' Learned Punjab Labour Court No,8 at Bahawalpur, on 19-6-1994, dismissed a grievance petition filed by Ghulam Rasool under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, challenging his removal as Reporter of the Daily 'Mashirq'. He preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order on 14-9-1994. It was obviously barred by the law of limitation, but the appeal was not accompanied by any application for condonation of delay; and quite late on 14-2-1995 the learned counsel sought an opportunity to make such an application. The appeal was adjourned to 12-3-1995, when the appellant, as also his counsel, opted to absent themselves; and this entailed dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution.
2. An application for revival of the appeal was submitted on 11-4-1995, but this too was dismissed in default on 16-4-1995. The instant application for restoration of the aforesaid application dated 11-4- 1995 was filed belatedly on 25-6-1995. The learned counsel continued seeking adjournments for addressing the Court in respect of this miscellaneous application. On the previous date, i,e, on 31-1- 1996, he did not turn up and instead addressed a letter to the Tribunal making a request for an adjournment. The request was granted in rather an indulgent manner, but it was made clear that the next one would be the last date. Today again the learned counsel has repeated his 'feat', which he has developed a habit to display. He comes from Bahawalpur, gets dates of his choice, in lot many cases, and cares little to make alternative arrangements, in the event of his inability to appear before the ,Tribunal for any reason. Once again he has made a similar request by dropping a letter. Such an unadvocate like practice cannot be approved and has to be deprecated with the disdain it deserves. If the learned Advocate cannot spare time for conducting his cases in the Courts at Lahore, he should frankly decline to be engaged as a counsel It in such cases. A Court of law cannot, in a limit-less manner, continue granting adjournments and restoring causes dismissed repeatedly for non-prosecution.
3. The present one is an application that has been submitted with an unreasonable and inordinate delay of 40 days; and the reason stated is only a fiction, which deserves no credence.
"Misunderstanding".About actual date of hearing is a favourite and usual pretext taken up by litigants and their counsel in such eventualities. The move is not even attended by a formal application made for condonation of delay in concrete terms. There is hardly any justification for granting such a request and for extending to the learned Advocate uncalled for and unrestricted indulgence. In the letter addressed to this Court by post on 29-1-1996, for 31st January date of hearing, have been listed as many as ten cases, in which adjournments have been sought. This habit of incessant 'skipping-over', this attitude of enduring indifference, indulged in by a litigant or his counsel, in an unending fashion, over an indefinite period, must not be permitted to flourish, for if it is done, it would amount to abusing the process of the Court, in gross and open terms, especially as it is generally resorted to by a litigant for serving his unholy designs, for advancing his ulterior interests and not for furtherance of genuine interests of justice; it abhorrably aims at inflicting maximum injury upon and prolonging the agony of an adversary. I would reject the application.
Application rejected.