1. WAJIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---We have heard those present. It would appear that the basic order in the relevant proceedings was passed by the learned Member, N.I.R.C., on 2-8-1995 and against that order the respondent No. 3, an individual, preferred appeal before the Full Bench. Of the N.I.R.C., which on 6-3-1996 admitted such appeal. It may bear mention here that through the said order, dated 2-8-1995, the application of the respondent No. 3 under section 22-A(8)(g) of the I.R.O. For action to prevent an unfair labour practice was dismissed as non-maintainable as well as having been without merit. As a sequel to the referred order of dismissal (under appeal), the learned Member, N.I.R.C., on 29-9-1996, passed yet another order on an application dated 1-8-1996, wherein the respondent No.3, who was the petitioner there, had made allegations that "the Chairman, K.P.T.
2. And General Secretary of K.P.T. Labour Union, acting as C.B.A., have misappropriated the amount running in lacs (may be over 35 lacs)", spending it for a purpose other than that for which it was collected, the collection having been directed for the welfare of the workers. The application dated 1-8-1996 had sought action in the way of contempt. What contempt could there have been of a simple order of dismissal, we are unable to see... Any way, in such background, the learned Member passed the impugned order dated 29-9-1996 operative part of which is as below:-- "5. The replies filed in fact are not convincing and, therefore, a thorough enquiry is required to be made in this matter to ensure that amount so collected which is the subject-matter in the present case should be properly spent under the supervision of Chairman, K.P.T.
6. In order to avoid the possibility of misappropriation of this money and ensure its utilisation for the welfare of workers, the Chairman, K.P.T. Is directed to hold enquiry into the matter and submit his report on this point and ensure that the said amount is being spent properly for welfare of the workers of Karachi Port Trust.
3. The Chairman, K.P.T. Is directed to hold enquiry and submit his report within a period of one month after receipt of this order. "
4. Hearing the learned counsel, Mr. Mehmood A. Ghani, for the Chairman and Trustees of Port of Karachi, supports the contention from the side of the petitioner Union (C.B.A.) that the reproduced observation was beyond the powers of learned Member, N.I.R.C. He further says that the Chairman, K. P. T. Could not be asked to meddle in ~ the Union affairs, an employer not being permitted to, in any manner, arrogate to himself the activities falling within the sphere of a labour union. These pleas may not be without substance.
5. However, we find that an appeal against the order dated 29-9-1996 could also perhaps have been filed by those aggrieved much as an appeal was taken against the order dated 2-8-1995 that was not done. Explanation of the petitioner is that such came about because, on account of retirement of some of the N.I.R.C. Members, a Full Bench cannot be formed. In the first place, even if that was so, an appeal could be preferred though such an appeal may have been confronted with difficulties of actual hearing. Secondly, we are informed by the respondent No. 3, and this is not denied by Mr. Mehmood A. Ghani, that at least three Members, including the Chairman, N.I.R.C. Are available and they can constitute a Full Bench, if and when desired though that may not necessarily be at Karachi itself. For such reasons, the petitioner could well have pursued the remedies under the statute.
6. Here we may take up a plea from the side of the petitioner, again supported by the respondent No. 2, and that is to the effect that the impugned order is void and of no legal effect. The remedy, if any, according to the learned counsel, is contemplated by sections 61 and 64 of the I.R.O. By way of due prosecution, if facts satisfy the requirements of the Commission of the relevant offence. We do not wish to enter into this question because, as said the and again, relief in Constitutional jurisdiction is a discretionary relief. The petitioner for seeking relief has, inter alia, to show that the petitioner would be aggrieved by the relevant order and that it is in the justness of things that the petition be entertained in the Court's Constitutional jurisdiction.
7. In the circumstances, we do not see as to how the impugned order would operate to the prejudice of the petitioner, when the Chairman, K.P.T., is not inclined to take up the gratuitous assignment because this what the same is. We also cannot see as to how a mere possibility of an inquiry, apparently without jurisdiction, because the learned Member, N. I. R. C. At the the was not even seized of the case, having disposed it of (no contempt of simple dismissal order being feasible), can be a cause for any serious grievance.
8. In these circumstances, we dismiss the matters at Serial Nos. 1 and 2, leaving an option to the respondent No. 2 to at according to law, indication of which the learned counsel for that respondent has already given I during the course of hearing.