1. ' AMANULLAH KHAN YASINZAI, J.--- The above Criminal Appeal No,131 of 1996, Criminal Acquittal Appeal No,161 of 1996 and Criminal Revision No,38 of 1996 have arisen out of judgment, dated 25-6- 1996 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pishin, whereby he has convicted appellant Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir under section 302(c), P.P.C. For the murder of deceased persons Daud Shah and Muhammad Raza and sentenced to 14 years' R.I. And fine of Rs,1,00,000 each and in default to further undergo one year's simple imprisonment. Both the appellants were also sentenced to 7 years' R.I. And a fine of Rs,50,000 and in default thereof to further undergo 6 months simple imprisonment, under section 324, P.P.C. For injuring Bismillah, Obaidullah and Ahmed Shah. While respondent No,1 Haji Allah Dad in Criminal Acquittal Appeal No,161 of 1996 was acquitted. The appellants Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir have filed Appeal No,131 of 1996 against their conviction.
2. Complainant Haji Bismillah Khan has assailed the acquittal of Haji Allah Dad by filing Criminal Acquittal Appeal. The complainant has also filed Criminal Revision for enhancement of sentence of appellants Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir.
3. ' Since Criminal Appeal No,131 of 1996, Criminal Acquittal Appeal No,161 of 1996 and Criminal Revision No,38 of 1996 have arisen out of the same judgment, therefore, same are being disposed of through this common judgment.
4. ' Brief facts are that a case under sections 302, 324, 147, 148, 149, 365 and 511, P.P.C. Read with section 17(3) of Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance was registered at Chaman Police Station on 7-5-1994 at 8-00 a.m. At the report of Haji Bismillah vide F.I.R. No,61 of 1994. It is alleged in the F.I.R. That he (complainant) left his house at 7-30 a.m. In his Land Cruiser alongwith his brothers Daud Shah, Muhammad Raza, Ahmad Shah and Obaidullah towards College Colony to see off Hajis. At about 8-00 a.m. On reaching telephone exchange Abdul Ali, Muhammad Khan, Musa, Waris, Abdul Hakeem, Zahir alongwith six/seven other persons stopped them, and tried to abduct them on gun point. On resistance Abdul Ali and his two accomplices opened fire with klashnikov and pistol as a result Daud Shah died on the spot, Muhammad Raza died in Chaman Hospital and Ahmed Shah received injuries on his right foot. The accused persons took away the Land Cruiser of complainant and made their escape good.
5. ' The motive was that last year deceased Daud Shah had fought with Shah Muhammad nephew of Abdul Ali and had seriously injured him. To revenge the same accused had attacked complainant party on the day of incident.
6. ' The prosecution in support of its case examined 15 witnesses.
7. ' P.W.1 Haji Bismillah Khan complainant lodged report (Fard-e-Bayan) (Exh.P./1-A) on the basis of which F.I.R. (Exh.P.13/F) was lodged. He narrated the incident as mentioned in the report. He stated that the accused persons wanted to kidnap them on resistance Abdul Ali fired at Daud Shah with Kalakof who died on the spot. Shah Muhammad fired at Haji Muhammad Raza who died in the hospital. Ghaffar fired at Ahmed Shah who was injured; Gul Baran was pulling him. Allah Dad hit him with the butt of klashnikov. Abdul Zahir fired at him which missed and has narrated the taking away of their vehicle and motive, and identified the appellants.
8. ' P.W.2 Obaidullah an eye-witness he has given account of the incident as narrated by P.W.1 with slight variations and identified the appellants.
9. ' P.W.3 Ahmed Shah was injured and received bullet injuries. He has supported P.W.1 and P.W.2 on material points with minor discrepancies and also identified the appellants.
10. ' P.W.4 Akhtar Jan,. a passer-bye and an eye-witness of the incident, and has almost narrated the same facts as stated by P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 and identified the appellants.
11. ' P.W.5 Muhammad Amin H.C. In his presence Land Cruiser (Art.P.1) of the complainant was taken into custody by S.H.O. Vide recovery memo. (Exh.P.5/A).
12. ' P.W.6 Dr. Akhtar Muhammad. He examined P.W.1 Haji Bismillah, issued medical certificate (Exh.P.6/A) P.W.3 Ahmed Shah issued (Exh.P.6/C), examined deceased Daud Shah and Haji Muhammad Raza. Issued certificates (Exh.P.6/B), (Exh.P.6/C), respectively.
13. ' P.W.7 Haji Abdul Zahir is a witness to recovery memo. Exh.P.7/A and Articles P.2 to P.44. He is not a material witness.
14. ' P.W.8 Zainuddin, A.S.-I. In his presence the S.H.O.. Took bloodstained shirt of deceased Muhammad Raza, vehicle belonging to accused, two empties of Kalakof, two empties of .30 bore pistol, one empty of .30 bore pistol, one live cartridge, blood-stained turban of appellant Gul Baran, one waist coat vide recovery memos. (Exh.P.8/A) to (Exh.P.8/H) and Articles P.45 to P.60.
15. ' P.W.9 Nazar Hussain, Naib-Tehsildar, Chaman. In his presence identification parade of suspects Abdul Ghaffar and Abdul Jabbar was held vide (Exh.P.9/A) who were not identified.
16. ' P.W.10 Muhammad Iqbal, Inspector Fire-arms, Forensic Science Laboratory examined the empties and issued certificate Exh.P.10/A.
17. ' P.W.11 Syed Abdul Jabbar carried out chemical test of blood-stained clothes of deceased and turban of appellant Gul Baran and issued certificate Exh. P . 11/A.
18. ' P.W.12 Matiullah, Tehsildar, Chaman. In his presence identification of appellant Gul Baran was held, who was identified by P.W.1 Bismillah. He issued Exh. P. 12/A.
19. ' P.W.13 Syed Ikram Hussain Zaidi, S.-I./S.H.O., Police Station Chaman, initially investigated the case, recorded the F.I.R. (Exh.P.13/A). Recorded statements of P.Ws. Took into possession blood-stained clothes of deceased persons, turban (stained with blood) of appellant Gul Baran. Prepared sketch and recovery memos. Etc. From Exh.P.13/A to Exh.P.13/F and Exh. P . 8/A to Exh. P. 8/B.
20. ' P.W.14 Muhammad Shakir. In his presence identification of suspects Abdul Jabbar and Abdul Ghaffar was held vide Exh.P.14/A.
21. ' P.W.15 Wali-ur-Rehman. He also investigated the case. He took Shalwar and waist coat of deceased Daud Shah vide recovery memos. Exh.P.8/A and Exh.P.9/A. He arrested appellant Abdul Zahir, submitted challan Exh.P.15/A and Exh.P.15/B.
22. ' Statements of appellants Gul Baran, Abdul Zahir and accused Allah Dad were recorded under sections 342 and 340(2), Cr.P.C. They all together denied the prosecution version and stated that they had been falsely implicated. Haji Allah Dad produced two witnesses in his defence. D.W.1 Juma Gul and D.W.2 Amanullah who stated that on the day of incident Allah Dad was at Quetta. Gul Baran produced D.W.3 Muhammad Afzal in his defence who, stated that at the time of incident Gul Baran was in the flour mill at Chaman.
23. ' Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pishin after hearing the parties on the basis of above evidence passed the judgment under appeal in the above terms.
24. ' We heard Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate for the appellants Abdul Zahir and Gul Baran. Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate for complainant, Mr. Ehsan-ulHaq, Advocate for acquitted accused Allah Dad, Raja Rab Nawaz, Advocate for the State.
25. ' With the help of the learned counsel we have gone through the evidence and have also heard lengthy arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and the learned counsel appearing for the State.
26. ' Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate learned counsel for the appellants Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir has argued as follows:--
(1) That the learned trial Court while convicting the appellants Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir, has not given any reason.
(2) The presence of the appellants has not been established.
(3) There was no ground to establish the presence of Gut Baran and Gul Baran has been convicted on the basis of his blood-stained Turban.
(4) No identification parade of Gul Baran was held soon after his arrest. The identification parade held at a belated stage is not reliable.
(5) The case of the acquitted accused Allah Dad is on the same footing as that of convicted appellants and there is no distinguishing features.
(6) The learned trial Court while convicting the appellants has not referred to common object. Even otherwise section 149 is not attracted.
(7) Motive as putforth by the prosecution is not convincing.
(8) The time of incident as alleged by the prosecution is in conflict with the medical certificate; according to prosecution the incident took place at about 8-00 O'Clock and according to the medical certificate P.W.1 and P.W.2 were brought at about 7-30 to the hospital.
27. ' Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate, learned counsel for the complainant opposing the appeal and in support of criminal acquittal appeal against Abdul Zahir and in support of criminal revision for enhancement of sentence has urged as follows:--
(1) The motive for committing the offence has been fully established by the prosecution witnesses.
(2) Appellants and acquitted accused were members of an unlawful assembly; irrespective of the role attributed to them, they are liable to be convicted under section 302/149, P.P.C. And be awarded maximum punishment.
(3) Ocular testimony of P.W:1 to P.W.4 supported by medical evidence of P.W.6 and corroborated by P.W.8 is sufficient to grant maximum punishment to the appellants and acquitted accused.
(4) It is not possible for the prosecution witnesses to give minute details and explain the role of each accused separately and in detail in such like fights.
(5) Identification parade of appellant Gul Baran was not necessary as P.W.1 did not know his name and he was otherwise familiar to him and all the P. Ws. Have identified him in the Court.
(6) As far as acquittal of Allah Dad is concerned, the trial Court has erred that eye-witnesses have not supported each other. He has been involved by all the eye-witnesses and his presence with an active role is established.
(7) Minor variations of timing in the medical certificate and F.I.R. Will have no adverse effect.
28. Learned Court has believed the medical certificates.
29. ' Mr. Ehsan-ul-Haq, Advocate appearing for Allah Dad supporting the judgment to the extent of acquittal of Allah Dad argued as follows:--
(1) That Allah Dad has been rightly acquitted as there are material contradictions in the statements of P.Ws. Regarding his role and presence.
(2) That there is presumption of double innocence in favor of the acquitted accused unless very strong circumstances exist acquittal cannot be converted by the appellate Court.
30. ' Mr. Raja Rab Nawaz, Advocate, learned counsel appearing for the State has adopted the arguments of Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate and also prayed for conviction of Allah Dad and enhancement of sentences of appellants Gul Baran and Abdul Zahir.
31. ' Adverting to the argument of Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants that presence of Gul Baran was not proved and the identification parade was not reliable and since the identification period was held after 12 days of the incident as such no reliance could be placed on the so-called identification parade, the learned counsel urged that appellant Gul Baran was arrested on the day of the incident. No reason has been given by the prosecUtion for holding identification parade after a delay of 12 days, the learned counsel argued that appellant Baran has been convicted by the trial Court only on the basis of the recovery of his blood-stained turban at the time of his arrest. The main contention of the learned counsel was that Gul Baran was falsely roped in and there was nothing against him. As regards the identification parade, the trial Court has also not believed it. We are of the opinion that there was no need of holding identification parade as the complainant P.W.1 did not say in his statement that he did know the accused persons but merely said he was not familiar with the name of accused persons. In this behalf reference may be made to the statement of P.W.1 Haji Bismillah who stated that Gul Baran was pulling him. The other eye-witnesses have confirmed his presence in the place of incident and properly identified him in the Court. They were not shaken in cross-examination. Since the appellant was familiar to the eye-witnesses, there was no need for carrying out his identification parade. In this regard reliance is placed on the following cases:--
(1) Muhammad Yousaf Zai v. The State PLD 1988 Kar.
32. 539.
(2) State v. Farman Hussain PLD 1995 SC 1.
33. ' In the former case a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court made the following observations regarding identification parade:-- "We may observe that there is no legal requiretnent to the effect that there should be an identity test of an accused person. If the eyewitnesses can identify the accused before the trial Court that is enough. In the present case the appellant had visited Karimabad Branch of the Bank not only at the time of opening of the account but had also visited five times while withdrawing the amount of Exh.2/F through five cheques during the period from 5-9-1984 to 17-9-1984 whereas the identification parade was held on 3-12-1984 and the evidence of the above witness was recorded in December, 1985."
34. ' In the latter case the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:-- "A distinction is to be made between a case in which witness has had only a fleeting glimpse of the accused who happened to be stranger and a witness who had known the accused previously or who had met the accused several times. In the former case the Court insists upon having proper identification parade whereas in the latter case the identification parade can be dispensed with as the witness can identify the accused even in the Court."
35. ' Coming to the second argument of the learned counsel that the case of the acquitted accused Allah Dad is on the same footing as that of the convicted appellants and there are no distinguishing features, the learned counsel argued that the trial Court has erred in convicting the appellants since the same role has been attributed to them as to the acquitted appellant. In this regard arguments of Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate, learned counsel appearing for the complainant and Mr. Ehsan-ul-Haq Advocate appearing for Allah Dad are also referred. Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate while arguing Criminal Acquittal Appeal No,161 of 1996 said that the presence of Allah Dad was established by the eye-witnesses and regarding his role there are no material contradictions. Learned counsel further argued that since Allah Dad was the member of an unlawful assembly and his presence was established at the place of occurrence irrespective of the role attributed to him he'is liable to be convicted under section 302/149, P.P.C.
36. ' Mr. Ehsan-ul-Haq, Advocate learned counsel appearing for Allah Dad argued that the trial Court had rightly acquitted Allah Dad as there were material contradictions in the statements of eye- witnesses regarding his role. Secondly, he argued that there is presumption of double innocence in favour of Allah Dad. He has been acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction and very strong and exceptional evidence would be required for interference in the same.
37. Regarding the role of Allah Dad, P.W.1 stated that he was holding klashnikov and hit him with the butt. The said version of P.W.1 has not been supported by the other witnesses and most important the medical certificate of the complainant does not corroborate his statement regarding the role of Allah Dad. The learned trial Court has given valid reasons for acquitting Allah Dad.
38. ' After going through the statements of the eye-witnesses we are of the opinion that trial Court has rightly acquitted Allah Dad giving him benefit of doubt and no exceptional ground exists for convicting him. In this regard reliance is placed on the case Ghulam Sikendar and another v.
39. Mamraiz Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 11 wherein the then Chief Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah has formulated following principles on the question in issue:-- "However, notwithstanding the diversity of facts and circumstances of each case, amongst others, some of the important and consistently followed principles can be clearly visualized from the cited and other cases-law on the question of setting aside an acquittal by this Court. They are as follows:--
(1) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused.
40. This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conversion when leave is granted only for the re-appraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions: One initial, till found guilty, the accused is innocent: and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence.
(2) The acquittal will not carry the second assumption and will also thus loose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below; (a) disregarded material evidence; (b) misread such evidence; (c) received such evidence illegally.
(3) In either case the well-known principle of re-appraisement of evidence will have to be kept in view when examining the strength of the views expressed by the Court below. They will not be brushed aside lightly on mere assumptions keeping always in view that a departure from the normal principle must be necessitated by obligatory observances of some higher principle as noted above and for no other reason.
(4) The Court will not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence it comes to conclusion different from that of the Court' acquitting the accused provided both the conclusions are reasonably possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that Court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this Court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusion and irresistible conclusion; and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualized in these cases in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with after scrutiny under the foregoing searching light should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous."
41. ' We are, therefore, of the view that on the basis of material on record, the trial Court rightly acquitted Allah Dad. We decline, therefore, to interfere 6 with the acquittal of Allah Dad and, therefore, acquittal appeal against him is dismissed. Coming to the argument of Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate, learned counsel F for the appellants that the motive put forth was not convincing; suffice it to observe that all the eye-witnesses have corroborated each other on the question of motive and stated that deceased Dawood Shah had seriously injured Shah Muhammad prior to the incident. To avenge the same the appellants along with the absconding accused attacked upon the complainant party. This piece of evidence was not shaken in the cross-examination nor defence has been able to negate the same. As such there is no force in the argument of Mr. M.
42. Zafar, Advocate regarding motive. As regards contradiction in the time of lodging the F.I.R. And the time in the medical certificate, it is held that as argued by Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate, learned counsel for the complainant that minor variations in the timing of the F.I.R. And in the medical certificate are of no consequence. Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate, learned counsel argued that in the F.I.R.
43. The time of lodging of F.I.R. Is shown as 8-00 O'clock and in the medical certificate of injured Ubaidullah P.W.2 and Bismillah the time of his admission in the hospital is 7-30. The learned counsel argued that from the difference in timing at hospital it appears that the prosecution has not come with the actual facts of the case. He tried to argue that in actual two incidents took place. One at 7- 30 and the other at 8-00 O'Clock. We see no force in the said argument as the P. Ws. Are consistent in their statement and even the defence has not suggested that there were two incidents. It is observed that in such like cases, it is not possible for the prosecution to give minute details of each and every incident and describe the role of each and every accused person individually. So, the variation of time in the F.I.R. Is of no consequence.
44. ' Now coming to the last argument of Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial Court has convicted the appellants under sections 302(c) and 324, P.P.C., he argued that admittedly the appellants did not kill the deceased persons. They were killed by absconding accused Abdul Ali and Shah Muhammad and even injury caused to P.W. Ahmed Shah is attributed to accused Abdul Ghaffar. As such they cannot be held responsible for the death of the deceased persons and the trial Court has not convicted the appellants under section 149, P.P.C.
45. The learned counsel for the complainant Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate argued that the appellants in furtherance of their common object formed an unlawful assembly. He further argued that irrespective of the roles attributed to them they are liable to be convicted under section 302(c)1149, P.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that from the statement of prosecution witnesses the appellants along with the absconding accused came to abduct the complainant party and the appellants had no intention to murder the deceased persons neither they shared the object/ intention of killing the deceased persons and further that they were not aware of the intention of absconding accused Abdul Ali, Shah Muhammad and Abdul Ghaffar. As such they cannot be punished under section 302, P.P.C. The trial Court has only convicted the appellants under section 302(c), P.P.C. And has not dilated upon the common object. Learned counsel further argued that there is no proof of common object. The prosecution has not established the same before the trial Court. As such their conviction under section 302, P.P.C. Is not sustainable under the law.
46. ' The arguments advanced by Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate are not tenable. Though the trial Court has not dilated upon the object but he has discussed the evidence and has convicted the appellants on the ground that they were accomplices of absconding accused Abdul Ali and helped him in the commission of the offence. After going through the evidence it is observed that the appellants along with accused persons came to the place of incident. Absconding accused Abdul Ali was armed with lethal weapon like kalakov and other two accused came armed with pistols to abduct the complainant party. The appellants could have inferred that the abduction of the complainant could further lead to firing and even to the extent of murder as it did in this case. The appellants at no stage disassociated themselves from the other absconding co-accused rather they stayed at the place of incident and did not resist the killing of the deceased persons. In this regard reliance is placed on the following cases:
(1) Case of Niamatullah and others v. The State PLD 1961 Lah.
47. 1.
(2) Muhammad Akbar and 2 others v. The State PLD 1991 SC 923.
(3) Muhammad Yacloob v. The State 1992 SCM R 1983.
(1) In the said case accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and armed with weapons lodged an attack on the opposite party only to injure them and in the course of the attack one of the persons died from the complainant party. It was held as under:-- "Section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code has two parts one dealing with liability for offences which are committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly and the second dealing with liability for those offences which the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The distinction between the two parts of the section has been brought out in several authorities and we may refer here to Rehman Samail and others v.
48. Emperor AIR 1939 Lah. 245 and Parmeshar Din v. Emperor AIR 1941 Oudh. 517 in which the Lahore authority was followed. The relevant observations of their Lordships of the Lahore High Court may be reproduced as follows- ' Once an assembly has become unlawful then all things done in the prosecution of the common unlawful object of that assembly are chargeable against every member thereof. The liability of every member extends not only to the acts intended by all to be done but also to those offences which are likely to be committed in achieving the common object'.
49. 'We are in respectful agreement with these observations. We consider that to attract the constructive liability incurred under section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, it is not necessary to show that the offence committed was identical with the common object of the unlawful assembly nor is it an essential requirement for such liability that the offence committed must in every case be directly and immediately connected with the prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly. The second part of the section would clearly come into play where the offence was such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the object.
50. When deciding the question of constructive liability in section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code it is necessary to consider the effect of both the parts of the section, the second part being of a wider import than the first'.
51. ' In the present case we have found that the appellants formed themselves into an unlawful assembly and they were variously armed with Takwas, Dangs and one of them was carrying a spear. They deliberately launched an assault on the deceased and his companions when they were sitting in the house of Lashkar P.W. In all seventeen injuries were inflicted on the deceased and forty-four on his companions. Most of the injuries to the deceased were on his head or the adjoining parts of the body with the result that his skull bones were fractured. It appears to us, therefore, that whatever the common object of the unlawful assembly formed by the appellants each of them must be burdened with the knowledge that death was likely to be caused in an assault carried out with such deadly weapons."
(2) Muhammad Akbar and 2 others v. State ' In the said case, all the accused persons came to the house of deceased Hameeda with the intention to commit Zina with her. On resistance they kept on insisting for Zina and deceased resisted the same. On her persistent refusal, one of the accused persons sprinkled kerosine oil on the deceased and then put her on fire. It was argued that the accused persons had only intention to commit Zina with her and had no intention to kill her and further it was argued that the other 2 accused who had no intention of burning the deceased cannot be held liable for murder. It was held by the Honorable Supreme Court as under:-- "From the above referred cases it is evident that a joint action by number of persons is not necessarily an action performed with a common object, but it may be performed on the spur of the moment as a reaction to some incident and such a case would fall within the ambit of section 34, P.P.C. However, it may be pointed out that section 34, P.P.C. Contemplates an act in furtherance of common intention and not the common intention simplicitor and that there is a marked distinction between a similar intention and common intention and between knowledge and common intention. It may also be observed that mere presence of an accused at the place of incident with a co-accused who commits offence may not be sufficient to visit the former with the vicarious liability but there should be some strong circumstance manifesting a common intention.
52. Generally common intention inter alia precedes by some or all of the following elements namely common motive, pre-planned preparation and concert pursuant to such plan. However, common intention may develop even at the , spur of the moment or during the commission of the offence as pointed out hereinabove. Conversely common intention may undergo change during the commission of offence."
(3) Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State ' In this case persons formed an unlawful assembly and murdered six rersons. Honourable Supreme Court held as under:-- "Even if we were to exclude section 34, P.P.C. Section 149, P.P.C. Would be very much attracted to,as once the accused were told that the object of bringing the deceased at the place of Wardat was to kill them, they instead of dissociating themselves remained at the place of Wardat to carry out above unlawful common object and, therefore, they had become members of an unlawful having common object and hence each of them would be vicariously responsible for the act of the other members of the assembly."
53. Applying the above principles in this case we hold the appellants guilty under section 302(c)/149, P.P.C. As far as the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants Mr. M. Zafar, Advocate are concerned, we are not convinced from the arguments that the appellants are not guilty of section 149, P.P.C. Suffice it to observe that the appellants came to the place of incident alongwith the absconding accused who had weapons with them. They could have inferred that the abduction could lead to murder, as such they are held vicariously liable, under section 302(c)/149, P.P.C.
54. ' Now coming to the argument of Mr. Azizullah Memon, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants regarding quantum of sentence, we feel that after thorough appraisal of the evidence, the trial Court had rightly convicted the appellants under section 302(c), P.P.C. We are not inclined to enhance the sentence of the appellant.
55. We hold that the appellants were rightly convicted under section 302(c), P.P.C. For 14 years' R.I. And fine of Rs,1,00,000 each. In case of default thereof to further undergo R.I. For one year; and under section 324, P.P.C. (as amended) for seven years' R.I. And a fine of Rs,50,000 each in case of default to further undergo six months' S.I. Both the sentences shall run concurrently and benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. Is extended to them.
56. ' With the above observations, Criminal Appeal No,131 of 1996, Criminal Revision No,38 of 1996 and Criminal Acquittal Appeal No,161 of 1996 are dismissed.