' RAJA FAYYAZ AHMED, J.--- This appeal under section 417(2-A), Cr.P.C. Has been preferred by the complainant against impugned judgment, dated 29-12-1996 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lasbella at Hub whereby the accused-respondents have been acquitted of the charge under Crime No,72 of 1993 registered on 27-10-1993 under sections 147/148/149/427 and 451, P.P.C. With Police Station Hub and ultimately challenged under the aforesaid sections besides under sections 427/504, 506 read with sections 9 and 14 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.
2. The appellant on 27-10-1993 lodged a report with the Police Station, Hub alleging therein that on 24-10-1993 he had proceeded to Multan and his son Aziz Ahmed on 25-10-1993 was present in the common office of their estate agency, Muslim Public School and Muslim Ice Factory while the armed "Kabza group" of Haji Yacioob Mullazai led by his brother Muhammad Ismail went upon the roof of their office and broke open a hole into the concrete roof and this caused damage to the Photostat machine just placed under the site of the hole and also by means of the stones/material so collected completely smashed the said machine and as the complainant's son came out of the office he was threatened of his life by Ismail, Ilahi Bakhsh, Karim Bakhsh and others, however, on the consequent resistance of the complainant's son they left the site. Again Haji Yacloob along with Karim Bakhsh, Dhani Bakhsh, Ismail, the eleven persons duly armed, assaulted their employee sitting outside the office who broke open the locks of the office, ransacked it and looted the movables, the cash amount and the valuables detailed therein. According to complainant accused Muhammad Yacioob also allegedly fired at his son which did not hit him, however; he was rescued by his companions present there. Later on some respectable and the Assistant Commissioner reached on the site and personally observed the rampage. The backdrop of this incident has also been given in the report. Consequently the respondents were challaned for trial of the above quoted offences in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lasbella at Hub and finally the learned Court upon conclusion of the trial acquitted the respondents by means of the impugned judgment.
3. At the very outset of the arguments, the question for determination came up before this Court as to whether the appeal against acquittal order recorded by the learned trial Court upon conclusion of trial under the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VI of 1979) is competent and maintainable before this Court.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant/complainant as well as the learned counsel for the respondents and Mr. Abdul Karim Yousafzai, Advocate appearing for the State has been heard at length in support of their respective contentions. Mr. Tahir Muhammad Khan, Advocate strenuously contended that the appeal against acquittal order, to the High Court is quite competent, keeping in view the relevant sections of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) on the grounds:--
(A) Though charge under section 17(3) of the Ordinance read with sections 148, 149, 427, 451, 504 and 506, P.P.C. Was framed by the learned trial Court but no offence under section 17(3) or other penal section of the Ordinance was proved by the prosecution rather the alleged offence under the quoted sections of P.P.C. Has been proved, therefore, the appeal could be validly preferred in the High Court.
(B) The joinder of charges in the instant case was not permissible and the offences triable under the P.P.C. Being not the offence/s under the Ordinance, therefore, the acquittal order passed by the Sessions Court, is appealable to the High Court and appeal thus does not lie to the Honorable Federal Shariat Court.
(C) Under the scheme of the Ordinance, appeal against the acquittal order has not been provided, therefore, on account of application of Cr.P.C. By virtue of section 24 of the Ordinance the appeal would be competent before the Sessions Judge and the High Court as the case be.
(D) The jurisdiction of the High Court has not been expressly ousted to appeal against an acquittal order, therefore, it has been competently filed, and the jurisdiction of the High Court has been curtailed only to appeal against the sentence if it extends beyond the period of imprisonment of two years, by virtue of 2nd proviso to section 24 of the Ordinance.
(E) Since the right of appeal against an acquittal order has been provided under section 417(2-A), Cr.P.C., therefore, it will be read in conjunction to subsection (1) of section 417, Cr.P.C. And appeal thus would only be competent before High Court.
' 'The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contentions referred and relied upon the reported judgments PLD 1969 SC 158, 1981 PCr.LJ 238, PLD 1985 FSC 416, PLD 1989 Lah. 272 and 1994 SCMR 152.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently controverted the arguments and contentions putforth on-behalf of the appellants and submitted that in view of the provisions of sections 20 and 24 of the Ordinance VI of 1979 which being a Special Law, has specifically conferred the jurisdiction to the Federal Shariat Court in case of conviction for a period exceeding two years imprisonment if awarded by the trial Court, irrespective of such conviction being under any of the offence defined and made punishable under the Ordinance or within its purview under any of sections of P.P.C. And the appeal against acquittal order for any or all of the offences under the Ordinance or P.P.C. Would also lie only before the Federal Shariat Court. The learned counsel also quoted an example that if in a case where there are more than one accused tried jointly for the offences as in the instant case under the Ordinance and if out of them only one or more acquitted by the Court and the remaining accused convicted for a period of more than two years imprisonment who to file appeal before the Federal Shariat Court while the complainant against acquittal order filed appeal before the High Court, which if entertained would cause great anomaly and likely to result in the conflicting verdicts in the same case, therefore, such an intent could not be of the legislature or the Statute itself . The learned counsel for the respondents further canvassed that the object of the law as is evident from its scheme with specific reference to sections 20 and 24 is abundantly clear on the subject and on account of jurisdiction of the Federal Sharia Court having been specifically conferred to it und-r the law, in absence of any provision to the contrary available in the Ordinance itself, does not vest in High .Court to hear the acquittal appeal. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the reported judgment i,e, PLD 1982 FSC 11, PLD 1983 FSC 33, PLD 1984 FSC 3, 1984 SCMR 129, 1995 PCr.LJ 724 and 1987 PCr.LJ 1240 in support of his contentions.
' The learned counsel appearing for the State adopted the arguments of the respondent's counsel and submitted that the acquittal appeal does not lie before High Court and relied upon a case reported in PLD 1985 FSC 416.
6. It is the well-settled principle of the law that a general law always give way to the special law on the subject. Upon the promulgation of Ordinance VI of 1979 the offences defined and made punishable under it or pursuant to its provisions, hold the field as against such offences specifically dealt with under the P.P.C. This special law (Ordinance VI of 1979) has been enacted to modify the existing law relating to certain offences against property, so as to bring the existing law on subject in conformity with the Injunctions of Holy Qura'n and Sunnah. The object of the law-maker is quite manifest not only by its preamble rather the positive change brought in the structure of definition of the offence of Theft and Harraba. The constituting ingredients of the offences and the prescribed standards of required evidence for imposition of Hadd punishments and the cases in which Hadd punishment is not to be imposed, have been dealt with specifically. The scheme of the Ordinance and its provisions substantially is a departure of the subject from the relative provisions of the P.P.C.
Except to the extent of punishment of such an offence by way of Tazir. Section 22 of the Ordinance deals with the attempt to commit an offence punishable by the Ordinance which provides that in absence of any provision in the Ordinance itself for the punishment of such an attempt; the offender shall be punished with imprisonment of either description or a term which may extend to ten years. Thus for all intents and purposes the Ordinance is a special law, therefore, the general law on the subject will lean in favour of the Ordinance on the subject covered by it. Moreover; by virtue of section 3, of the Ordinance; an overriding effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force has been given.
' Section 20 of the Ordinance provides punishment for the offence of Harrabah by way of Tazir if not liable to the punishment provided for in section 17 of the Ordinance or for which the required proof under section 17 is lacking or for which the punishment of amputation or death may not be imposed or enforced under the Ordinance shall be awarded punishment according to the provisions P.P.C. For the offence of dacoit or extortion as the case may be. The qualified punishment under P.P.C. As envisaged by section 20 of the Ordinance will not ipso facto restore or reverse the forum of appeal as it stood prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance except to the extent provided in the Ordinance itself.
' The Code of Criminal Procedure has been made applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of the cases under Ordinance VI of 1979. The words "in respect of the cases under this Ordinance" used in subsection (1) of section 24 of the Ordinance are the qualifying words having specific reference to the cases falling or covered under any of the provisions of the Ordinance; which definitely include the offences punishable by way of imprisonment under the relevant sections of P.P.C. And thus not excluded such offences from the ambit of Ordinance. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in cases where the punishment under the relevant section of P.P.C. Is to be awarded but not so imposed the order of acquittal would be appealable to the forums of appeal provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure; to our mind is without any substance for the reason that by virtue of second proviso to section 24 of the Ordinance forum of appeal from an order sections 9 and 17 or from an order under any other provision of the Ordinance imposing a sentence of imprisonment for a period of more than two years shall be the Federal Shariat and thus the second proviso determines the forum of appeal, therefore, appeal against sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years under any provision of the Ordinance except under section 9 or 17 shall lie to High Court and in any other case to the Federal Shariat Court. While interpreting any Statute or any provision of law the object of the particular enactment and its provisions are to be looked into, to ascertain its true intent, import, purpose and object from the Statute itself. To enter into the arena of construction of a Statute, the harmonious interpretation of such an enactment is to be made which in no way makes redundant or superfluous any provision of the law or to result in causing any conflict within the provisions or to its object, as the lawmaker/Legislature make and enact laws to be effective consistent, purposeful and objective and the superior Courts while interpreting a Statute to advance and harmonise the object, intent and purposes of law and not to make any provision redundant or ineffective. As such it cannot be legitimately conceived that the Ordinance within the purview of section 24 created different forums for appeals against acquittal orders. The conclusion of the learned counsel for the appellants that due to the applicability of Cr.P.C. Mutatis mutandis in respect of cases under the Ordinance, the appeal against acquittal order would lie to the High Court is not sound and tenable as the second proviso controls the subsection (1) of section 24, therefore, it will be read subject to the proviso and not independently.
' According to the first proviso to section 24 of the Ordinance, if it appears in evidence that the offender has committed a different offence under any other law,, he could be convicted for such an offence by the Court provided the Court is competent to award punishment, includes the Court of Sessions or Magistrate as the case may be subject to the exception of trial of offence under section 9 or 17 of the Ordinance by a Court of Sessions under the second proviso to the section 24, thus, the first proviso to this specified extent is controlled by the second proviso and in this context the plea of the learned counsel that it includes the filing of appeal against the acquittal order in respect of an offence other than the offence defined and punishable under the Ordinance, shall lie to the Court of Sessions or High Court as the case be, is devoid of any force. Under the second proviso to section 24 of the Ordinance, Federal Shariat Court has been expressly termed and specified to be the Court of appeal, whereas; for limited purpose of a case where the sentence of imprisonment not exceeding two years has been passed an appeal shall lie to High Court except against an order under section 9 or 17 of the Ordinance. Thus, the principal Court of appeal is the Federal Shariat Court and not a High Court.
As discussed above the provisions of Cr.P.C. On the strength of subsection (1) of section 24 applies with complete force and extent, to the cases under the Ordinance but is subject to the qualifying provisions of the second proviso to the said section, therefore, section 417(2-A), Cr.P.C. Will not be attracted to the extent of the forum of appeal against an acquittal order as provided in subsection
(1) of section 417, Cr.P.C. Rather in accordance with the second proviso to section 24 of the Ordinance such an appeal would lie to the Federal Shariat Court being the ulterior Court of appeal and the contention to the contrary canvassed by the learned counsel on the grounds taken in this behalf does not sound to be well based.
7. In the reported judgment PLD 1969 SC 158 under head note (C) page 159 it has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court that the rule laid down in section 233, Cr.P.C. Is that for every distinct offence of which any person is an accused there shall be a separate charge which shall be tried separately except in cases mentioned in sections 234 to 239, Cr.P.C. Which are exception to the general rule and the joint trial under these sections is not mandatory nor it can be said that if several accused persons are charged for committing the same offence in the course of same transaction are tried separately irrespective to any question of prejudice, be illegal. This case-law on the point invoked in the attending matter before this Court bears no relevancy or material effect whether the respondents tried under separate charge or jointly for each of the alleged distinct offence.
' In the light of the above discussion there could not be any opinion or conclusion otherwise that the ouster of jurisdiction not to be readily inferred in absence of provision to the contrary leading to such a conclusion and it is the well-settled principle of interpretation of law but the case-law on this point relied upon is not attracted in the case in hand. PLD 1985 FSC 416 in no way helps the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant rather it to an extent strengthens the view that appeal against acquittal order under the Ordinance VI of 1979 lies to the Federal Shariat Court. The ratio decedent of the case reported in PLD 1989 Lah. 272 of the Single Bench of the Honorable Court is that the jurisdiction of High Court is not ousted with respect to the offence under sections 379 and 380 or in respect of an offence, not made punishable as such under the Ordinance VI of 1979.
The Rule so laid down in the reported judgment PLD 1989 Lah. 272 will also amount to affect the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court in cases even where the sentence of imprisonment exceeding two years has been passed under section 379/380, P.P.C. While against such an order of conviction jurisdiction has expressly been conferred under section 24 of the Ordinance to the Federal Shariat Court for appeal. With utmost respect to the view taken in the said reported judgment, it may result in creating anomalous effects and of conflicting judgments by the forums at High Court and Federal Shariat Court levels. There may be cases in which only one or more accused are charged for the offence/s under the Ordinance as well as for the commission of offence under some relative section of P.P.C. Resultantly one set of the accused convicted by the trial Court for one offence under section 9 or 17 of the Ordinance or sentenced exceeding two years imprisonment and the other/s under the charged section of P.P.C. Thus, the convicted accused have to prefer appeal in this view of the matter to Federal Shariat Court as well as to High Court respectively which obviously might bring conflicting, in consisting and anomalous results; thus such an intention cannot be attributed to the intention of law-maker or to the Statute itself.
' In the cited case reported in 1994 SCMR 152 the proposition involved in the instant case was not under consideration of Honourable Supreme Court and as per facts of the case, the accused were involved in connection with the offence under section 17(4) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance read with sections 302/149, 307/149, 460/149 and 148, P.P.C.
The accused were convicted for all the offences except the one who was acquitted. The convicted accused filed appeal before the High Court and consequently the Honorable High Court after appraisal of the evidence acquitted them all from the charges. The State against the acquittal order of High Court filed appeal before the Honorable Supreme Court, which was finally dismissed.
The question of maintainability of appeal in the High Court or even before the learned apex Court was not raised, therefore, the cited case-law has no bearing in the present matter.
8. The case-law i,e, PLD 1982 FSC 11, PLD 1983 FSC 33, PLD 1984 FSC 3, 1984 SCMR 129 and 1987 PCr.LJ 1240 referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents pertain to the cases registered under the offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII of 1979) read with the other sections of P.P.C. As per respective cases, wherein it has been held in view of section 20 of the Ordinance (VII of 1979) that appeal against conviction as well as of acquittal order shall lie to the Federal Shariat Court. By virtue of the second proviso to section 20 of Ordinance VII of 1979 it has been provided that appeal from an order of the Court of Sessions shall lie to the Federal Shariat Court, therefore, there remains no ambiguity that the word "order" used in the second proviso includes both the orders of conviction as well as that of acquittal and the forum of appeal has also been specifically given. These cited authorities as such of not direct help to the proposition involved in the instant matter, however; in view of these authorities, the case-law i,e, PLD 1989 Lah.
272 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants remains of no avail for the purpose it was cited for. The cited case-law 1995 PCr.LJ 724 is not relevant to the proposition in hand.
' By virtue of section 24 of Ordinance VI of 1979 the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been made applicable mutatis mutandis in respect of cases under the said Ordinance, therefore, it could safely be understood that the provisions of Cr.P.C. Will operate and come in aid to and to advance the purposes and object of the Ordinance (VI of 1979); save to the extent of the express provisions of the Ordinance on such subject.
9. We feel inclined to hold that even for the offences other than those defined and made punishable under the Ordinance or punishable under any other law for the time being in force within the ambit of the Ordinance, whether it result into conviction of imprisonment for a term exceeding two years or into an order of acquittal passed by a competent Court, appeal would lie to the Federal Shariat Court only due to the jurisdiction having been so conferred to the Federal Shariat Court.
' Keeping in view the principles of the interpretation of Statutes that it should advance the remedy, to save rather destroy the Statute and to meet with certain contingencies not provided for in the Statute; beneficial construction of an enactment is to be made and for the reasons given hereinabove, we are of the considered view that against an order of acquittal for the offence/s tried within the ambit of Ordinance (VI of 1979) appeal shall lie only to the Federal Shariat Court; resultantly the appeal filed in this Court is not maintainable, therefore, is ordered to be returned to the appellant for its presentation to the competent Court if so desired by him. Order accordingly.
Order accordingly.