MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN (MEMBER).---The appellant had participated in the competitive examination held by the Federal Public Service Commission in the year 1986. In the merit list, he secured the position at Serial No. 367 on all Pakistan basis which was calculated to be at Serial No. 14 in the further bifurcated merit list of urban Sind. He belongs to Sukkur (urban Sind). It is contended in the appeal that at the the of application for participation in the competitive examination, the appellant had mentioned his choice of Groups as District Management Group, Police Group, etc. Etc. However, as a result of the final conclusion of the selection process, he was allocated Postal Group. There was also a condition in the offer letter that no representation shall lie against the allocation of a particular group, hence, allegedly, in compliance of the said provision, the appellant did not file any representation to any quarter. However, the appellant found that the respondent No. 5, who was placed at S.No. 390 in the merit list of the said examination of 1986 was allocated District Management Group. Another person namely Dr. Fazlullah Pechuhu appearing at Serial No. 258 was reallocated District Management Group on 22-1-1993. It was also alleged that vide yet another order dated 2-3-1994, one Mr. Ali Mumtaz Zaidi was allocated District Management Group from the Information Group. He was also a participant of 1986 batch. Thus, the appellant considered himself to have suffered discrimination and filed a representation in 1995 which was forwarded by his Ministry to the Establishment Division on 1-11-1995. This representation was rejected on 17-1-1996 and allegedly the appellant filed an appeal on 10-3-1996 but the same was also rejected in April, 1996 and the result whereof was communicated vide letter dated 11-6- 1996. Hence in the present appeal, filed on 20-6-1996, the appellant asks for his reallocation from the Postal Group to the District Management Group.
2. The respondents contested the appeal. We have listened to the arguments on behalf of the parties and perused the record of the case including the written objections filed on behalf of the respondent-department.
3. Prior to commencement of discussion on merits of the case, we must place on record that the main stress of the appellant was placed on the point of discrimination as allegedly the others were allowed the benefit of reallocation to a better group whereas he was being refused. Except the respondent No. 5 none else junior to the appellant in the merit list was reallocated the better Group which means that the appellant who was placed at Serial No. 367 was not allocated the Group of his choice and similarly Dr. Fazlullah Pechuhu placed at much better position at Serial No. 258 was also not originally allocated the group of his choice. Similarly, others, carrying better position than the appellant, were also not placed in the relevant Group. However, some of them pursued their remedy and got the group changed through various agencies. This reallocation may be termed as favouritism but it cannot amount to discrimination. The term 'discrimination' denotes the refusal of a vested right of one particular person and grant of the same right to another one carrying junior merit. Extending favour without the existence of a vested right does not become a precedent for another similarly placed person with no vested right. Thus, so far as the appellant is concerned, he was not vested with any right to be allocated to a particular group and the reallocation of group to a person placed 23 steps below the appellant does not invest him with an immediate right to be so favoured. Not only the 22 persons falling in-between the appellant and the respondent No. 5, but dozens of persons, at least, falling between Serial Nos. 258 to 390 were also similarly ignored but the extension of special favour does not become a precedent for all of them to demand similar treatment. Vested rights can be enforced through judicial or Constitutional process but concessions, favours and extension of facilities do not invoke the judicial jurisdiction, particularly when there was no immediate right of the appellant to be the sole affectee of the alleged discrimination. In the earlier judgments of this Tribunal, it was also held that the orders passed by an authority and implemented by the respondent-department cannot be invalidated thereafter either on the ground of discrimination or on the basis of incompetence of the competent Authority.
Thus, we do not find any element of violation of any vested right of the appellant and we further hold that the cases of favouritism cannot become precedents nor vest a particular person with any valuable right on the point of discrimination.
4. Another issue requiring analysis and deliberation is with regard to the limitation. The appellant belongs to 1986 batch whereas the first representation demanding the reallocation of the Group was made in November, 1995 i.e. Almost nine years after the accrual of cause of action. The service laws have carefully prescribed schedule of limitation for seeking remedy but no period of limitation extends beyond the scope of 120 days. The filing of service appeal after 120 months is entirely inconceivable not only in service matters but in any other case of enforcement of civil rights.
Confronted with this situation, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the basic order wherefrom the appellant has been aggrieved, was a void one, therefore, limitation would not run against the same. We are at a loss to appreciate the force behind this argument. If the selection of the appellant or allocation of Postal Group to him was a void order, he loses all the grounds. If the decision of the F.P.S.C. Regarding the allocation of Postal Group in denial of the choice of District Management Group was deemed to be a void order, the appellant should have protested earlier. In fact, the analysis of the entire situation discloses that there was no order at all which was being stamped as void one. Therefore, the argument of extension of period of limitation on the ground of the order being void is repelled.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the main defence of the respondents in their written objections was that the allocation of Group was the sole discretion of the Federal Public Service Commission and it is based on the determination of suitability by the said Commission and n4 other authority or forum was competent to order the reallocation of any Group or to convert the unsuitability of a candidate for a particular Group into his suitability for the same. Based on this contention of the respondents, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that in several cases, the Groups have been charged not by the Commission but by various other agencies like the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Establishment Division; Federal Service Tribunal and the Wafaqi Mohtasib.
This argument is also devoid of force to a great extent. This Tribunal had simply directed in five appeals that the order of an authority, howsoever invalid, if implemented, cannot be reversed on the principle of locus poenitentiae. Therefore, no reallocation was ordered by the Tribunal. Similarly, the perusal of the findings recorded by the Wafaqi Mohtasib shows that he has highlighted the defects in the procedure that was being followed in the selection during the competitive examination and the allocation of Groups. Such a finding has resulted in the issuance of recommendations only and no executable judgment had been passed. Similarly, the Establishment Division had issued notifications on the basis of certain observations of the Wafaqi Mohtasib Secretariat and, therefore, it his not reallocated the Group. In addition thereto, the exercise of an authority not vested in a person or an institution, cannot become a precedent for a similar exercise of authority by any other institution. It is generally stated that legal orders are considered to be precedents for similar orders but illegalities cannot serve as precedents for other illegalities. The orders made by several agencies were, as per learned counsel for the appellant, passed bye excessive use of authority, does not justify the demand for repetition of such an order in future. Even otherwise, if the appellant persists his claim, he could also have availed the same remedy as the others have adopted but the filing of a service appeal against a non-existent original impugned order is not conceivable.
6. With regard to question of limitation, it may be stated that the cause of action had accrued to the appellant in 1986. Much water has flowed below the bridges during the past decade. Several people have matured their vested right of seniority at a particular position. The clock cannot be reversed for ten years to accommodate the appellant in the Group to which he was allegedly entitled in 1986. The first representation was made by the appellant in late 1995, which was dismissed on the point of limitation. And the said representation been decided by the department on merits without indicating the representation as the-barred, the delay could have been deemed to have been condoned by the department. However, the said representation had been rejected on the legal issue of limitation and the service appeal based on a the-barred representation is never competent. Even the appeal had been filed on 20-6-1996 i.e. Almost six months after the appellate order whereas the law prescribes the period of thirty days only to challenge an appellate order by service appeal.
7. Thus, looking to the case from every angle, we find that the appellant did not seek his legal remedy within the. He was not considered suitable for any of the groups mentioned by him in the order of choice. There was no violation of any vested right, the extension of favour to another colleague does not become a precedent to be followed for him and that to after the expiry of ten long years, we are of the opinion that there is no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.