1. ' Through this application applicant Iqbal Ahmed seeks abashment of order, dated 21-1-1996 of learned Presiding Officer Labour Court No,VII, Sukkur whereby he initiated the proceedings against him under section 476, Cr.P.C. For alleged offence under section 228, P.P.C. Read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act.
2. ' The relevant facts leading to this application are that applicant is a Tapedar in Revenue Department and is posted in Taluka Moro District Naushahro Feroze. One Chanesar, a Beldar in Irrigation Department, had filed a grievance application before respondent No,1 for re-instatement which was fixed on 21-1-1996 when the applicant and said Chanesar were present in the Court. On that date Chanesar made an application to respondent No,1 alleging therein that applicant Iqbal Ahmed had threatened him of arrest in case he does not withdraw the grievance application and has an apprehension of his life. Respondent No,1 called the applicant in Court and passed the above order of his instant arrest and to proceed against him under section 476, Cr.P.C. For offence under section 228, P.P.C. Read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act and remanded him to jail. However, the applicant was released on the next day on surety. Applicant was served with show-cause notice and in reply he denied the allegations and clarified the position.
3. Mr. Nizamuddin Baloch learned counsel for the applicant argued that the order of respondent No,I is illegal, without lawful authority and not sustainable in law. He next argued that applicant has not committed any act warranting action under section 476, Cr.P.C. Nor has he committed any offence as shown under section 228, P.P.C. According to him the above provision-of law has been misconceived by the learned Judge/Presiding Officer of the Sindh Labor Court and has not applied any mind to the extent of applicability of section 476, Cr.P.C. Which in fact lays down a procedure for the offence referred to in section 195, Cr.P.C. He further submitted that applicant was neither a party in the grievance application filed by Chanesar in which action has been taken nor in any other case pending before said Court, therefore, the provisions of section 476, Cr.P.C. Will not be applicable. Moreover, applicant has not committed any contempt of Court of respondent No,1 and respondent No,1 is not competent to initiate the proceedings of its own contempt of Court and is prohibited by section 38 subsection (5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 where under it is only Labor Appellate Tribunal who has authority to punish for contempt of its own authority or that of any Labor Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction. He lastly contended that respondent No,1 Mr. Rasool Bux Sial irrespective of Presiding Officer of Sindh Labour Court No,VII, Sukkur has mentioned him as a District and Sessions Judge in the impugned order and this way he has exercised the authority beyond his jurisdiction. In support of contention he relied upon the case-law reported in 1985 PLC 1065.
4. ' Mr. Zawar Hussain Jafri learned Additional Advocate-General, Sindh appearing on behalf of respondent frankly conceded and stated that respondent No,1 has acted beyond his powers and jurisdiction and has passed an illegal order which is not maintainable in law and merits abashment. He accepts that the powers of contempt lie with Labour Appellate Tribunal only and respondent No,1 is not empowered to take any action in this respect.
5. ' The impugned order seems to have been incorporated in the diary, dated 21-1-1996 of grievance Application No,100 of 1995 which reveals that respondent No,1 straightaway took the cognizance and observed that the applicant had committed an offence under section 228, P.P.C. Read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act and was, therefore, taken into custody and was remanded to jail for service of show-cause notice. In the said order he has held that act of applicant is cognizable under section 476, Cr.P.C. For the offence punishable under section 228, P.P.C. Read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act. For proper appraisal of legal aspect, it is essential to make reference to section 476(1), Cr.P.C. In the first instance which read as under:-- ' Section 476. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.---(1) When any offence referred to in section 195, subsection (1), clause (b) or clause (c), has been committed in, or in relation to, a proceeding in any Civil Revenue or Criminal Court, the Court may take cognizance of the offence and try the same in accordance with the procedure prescribed for summary trials in Chapter XXII."
6. ' The plain reading of this section indicates a procedure for taking cognizance in the cases mentioned in section 195(1) clause (b) or (c) which shows that no Court shall take cognizance of offences under section 228, P.P.C. When such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in any Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. The word Court has been defined to be, Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court. Admittedly Labour Court has not been included in section 476, Cr.P.C. As the Court. Therefore, learned respondent No,1 has absolutely no jurisdiction to initiate above action for the following reasons:-- ' Firstly the action initiated against applicant under section 476, Cr.P.C. Is devoid of jurisdiction as it is taken against a person who is not a party in the proceedings in any Civil Revenue or Criminal Court so much so that he also was not a party before the Court of respondent No,1.
7. ' Secondly the respondent No,1 in order to justify his action has apparently posed and written down in the impugned order to be District and Sessions Judge in addition to the Presiding Officer of Labour Court, Sukkur, which in fact he was not and had never acted as District and Sessions Judge which is purely judicial post and is directly under the subordination of High Court whereas the Presiding Officers of Sindh Labor Court work under the Government and are appointed by the Government. In this respect respondent No,1 has not mentioned any authority or notification about his being District and Sessions Judge which comes within the misuse of authority and powers and liable for taking proper legal action.
8. ' Thirdly, the impugned order is also not sustainable in law because immediately on coming in the Court applicant was alleged to have committed an offence under section 228, P.P.C. Read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act and was taken in custody, remanded to jail and thereafter, a show-cause notice was served upon him.
9. ' This action is in clear violation of the law as immediately without affording an opportunity to the applicant on the face of it he has been found guilty of committing contempt of Court and was taken into custody and thereafter a show-cause notice was given to him for initiating the proceedings under section 476, Cr.P.C. Learned Presiding Officer did not file any complaint in writing as contemplated under subsection (1) of section 195, Cr.P.C. In the concerned Court for commission of the alleged offence. Here in the present case although Presiding Officer has no authority to invoke the jurisdiction under this provision of law yet he has not adopted the above course. Therefore, action taken by him is entirely illegal and without lawful authority.
10. ' It has also been urged before me that section 38(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 empowers Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise powers to punish for contempt of its authority or that of any Labour Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Respondent No,1 has violated this provision of law by taking action of contempt of Court himself and not referring the matter to Labour Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the entire exercise is wholly without lawful authority and liable to be quashed. This view is supported by the case-law reported as Muhammad Sanauddin Siddiqui v. Ghulam Nabi 1985 PLC 1065 wherein it is held that it is only the Labour Appellate Tribunal which is vested with the powers to punish for contempt of its own authority or that of any Labour Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction as if it were a High Court.
11. ' For the above reasons I allow this application, set aside the impugned order and quash the proceedings against the applicant. Above are the reasons for u short order, dated 31-3-1997 passed in the identical terms.