' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--The above appeal with the leave of this Court is directed against the judgment of a learned Judge in Chambers of High Court of Sindh dated 16-10-1994 whereby the learned Judge on reversal of the judgment of the Rent Controller granted ejectment of the appellant from the premises in his occupation under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred as the 'Ordinance' only). Leave was granted in the above case to consider the following contentions: "2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we feel inclined to grant leave to appeal to consider, whether in the peculiar circumstances of the case, that the husband of the respondent landlady had received Rs,85,000 as Pagri from the petitioner/tenant; that the respondent/landlady was peacefully living with her son in the Bungalow of her son since long before the filing of the ejectment application; and that she has already got vacated residential portion of the same building through ejectment proceedings; the respondent was legally entitled to an order for ejectment of the petitioner from the shop in dispute on the ground of her personal need. Leave to appeal is, therefore, granted.
' With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties it is directed that the appeal shall be heard out of turn."
2. The relevant facts of the case are that the respondent filed an application under section 14 of the Ordinance for eviction of the appellant from a shop in his occupation. In het application she alleged that she had served the appellant with the necessary notice required under section 14 of the Ordinance. As the appellant did not vacate the premises on expiry of two months' period, she filed an ejectment case before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller after recording evidence of the parties did not believe the bona fide requirement of the respondent and accordingly, dismissed the application. On appeal, a learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court of Sindh reversed the judgment of the Rent Controller and granted ejectment.
3.' The learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal contended that the respondent had already obtained possession of a residential flat but she failed to occupy the same. It is also contended that the appellant is living in a posh area along with her son and, therefore, it is not conceivable that she required a sma ll shop in possession of the appellant for her personal and bona fide requirement. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent in her statement had admitted that she was earning Rs,35,000 per month and, therefore, the requirement expressed by her in getting the shop in occupation of the appellant was neither bona fide nor genuine. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal have no merit.
4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the premises which the respondent got vacated is a residential premises while the premises for which she applied under section 14 of the Ordinance, seeking eviction of the appellant was a commercial premises. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that according to the evidence on record, the appellant is not in possession of any commercial buildin& in the area. The scope of enquiry under section 14 of the Ordinance was considered in detail by one of us (Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, J.) in the case of Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Khatoon (PLD 1982 Kar. 823), sitting as a Judge of High Court of Sindh, as follows:-- ...On a plain reading of section 14, it is clear that an applicant under this section has only to show that she is a widow or a minor whose both parents are dead, or he or she is salaried employed due to retire within six months or had retired or he or she is a person who is due to attain the age of 60 years within the next six months or has attained the age of 60 years. The further requirement of law is that before institution of application under this section a notice is to be served by such landlord on the tenant informing him that he or she needed the building for personal use and call upon him to deliver the possession of the premises within the time fixed in the notice which should not be less than two months. After reading the above provisions of law I am in no doubt that no enquiry as to the genuineness or bona fides of the requirement urged by a landlord can be gone into in proceedings under section 14 of the Ordinance. The enquiry under this section must confine to such facts which are necessary to give jurisdiction to Rent Controller to proceed under this section, such as the person applying under this section is a widow, is a salaried employed due to retire within six months, is a minor whose both parents are dead, is a person who is due to attain the age of sixty within next months or has already attained the age of sixty and lastly that a notice calling upon the tenant to vacate the premises within two months of the receipt of the notice has been served. The scope of enquiry under this section will also include if it is so alleged by the tenant, the determination by the Controller whether the landlord after having attained the age of sixty years or become a widow or after having retired had rented out the building in respect of which the application is filed under section 14 of the Ordinance, or is in occupation of a similar building owned by him or her in any other locality. As soon as these facts are determined by the Controller in favour of the landlord he is bound to make an order for eviction against the tenant and no further enquiry as to the genuineness or otherwise of the need of the landlord can be made by him. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the Rent Controller is bound to enquire into the genuineness of the needs of a landlord before passing an order of eviction under section 14 of the Ordinance, is accepted, there will be no difference between the proceedings under sections 14 and 15 of the Ordinance which is .Clearly not the intention of the law giver. The manifest intention of the Legislature in enacting section 14 of the Ordinance is to provide a summary remedy to certain class of person without holding enquiries into their needs and if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted this very object will be defeated."
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the cases of Abdul Majid v. Mst. Naimun Nisa Begum PLD 1981 SC 118, Mst. Najma Ashraf v. Mst. Noor khan 1994 SCM R 913 and Bakhsh Elahi v. Qazi Wasif Ali 1985 SCM R 291. In none of the cases relied by the learned counsel for the appellant the principle of law laid down is different from the one stated in Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Kahtoon, referred to above. It is not disputed before us that the respondent became widow on 6-7-1988 and she served a notice under section 14 of the Ordinance on the appellant on 18-3-1989. There was no allegation in the case that she is occupying any commercial building or that she rented out any such building after becoming a widow. In these circumstances, the learned Judge . In chambers was fully justified in reversing the judgment of the Rent Controller and ordering eviction of the appellant from the premises. No case for interference with the order of the High Court is made out.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. However, with the consent of the learned counsel for the respondent, we allow four months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises on the condition that he will continue to pay rent of the premises during this period and in case he fails to vacate the premises on expiry of four months' period, he will be evicted from the premises without notice and if necessary with police aid.