' Revision petition, assailing an order dated 5-4-1995 of Punjab Labour Court No,6, at Rawalpindi, filed on 30-4-1995, was dismissed in default on 15-10-1995. An application for its revival was submitted on 24-10-1995. That too was dismissed for non-prosecution on the next date, which was 29-10-1995. Yet another application for restoration of the aforesaid application dated 24-10-1995 was made on 25-1-1996. It was obviously barred by time.
2. It is to be noted that the revision petition had, for the first time, been dismissed for non- prosecution on 15-10-1995 at 12-30 p.m., but in the application made for revival of the revision petition it has been averred that the learned counsel was busy in the Supreme Court of Pakistan till 12-30 p.m., and he had deputed his clerk to make attendance in this Court in time, but when he reached the Court at about 10-30 a.m. He came to know that the case had been called in early hours and dismissed in default. This is an incorrect statement.
3. Application for restoration of the revision petition also met the same fate, as it was dismissed at 11-30 a.m., when nobody on behalf of the petitioners made appearance in the Court. The petitioners, it seems, went into deep slumber thereafter, as a move for revival of the earlier application dated 24-10-1995 was made too late in the day on 25-1-1996. Contents of the application dated 25-1-1996 make an interesting reading. Reason for absence of the counsel for the petitioners on 16-10-1995 has been given, although the revision petition had been dismissed in default on 15-10-1995 (and not on 16-10-1995). Learned counsel for the petitioners, as is stated, was busy before the Supreme Court on the said date. He had instructed his colleague, Mr. Haroon Latif, Advocate, to make appearance in order to make a request for an adjournment. He is said to have arrived in the Court somewhat late. In the application earlier submitted on 24-10-1995 a different stand had been taken. The learned counsel, it was stated, had asked his clerk, Mr. Amanat Ali, to attend the Court and make a request for an adjournment. In both the applications, surprisingly, the date of hearing has been mentioned as 16-10-1995, although it was, in fact, 15-10-1995. Actually, it appears, the petitioners and their counsel had just not cared to take care of the matter that had to be taken up by the Court on 15-10-1995, and, as is usual, an incorrect excuse was put up, with a view to explain absence of the counsel for the petitioners on the date of hearing in question. It is to be reiterated that it was 15th and not 16th of October, 1995.
4. It has not at all been explained, while submitting the instant application, on 25-1-1996, as to why and how the petitioners remained in a state of absolute in-action from 29-10-1995 to 25-1-1996.
Application dated 24-10-1995 was dismissed by reason of absence of the applicants' counsel on 29-10-1995, and they made a move for its restoration on 25-1-1996. Ignorance about 29-10-1995 being a date of hearing has not been pleaded. The petitioners were well-aware of their obligation and they were supposed to make appearance in the Court in person or through counsel on 29-10- 1995. They, however, chose to absent themselves. Even if their counsel, as is averred, was out of Lahore, on 29-10-1995, presence by way of proxy could well be made; and if even the clerk of the counsel had fallen prey to forgetfulness, the petitioners should have hastened to make a bid for revival of their cause without any amount of delay; but they preferred to sit idle over a period of about three months. No reason at all is forth-coming for this palpably prolonged silence. No application for condonation of delay was submitted, alongwith the application dated 25-1-1996. It has only been urged that absence of the petitioners/their counsel was owing to inadvertence. Was then silence or inaction over a period of about three months also owing to in-advertence? Conduct of the petitioners, beyond any manner of doubt, betrayed absolute lack of interest on their part.
There is no escape from the assumption that the petitioners were wholly negligent in the matter of pursuit of their cause. This would, therefore, be one of such cases, in which no indulgence on the part of the Court would be warranted; and if it is extended to such an indolent party, it will amount to abuse of process of the Court. I am, therefore, not in the least in doubt that lack of vigilance on the part of the petitioners is that gross and tremendous that it is not at all excusable or condonable. I, therefore, proceed to reject the instant application dated 25-1-1996. This, in turn, would entail affirmation of the order dated 29-10-1995, dismissing in default the earlier application dated 24-10-1995, aimed at revival of the revision petition, dismissed in similar fashion on 15-10- 1995.