' It is alleged that Mst. Ishrat Parveen (petitioner No, 2 herein) was produced before me in a Habeas Corpus Petition No, 393/H-1977. It was observed therein that she appeared to be of 18 years of age and it was stated that she is a wife of the petitioner and wanted to live with him. Thereafter she was set at liberty.
' It appears, that, at the same time (according to the learned counsel) the petitioner No, 1 had made a bail before arrest application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore (respondent No, 1) who passed an interim order dated 9.7-1977 (Annex. 'M' impugned order) at the request of the Investigating Officer, directing that the girl (petitioner No, 2) be produced before the Investigating Officer for recording her statement and verification of her age.
2. According to the learned counsel, the learned Additional Sessions judge, Lahore (respondent No, 1) has no lawful authority to pass this order since in an earlier application under section 491, Cr. P. C.
This Court had already determined the age of Mst. Ishrat Parveen (petitioner No, 2) and her statement, in a way, had already been recorded before this Court when she deposed that she is a legally wedded wife of petitioner No, 1 and wants to reside with him. According to the learned counsel the above order of this Court operates as res judicata. For this reliance has been placed on Muhammad Ajmal Khan v. Lt. Col. Muhammad Shafaat and 4 others (1). Learned counsel has also referred to Annex. '1' to this petition which purports to be a certificate issued on 24-6-1977 by the Police Surgeon, according to which, Mst. Ishrat Parveen daughter of Muhammad Sharif is aged about 17 years.
3. In the presence of the above material the learned counsel submits that respondent No, 2 has no lawful authority to pass the impugned order (Annex. M) dated 19-7-1977. Whatever observations I had made were germane only for deciding the Habeas Corpus Petition. The material A thereunder cannot have any wider connotation, nor it can affect the jurisdiction of other Courts to lawfully make any inquiry and follow lawful procedure and arrive at their own conclusions. The observations made under section 491, Cr. P. C. Cannot pre-empt the jurisdiction of other Courts.
There is no law that once a lady has been examined by a competent doctor, there cannot be any order by the Court for further examination. In this case the petitioner No, 1 had invited the jurisdiction of respondent No, 1 (Additional Sessions Judge) for the purpose of grant of bail before arrest. To determine the propriety for granting bail, the learned Additional Sessions Judge (respondent No, 1) deemed it proper that statement of Mst. Ishrat Parveen should be recorded by the investigating agency and she may also be medically examined regarding her age. It is not possible for me to find out any exception to the procedure adopted by respondent No, 1, nor I regard the order passed as an effrontery to my order made under section 491, Cr. P. C. Learned counsel has further contended that the impugned order of respondent No, 1 amounts to violation of injunctions of Holy Qur'an especially Sura Nur. I am not persuaded to believe that the impugned order amounts to slandering, defaming, and molesting the privacy or disruption of marital rights of the legally wedded wife. Learned counsel has relied on Mauj All v. Sped Safdar Hussain Shah and another (2) wherein it had been decided by the Supreme Court that a girl after having obtained puberty under the Muslim Law, marriage was valid in accordance with Muslim Law, and husband becomes the guardian. From this the argument is that the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge amounts to violation of the guardianship rights of the petitioner No, 1.
The order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not amount to denial of any right of petitioner No, 1 qua petitioner No,
2. Learned counsel further argues that the impugned order amounts to violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution regarding the inviolability of home life.
4. There is no such violation committed by the respondent No, 1 through the impugned order. There is no merit in this petition. Dismissed in limine.
(1) PLD 1976 Lab. 396 (2) 1970 S Q M R 437