call in question the legality of the aforesaid notification. On 30th of January, 1994, a learned Judge .Of the Lahore High Court decided the writ petition alongwith other identical matters in the following manner:-- "The Government is, therefore, well advised to hold elections to the local councils till 31-3-1994. The date has been fixed keeping in view the the required for making necessary arrangements for holding the elections, the Holy month of Ramazan and the harvesting season.
4. This is all the more necessary to create uniformity. There are 29 Zila Councils, one Metropolitan Corporation, 7 Municipal Corporations, 63 Municipal Committees, 135 Town Committees and 2392 Union Councils with thousands of Councilors and innumerable office-bearers in the Province. Only a small fraction i.e. 12 Zila Councils, the Metropolitan Corporation, one Municipal Corporation and one Municipal Committee are before the Court. The High Court can grant relief under Article 199 of the Constitution to an "aggrieved party" and not to those who seem to have foregone their rights, if any.
5. However, it is made very clear, that if the election process is not completed by 31st of March, 1994, it would mean that the Government is not interested in the general public good, the will of the political sovereign ------------------- electorate in the Province is not being honoured, and the provisions of the Ordinance are being violated, breached and by passed. All this would be hit by Article 4 of the Constitution (to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen). In that eventuality the law must have its course and the writ petitioner Local Councils shall, stand revived w.e.f. 1-4-1994. "
6. W.P. No. 9194 of 1993 was dismissed due to the death of the petitioner, Mian Abdul Majid. Civil Miscellaneous Application No.1858/93 of Muhammad Latif Rana and another application filed by Muhammad Iqbal Khokhar, Advocate in W.P. No. 9009 of 1993 for their impleadment as patty were dismissed because the learned counsel did not argue their cases. Intra-Court Appeals Nos.81, 92, 93, 96, 97, 102 and 123 to 132 of 1994 were instituted to assail the impugned judgment. Writ Petition No. 2311 of 1994 challenging the notification dated 15th of August, 1993 was also brought before the Court. On 5-4-1994, the Governor of the Punjab promulgated the Punjab Local Government (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1994 whereby an explanation was added to section 26-A which is as follows:-- Explanation.-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the Government has and shall be deemed always to have had the power to curtail the term of the Local Councils regardless of the duration of the residual term of the said Local Councils".
7. Section 3 is a validation clause, which is in the following terms:- "Validation. --Notwithstanding anything contained in section 26-A of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979), before its amendment by this Ordinance, or any judgment or order of any Court or other authority or any proceeding pending before any Court or other authority, any Notification under the aforesaid section 26-A, issued before the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be valid and shall be deemed always to have been validly issued."
8. The result was that the earlier notification was superseded by issuing another notification on 5-4- 1994 where under elections to the local councils were ordered to be held on 27-7-1994. The tenure of Local Bodies was curtailed with immediate effect. This being the position, the aforesaid matters were declared to have become infructuous and as such were dismissed by the Division Bench on 9-4-1994. The appellants challenged this order through petition for leave to appeal. This Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, converted petition into appeal and allowed the same by remanding the case to the High Court with direction to decide it on merits after obtaining the amended memo of appeal. On remand, the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court vide its judgment dated 19th of February 1995 upheld the judgment of learned Single Judge with modification observing:-- "The learned Single Judge did not feel persuaded to exercise discretion in favour of reviving the dissolved Local Councils in the facts and circumstances of this case. The view which prevailed for declining to exercise discretion was that there was allegations of large-scale embezzlement in Local Councils Fund and that the members had openly announced their affiliation with a particular political party in the writ petition which was violative of the law and the rules. This view was taken considering that the elections of members of the Local Bodies under the law were required to be held on non-party basis with a view to keep the Local Bodies free from the influence of the political parties. It was found to be not a fit case on account of this conduct of the members of the Local Bodies for exercising discretion in favour of their revival.
9. The question of revival or otherwise of the Local Councils engaged on serious consideration and we heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The impugned decision to dissolve the Local Councils was taken by the then care-taker Provincial Government installed as a result of consensus at the national level between the to rival political forces for a limited purposes of holding free, fair and transparent general elections in the country. The said Government cannot be said to have any political motive to benefit itself while taking such a decision. Though in the normal circumstances as argued by Mr. S.M. Zafar, Advocate, there may be no nexus between the general elections in the country and the Local Councils but in the peculiar circumstances of this case if the care-taker Government in order to achieve the object of holding fair and free general elections took such a decision the same was not wholly without substance, as `such, it did not suffer from mala-fide as was urged in the Constitutional petition. The idea behind the dissolution of the Local Councils appears to be that there should be no possibility of raising any plea that the members of the Local Council who had been declaring their affiliation with a particular political party had used the Local Councils Funds for any party in the General Elections. For this additional reason also, we are not inclined to disagree with the learned Single Judge on the question of declining the exercise of discretion against the restoration of the Local Councils.
10. We, however, do not find ourselves in agreement with the learned Single Judge that in case the elections were not held as directed by him only those Local Councils should be restored which had filed the writ petitions and not the others. The notification/impugned order was one single transaction as such there is no reason not to revive all the Local Councils in case the Government fails to hold elections as ordered.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld with the modification that in case within three months from today the process for holding fresh elections of the Local Bodies is not commenced and taken to its logical conclusion, all the Local Bodies shall automatically stand revived. In the above terms all the appeals and the writ petitions are disposed of. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
12. Mehar Zulfiqar Ali Babu etc. Again came before this Court through C.P. 245-L/95 to question the validity of the impugned judgment. Another C.P. No. 471-L/95 was filed by Humair Hayat Khan Rokhri. The 3rd matter was brought by Attiqur Rehman vide C.P. No. 585-L/95. These petitions had arisen out of common judgment of the High Court on the same controversy. All the matters were, therefore, clubbed together for their hearing and disposal. It may be noted that Attiqur Rehman moved an application before the High Court to become party in the proceedings when the arguments had already been concluded by the parties but the judgment was still to be announced. The Advocate-General did not raise objection for his becoming a party. This being so, the applicant, Attiqur Rehman was made party in the case with the following order:-- "C.M. No. 1745/94 and C.M. 1764/94, have been moved by R.I Attiqur Rehman and Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bajwa respectively for impleading them as parties in this appeal. Their case is that they were members of the dissolved Local Councils and would be affected by the decision in the appeal for if the appeal is accepted they would also be the beneficiaries. Learned counsel for the said petitioners appearing today stated that if the petitioners appearing are made parties they will not press for the rehearing of the appeal as they would adopt the arguments already addressed favour of the appeal.
13. C.M. No. 1746 of 1994 has been moved by R.I Atiq-ur-Rehman for issuance of a direction to the Provincial Government not to hold fresh local bodies elections till the disposal of the appeal, because if the same are allowed to be held it would create complications.
14. Learned Advocate-General states that in principle the Provincial Government has .No objection to: the grant of the prayers made in these miscellaneous applications. We also on considering the prayer to stay forthcoming local bodies elections find the same reasonable for if ultimately the appeal succeed the entire exercise of holding of local bodies elections and spending huge amount from public exchequer would be futile exercise and go waste which eventuality in the interest of justice should be avoided.
15. For the foregoing reasons, these petitions are allowed. The petitioners are impleaded as appellants in the appeal. As they do not want to advance further arguments, therefore, no further hearing is necessary as consequence of their impleadment. The Provincial Government is hereby restrained from holding local bodies elections till the disposal of the appeal. This disposes of these miscellaneous applications."
16. On 26th May 1996 leave to appeal was granted to the appellants observing:-- "There is prima facie force in the argument of the learned counsel. Leave to appeal in the aforementioned petition is, therefore, granted. These connected matters shall be heard and decided in the 3rd week of June 1996. In view of the importance having been involved in the cases, a request may be conveyed to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan for constitution of a larger Bench for hearing the appeals. Interim relief already given in Civil Petition No. 585-L/95 (Attiqur Rehman v. Government of the Punjab etc.) would continue till the final hearing of the appeals."
2. We have heard Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Mr. Maqbool Illahi Malik and Ch. Muhammad Farooq learned Advocates on behalf of the appellants. The respondents were represented by Mian Abdul Sattar Najam, learned Advocate=General Punjab. Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani has submitted that the respondent, Government did not challenge the judgment of the Lahore High Court under which beyond a specific period, the local bodies were ordered to be revived, in case, fresh elections were not held. The fresh elections were not held as undertaken by the Government within the stipulated period and as such, the Local Councils throughout the Province of Punjab stood revived automatically by operation of the impugned judgment. He argues that mala fide on the part of the Government was established inasmuch as twice clear commitments were made by it to hold elections but the undertaking was never' fulfilled by giving a positive schedule to that effect. He has submitted that there was no jurisdiction/powers vested in the Government to deprive the appellants to complete their term of office under section 26 of the Ordinance read with Articles 2, 2A and 17 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. He contends that full tenure of 5 years as fixed under section 26 of the Ordinance had to be ordered to be completed by the appellants to meet the ends of justice. It is added that issuance of notification by Government curtailing the tenure of the local bodies was an at without jurisdiction, mala fide, coram non judice and as such it did not exist in law.
3. Mr. Maqbool Illahi Malik, learned counsel for the appellants has stated that validity of section 26- A of the Ordinance was open to objection because it was surely a case of excessive delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature to the executive which was forbidden by law. To support the plea, he has relied upon the Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854) and Haji Ghulam Zamin and another v. A.B. Khondkar and others (PLD 1965 Dacca 156). He has maintained that the tenure of the local bodies could not be shortened or brought to an end abruptly on the pretext of allegations of corruption or embezzlement of public funds. He has urged that no such drastic action could be taken unless the allegations were proved in a Court of law on the basis of concrete evidence. According to the learned counsel, there was no proof as warranted by law, to, suspend/curtail the tenure of the appellants. He has relied upon sections 26 * and 159 of the Ordinance. According to the learned counsel, the appellants had the vested right to complete their term of five years. At any rate, it could not be curtailed under the given facts and circumstances of this case. He has drawn our attention to section 159 of the Ordinance to submit that in case of serious allegations against Local Councils, they could be suspended for a period of to months only and certainly not beyond that. It has been brought to our notice that there were no provisions in the Ordinance, under which the whole system of Local Bodies could be ended in an arbitrary manner. Ch. Muhammad Farooq, Advocate appearing on behalf of Muhammad Ashraf Jaura, applicant in C.M.A. 347 of 1996 for impleading him as appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1254/96 has also argued with our permission that the expression "curtailment" has been 'defined in Black's Law Dictionary to state that curtailment does not mean to abolish. The definition as contained in the above is as follows:-- Curtail".--To cut of the end or any part of, hence to shorten, abridge, diminish, lessen, or reduce; and term has no such meaning as abolish."
17. We did not pass any order one way or the other on the aforesaid application of Ch. Muhammad Farooq for his client to become party in these proceedings as it was not considered to be appropriate.
4. Mian Abdul Sattar Najam, the Advocate-General Punjab while forcefully refuting the arguments of the counsel for the appellants had submitted that the appellants were involved in the embezzlement of public funds at a very large scale. He states that several criminal cases have been registered against them for misappropriation of public money. To support his plea, he has read before us several documents to show that the appellants were guilty of corruption. On this basis, he argues that the appellants were not entitled to be reinstated in their offices because of their massive irregularities/embezzlement/corruption. Learned Law Officer has also extensively quoted from the Holy Qur'an to demonstrate that impugned action on the part of Government was justified. He relied upon:- Allah doth command you To render back your Trusts To those to whom they are due And when ye judge Between man and man, That ye judge with justice: Verily how excellent Is the teaching which He giveth you! For Allah is He Who heareth And seeth all things. (S IV. 58).
18. Contend not on behalf Of such as betray Their own souls: For Allah loveth not One given to perfidy And crime. (S IV. 107).
19. The (selfish) soul of the other Led him to the murder Of his brother: he murdered Him, and became (himself) One of the lost ones. (S. V. 33).
20. O ye that believe! Betray not the trust Of Allah and the Apostle, Nor misappropriate knowingly Things entrusted to you. (S. VIII. 27).
21. And O my People: Give Just measure and weight, Nor withhold from the people The things that are their due: Commit not evil in the land With intent to do mischief. (S.XI. 85).
22. Verily Allah will defend (From ill) those-who believe: Verily, Allah loveth not Any that is a traitor To faith, or shows ingratitude. (S.XXII. 38).
23. Who make mischief in the land, And mend not (their ways). (S.XXVI. 152).
24. Then, is it To be expected of you, If ye will do no mischief In the land, and break Your ties of kith and kin? (S.XLVII.22).
25. Such are the men Whom Allah has cursed For He has made them Deaf and blinded their sight.
26. And do not eat up Your property among yourselves For vanities, nor use it As bait for the judges, With intent that ye may Eat up wrongfully and knowingly A little of (other) people's property (S.AI- Baqara, V. 188).
27. In this background of Holy Injunctions as mentioned above, the Government was justified to curtail the tenure of the appellants on the basis of their misdeeds. He has heavily relied upon the observations of the learned Single Judge which were upheld by the Division Bench holding that the appellants were not fit to remain in their offices because of the serious allegations having been levelled against them. These observations are as follows:-- "Specific case was set up by the Government that to obviate further misuse of funds; resources and powers and to avoid interference in the general election, in the interest of the greater public good, the period had been curtailed vide the impugned notification. Though the Election Authority could have proceeded against the individual councillors for breach of the provisions of section 21-A and Rules 19 and 20 referred to above and the Government could have taken action against individual local councils under section 159 of the Ordinance but in view of the large number of local councils and the councillors and office-bearers, head of the general elections and also from the very nature of the Government i.e. Care-taker, it would have been impossible for the Election Authority or the Government to deal with breaches and delinquencies. The Administration would have been rather swa mped as claimed by the respondent Government. The stand of the Government that it was in the larger public good that the period was curtailed so that .The elections could be free, fair and transparent without any interference from local councils/Councillors seems to be correct. However, the contradiction is the situation created by section 21-A of the Ordinance, Rules 19 and 20 of the Conduct Rules and the proviso to the main section is a matter for the Legislature to consider.
28. I have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that the good of the public rather greater good of the public demanded that the sitting councillors be removed from the scene. "
29. Learned Law Officer has brought to our notice that the appellants have also instituted writ petitions in the nature of Quo Warranto in the High Court for obtaining the relief which is being sought through these appeals from this Court. He prays for dismissal of these appeals because they could not be permitted to continue during the pendency of these petitions before the High Court. Mr. Maqbool Illahi Malik, learned counsel has, nevertheless, stated that the appellants had moved application for withdrawal of the writ petitions having been instituted by them in the High Court. All such petitions may, therefore, be deemed to have been withdrawn in view of his statement before the Court.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties on a number of days I and perusing the record, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned, conditional judgment of the High Court was not sustainable. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was to the effect that if by a particular date, the elections were not held, the local bodies would stand revived. This view was upheld by the Division Bench. The respondent, Government appeared to have been fully satisfied with the judgment of the High Court. This being the reason, they did not further assail the validity of the impugned judgment before this Court. According to the notification dated 15th of August 1993, the elections were to be held in the month of January 1994 which were not held for no plausible reasons. No schedule in that behalf to hold elections was given by the competent authority. The target period, ended without holding the elections. In our view, the local bodies stood automatically revived without attaching any conditions after the specified period. It may also be noted that under section 26-A of the Ordinance, life of the local bodies was curtailed with an object to hold free, fair and transparent general elections in the country by the then care-taker Government. To achieve this object, the local bodies would, of course, be deemed to have been suspended for a short while and certainly not or. Permanent basis. In our view, this was done for a limited period in order to disable/ incapacitate the local bodies to interfere with the outcome of the general elections. We, therefore, hold the view that power under section 26-A of the Ordinance could only be used for a limited period to achieve the specific objective of holding fair elections as was the position which prevailed in this case. The said objective was, undoubtedly, achieved by the care-taker Government by holding fair and just election. Meaning of word "curtail" as given in the Balck's Law Dictionary and already quoted above shall not mean to abolish. "Abolish" means as given in "Dictionary MacMillan-William D. Halsey" in the following manner "to put an end to; do away with completely; to abolish poverty (french aboliss a stem of abolir, from Latin abolere to destroy) abolishable, adj. Abolisher, abolishment, n. Syn. Abolish, annihilate, exterminate refer to making an end of something. Abolish applies more to human usages, as laws, traditions, customs and ideas, than to physical things: Slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1807. Annihilate indicates the complete destruction of the object of the verb; it means to wipe out beyond hope of being revived: One cannot really conceive of the human rare- being annihilated. Exterminate also indicates complete destruction, but is usdally used of things considered to be bad: They succeeded in their effort to exterminate the termites." (Dictionary Macmillan, William D. Halsey/Editorial Director, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London). This will clearly show that the "local bodies" as elected on 28-12-1991 by the people of the Province of Punjab could not be ended as a whole by one stroke of pen in the fashion it had been done without giving any valid reasons. After the said exercise of general elections was over the local bodies should have been revived by issuing another notification to meet the ends of justice. This was not done nor fresh elections as stated above, were held for no reasons at all. This could not be so held by the High Court although the revival of the local bodies was announced conditionally on the plea of allegations of corruption. The appellants were duly elected by the electorate on the basis of adult franchise in a fair and transparent election for a fixed term of five years. The remedy to rectify the malpractices or corruption alleged to have been committed in the elections had also been provided in the Ordinance by way of filing election petitions. It may be presumed that such remedies might have been availed of by the aggrieved persons within the meaning of law. There is a provision having been enacted in section 159 of the Ordinance which would provide a remedy through an action to be taken against a local council' or councils which was/were not running its/their offices in the prescribed manner. Section 159 reads as follows:-- "159. Suspension and dissolution of a local council.---(1) Government may, by notification, suspend a local council if there are reasons to believe that a local council --
(a) is unable to discharge or persistently fails to discharge its duties; or
(b) is unable to administer its affairs or meet its financial obligations; or
(c) generally acts in a manner contrary to public interest; or
(d) otherwise exceeds or abuses its powers.
(2) On the publication of a notification under subsection (1)--
(a) persons holding offices as chairman and members of the local council shall cease to hold office;
(b) all functions of the local council shall, during the period of suspension, be performed by such person or authority as Government may appoint in this behalf; and
(c) all funds and property belonging to the local council shall, during the period of suspension, vest in Government.
(3) Government shall hold or cause to be held an inquiry into charge on which a local council is suspended. If, within a period of to months from the date of the suspension of the local council, the inquiry is not completed, the council shall stand revived.
(4) If, as a result of the inquiry, the charges against the local council are proved, Government may dissolve the local council.
(5) When a local council is dissolved ---
(a) Government shall hold fresh elections within three months from the date of dissolution if the remaining term of the local council is not less than nine months and the term of office of the local council so reconstituted shall be the residue of the original term;
(b) if the remaining term of its office is less than nine months, the person or authority referred to in subsection (2) shall, continue to perform the functions of the Local Council and its fund shall continue to vest in Government till the reconstituted Local Council assumes office. "
30. There is no doubt that the Government possesses the powers to suspend a Local Council or Councils under the afore-quoted section if it has the reasons to believe that a particular council has failed to discharge its functions or administer its financial obligations or has been proceeding against the very public interest or is abusing its powers in the discharge of its functions. Suspension period shall be to months in which enquiry has to be conducted against the delinquent council. If the requisite enquiry is not held within the stipulated period, the suspended council shall stand revived. Subsection (3) of the section is the pivotal provision under which the local council can also be dissolved provided charges against it are proved. Subsection (5) has provided that fresh elections to that dissolved local council would be held within three months from the date of dissolution of the said council. It is evident that no such action as mentioned above was ever taken in this case by the competent authority to meet the requirement of law. It is also clear that such an action could not be taken at random against all the local councils in the Province of Punjab by giving it a blanket cover in one exercise under the garb of section 26-A which had its limited application as had already been held above to meet a different situation. This being the position, the Government can take action in the light of the above provisions against that local council against which charge of corruption had been levelled or for some other specified reason/reasons.
31. In any case, it does not empower the Government to pack up the whole Local Government system as has been done in this case. Apart from the above, the appellants were proceeded against without providing them an opportunity of hearing. They were condemned unheard which is against the spirit of natural justice contained in the adage, audi alteram partem. Right of hearing has also been given to the affected council/councils under section 159 of the Ordinance. The issuance of impugned notification curtailing the tenure of the appellants can be struck down on the sole ground that they were not heard before proceeding against them in a regular manner. We agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that the Government did not want to conduct the elections as under-taken by it from the to the. We are also in agreement with the learned counsel that issuance of notification to dissolve the local bodies was based on bad faith to defeat the very spirit of law. The action was therefore, coram non judice on the face of it. In this background, we feel no hesitation to declare the issuance of Notification No. SOV(LG)3-32/93 dated 15th August, ,1993, to be without jurisdiction. It is liable to be set aside. In this view of the matter, the appellants are held to be entitled to be reinstated in their offices so as to enable them to complete their remaining term. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the period for which the elected bodies remained out of office might be extended to them, could not be entertained for its serious consideration inasmuch as there were no provisions in the Ordinance under which the relief asked for could be given to them. Answer to this question is also available in subsection (5) of section 159 of the Ordinance which commands that the fresh election to the dissolved local council shall be held within three months and the newly-constituted local council shall remain in office for the residual term. The contention of the learned counsel being misconceived, is overruled. In the situation prevailing at present, the objection relating to the excessive delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature to the executive is not required to be looked into further as we understand that the Ordinance has been repealed by passing an Act by the Punjab Assembly. This question may, therefore, be left open to be dealt with in some other appropriate proceedings.
6. Coming back to the controversy, we do not find any force in the argument of the learned Law Officer that the appellants had indulged in large --scale corruption in the misappropriation of public funds and as such were rightly deprived of their public offices. He may be right to the extent that there were allegations of corruption against the appellants. There was no proof brought on record to show that they were ever convicted by competent Courts on the basis of corruption or misappropriation of public funds. In our considered view, these allegations would remain mere allegations unless they were established on the basis of evidence. Unless and until it is proved that the appellant had misappropriated public funds, they could not be declared disqualified to hold public offices on which they were inducted by the people. A voluminous documentary evidence which was read before us by the Advocate-General could not be placed before this Court in a regular manner nor it was brought before the High Court for its consideration. No such documents were even placed on record today alongwith application to do so nor copies thereof, were given to the appellants to enable them to raise objections about their validity well in the. This being so, this evidence could not be allowed to be used against the appellants in these proceedings. The verses of Holy Qur'an, produced and relied upon by the leaned Advocate-General would not support his case in any way whatsoever. Nowhere it has been commanded by Allah Almighty that mere allegations can be enough to deprive a person of his right as has been done by the Government in this matter in a summary manner. These Holy Injunctions cannot at all be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The following verses from the Holy Qur'an, although not cited by the Advocate --General, may throw light on the mode of evidence:- And they both rushed to the door; and she (grasped and) rent his tunic from behind-- and (lol) they met her lord at the door!
32. Said she: "What ought to be the punishment of one who had evil designs on (the virtue of) thy wife-
(what) imprisonment or a (yet mere) grievous chastisement? (S.XII 25).
33. (Joseph) exclaimed: "It was she who sought to make me yield myself unto her!" Now one of those present, a member of her own household, suggested this: If his tunic has been torn from the front, then she is telling the truth, and he is a liar; (S.XII 26).
34. But if his tunic has been torn from behind, then she is lying, and he is speaking the truth." (S.XII 27).
35. And when (her husband) saw that his tunic was torn from behind, he said:, "Behold, is (an instance) of your guile, . Owomankind! Verily, awesome is your guile! (S.XII 28).
36. (But), Joseph, let this pass! And thou, (O wife,) ask forgiveness for thy sin-- for, verily thou has been greatly at fault!" (S.XII 29).
37. Allah, Almighty has ordained in the above-quoted verses about the punishment which may follow only on the basis of availability of proof of unimpeachable character, The episode of Hazrat Yousaf shall show/demonstrate the way in which an allegation is to be proved beyond doubt on the basis of reliable evidence. Hazrat Yousaf was followed by a woman with an evil design to fulfil her sexual lust. To satisfy her desire, she caught the shirt of Hazrat Yousaf from behind and in the result, the shirt of the latter was found to have been torn from behind and not from the front side. This incident provided credible evidence to condemn the woman to be a liar and the Prophet of Allah Almighty was declared to be innocent. These Holy Injunctions are sufficient to hold that mere allegations cannot be made the basis to condemn the appellants to be corrupt in; order to disqualify them from being the chosen representatives of the people.
7. Even the last argument of the learned counsel that quo warranto writ petitions were pending adjudication in the High Court equally did not persuade us to agree with him inasmuch as, on the basis of the statement of the learned counsel for the appellants, the writ petitions so filed would be deemed to have been dismissed as having been withdrawn by them. In this view of the matter the arguments of the learned Advocate-General are repelled being without any substance.
8. Upshot of the above discussion is that the judgment dated 19-2-1995 of the Lahore High Court is set aside by Accepting Appeals Nos:1254 and 1255 of 1996. Appeal No.1256 of 1996 was not pressed by Mr. Aitzaz Ahsan, learned counsel for the appellants and as such, it is disposed of. In the peculiar circumstances of these cases, there shall be no order as to costs. On 26-6-1996. The following short order was passed by this Court:-- "For reasons to be recorded later on, we allow Civil Appeals Nos. 1254 and 1255/96 and set aside the impugned judgment dated 19-2-1995 of the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court and order restoration of all the local bodies/councils in the Province of Punjab to enable them to complete their term up to 9-2-1997, as contemplated under section 26 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. C.A. No.1256/96 is disposed of as not pressed.
38. 'The learned counsel for the appellants have stated and undertaken before us that the appellants would withdraw writ petitions if filed by them seeking relief in the shape of quo warranto connected with the subject-matter of these appeals."
39. The above are the reasons in support of the said order passed on that day. In the end, we are grateful to all the learned counsel for the ability knowledge and industry with which they assisted us in the discharge of our duty while deciding the controversy involved between the parties.