1. MALIK MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN (CHAIRMAN). This Review Application has been filed against our order dated 31-7-76 passed in the appeal filed by the respondent against the petitioners. The respondent, who is an A.C.F. in the Forest Department, had challenged Government order dated 30-3-68 by which he and another A.C.F. were reverted from Class I to Class II. We* accepted the appal and held that the impugned Govt order was without any legal effect thereby entitling the applicant to remain and continue as A. C. F. Class I.
2. It may be stated here that prior to the establishment of Service Tribunal in Azad Kashmir, the respondent had filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the above stated Govt. order, but the writ petition abated when the Service Tribunal was established in Azad Kashmir in April, 1975.
3. Thereafter the respondent filed the above-mentioned appeal before this Tribunal, resulting in our decision in his favour. This background has to be kept in view while considering the points raised in the review application.
2. The main point raised by the petitioners in the review application is that as in his appeal the respondent had challenged Govt. order dated 30-3-68, which having been an order dating prior to 1st July 1969, the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal was ousted under proviso (c) of section 4 of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Service Tribunal Act, 1975 (hereinafter called the Act). This proviso reads as: "No appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a Departmental authority made at any time before the 1st July 1969."
4. In view of this mandatory exception, it is stated, the impugned Govt. order having been passed prior to 1st July, 1969, it could not be legally challenged before or decided by the Tribunal. This being a material error on the face of record, the order should be vacated in review.
5. In reply. the respondent has raised twin objections, namely:
(i) that no review application lies to the Tribunal under the Act even if it be presumed that the order under review falls outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, and (ii) that since the writ petition of the respondent had abated in the High Court, the respondent under proviso to sec--tion 8 of the Act was entitled to challenge the Govt. order by way of appeal before this Tribunal even though it was passed before 1st July, 1969.
3. So far as the first objection is concerned, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Service Tribunal being a creature of a special Act it can have no powers of review, unlike other civil Courts, except the one which is specifically given by the Act itself. Since the Act does not give any power of review to the Service Tribunal, it cannot howsoever grave the error might be, correct its orders by way of review. For this reliance has been placed on PLD 1970 SC 1.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on this very ruling and argued that since under section 5 of the Act, the Service Tribunal for the purpose of deciding appeals, is a civil Court, having all the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, provisions of section 114 and Order XLVII, C. P. C. are very much applicable to the pro--ceedings before the Tribunal.
7. We have heard the learned counsel of the parties and gone through the authority relied by both of them. In this authority, Hussain Baksh v. Settlement Commissioner Rawalpindiothers, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court bad powers to review an order made by it in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962). It was held that apart from the High Court's powers to correct errors apparent on the face of the record in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, the High Court had also powers under the Code of Civil Procedure to review its own orders made in writ jurisdiction under Article 98 *of the Constitution as these were civil proceedings and provisions of sec--tion 114(b) read with Order XLVII, rule 1 were attracted in spite of the fact that no such power was specifically conferred under Article 98 of the Constitutions.
8. It was against this context that it was remarked that the right to claim review of any decision of a Court of law is a substantive right and must be given by express enactment. This remark, in our view, does not in any way negative the broad contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that section 5 of the Act does clothe the Service Tribunal with the powers of reviewing its orders if they contain errors apparent on the face of record. Relevant provisions of section 5 of the Act may be reproduced as:
(i) A Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
(2) A Tribunal, shall for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1903 (Act V of 1908).
9. A close look at subsection (2) of section 5 leaves no doubt that the Service Tribunal for the purpose of deciding an appeal is a civil Court and the proceedings before it too are of civil nature. The Tribunal has also the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of deciding appeals and like the High Court exercising the powers of writ under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962, the Tribunal being a civil Court and proceedings before it being also of civil nature, has the powers to review its orders. Because section 5 of the Act makes it amply clear that the Service Tribunal is a civil Court and has the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under. P. C. Therefore for correcting errors on the face of record, provisions of sections 114, 141 and order XLVII, C. P. C. are available to the Tribunal. It may also be stated, as laid down by their Lordships in 1970 S.C., the nature of the proceeding do not necessarily depend upon the nature of the jurisdiction of the Court invoked. Therefore the provisions of the C. P. C. by virtue of section 5(2) of the Act will apply for the purpose of deciding an appeal irrespective of the special nature of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Another authority that strengthening our view is entitled "Dr. M. Fazil Zahir and others v. Kit. Begum Jan and others" (P I. D 1966 Lah. 53) This was a Second Appeal under West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance and one of the points that come up for decision before High Court, on whom the appellate jurisdiction had been conferred under section 115(4) of the Ordinance was as to whether it had the power to review its order dismissing second appeal passed ire limine when there was no appeal provision of review provided under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. It was held by Mr. Justice Anwarul Haq, that as the procedure prescribed by the C. P. C was applicable to proceedings under the Ordinance, the powers of review under C. P. C. were available to the High Court even when hearing appeals under section 15 (4) of the Ordinance. We may quote with advantage the following passage from his Lordship's judgment: "There is another aspect of the matter, namely, that the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code is applicable to proceedings under the Ordinance by virtue of the provisions contained in sec--tion 141 of the Code which is to the effect that, the procedure r provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. This view has been held in Sheikh Muhammad Nawaz v.' Mohammad Azim and Syed Nafis Ahmad Zaidi v. S. M. Hussain. That being so, the provisions contained in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the power of review would also be available to a Court or Tribunal acting under the Ordinance."
10. In view of the aforementioned legal position we find no force in this objection canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent and hold 8 that a Tribunal has the power of review like any other civil Court within) the limits of Order XLVII, r. 1, C. P. C.
11. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the respondent that if the objection of the petitioners prevails that this Tribunal was barred under all circumstances from entertaining and deciding appeals against orders or decisions of a Departmental authority made at any time before 1st July, 1969, the order under review will constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore we proceed to entertain the review application and examine the next point raised about our jurisdiction in this review application.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has tried to make out a cast for review by relying on proviso (e) of section 4 of the Act which reads as:-- "No appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a Departmental authority made at any time before the first July 1969." The argument developed is that section 4 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such proviso (c) of this section is a complete bar against entertaining of appeals by this Tribunal against orders made before first July, 1969 and that section 8 of the Act cannot come in aid of appeals filed against such orders.
12. The plea of the learned counsel for the respondent is that section 3 and not section 4 of the Act deals with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and as such the ouster of jurisdiction under proviso (c) of section 4 will not bar the juris--diction of the Tribunal, if it is covered by proviso to section 8 and not barred by section 3 of the Act.
13. We have given deep consideration to the points raised at the bar and are of the view that the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent must prevail. Comparative reading of sections 3, 4 and 8 of the Act make it amply clear that it is section 3 and not section 4, which deals with the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and as such proviso (c) of section 4 will not stand in the, way of entertainment and decision of an appeal by this Tribunal even against orders passed before first July, 1969, provided the appeal falls within the four corners of section 3 or section 8 of the Act. It appears that section 31 is of a general nature investing the Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of Service of civil servants including disciplinary matters; while section 4 deals with matters relating to appeals, the period of limitation and certain conditions under which appeals to the Service Tribunal are to be filed. Section 8 is a special section dealing with a situation where the suits, appeals or applications had been filed and were pending in the civil Courts immediately before the establishment of the Service Tribunal. Such suits, appeals and applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal abate by virtue of this section after the establishment of the Tribunal. But the Legislature, in its supreme wisdom had foreseen sacs. a situation and to meet it, provided specially under proviso to section 8, he right of appeals to all such aggrieved persons, before the Tribunal with in 90 days ofthe establishment of the Tribunal. Since there is no jurisdictional restriction under section 3 of the Act against entertaining and deciding appeals against orders passed before 1st July. 1969 and proviso to section 8 rather specifically has been enacted to meets situation where suits etc, were to abate because of establishment of Service Tribunals, we are of :he view that ouster proviso (c) has no application to the cases falling under section 8 of the Act. It is a basic principle of interpre-- tation of statutes that a general section does not override a special section and section 8 being a special section cannot be subordinated to section 4 $ which is of a general nature, although section 4 does place certain restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Otherwise too an exception contained in a proviso of a section cannot be extended to operate against the provision of any other section, much less a special section, unless specifically so provided. Since there is no such provision even in section 4 P that its exceptions contained in its proviso shall be extendable to provisions of section 8, proviso (c) of section 4 cannot control the proviso of section 8 of the Act. At this stage it may also be stated that the learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to an unreported decision of this Tribunal (Service Appeal No. 13 of 1976 S. Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Azad Government and others) wherein it was remarked that appellant's appeal was hit by provisions of section 4 of the Act. In that appeal this point was not directly in issue and was neither canvassed by either of the counsel. In fact the Tribunal itself passed it as a supporting remark in support of argument to the main issue and as such we do not take it as law stated on the point now directly in issue. It may also be stated that even in the appeal against the order under review none of the counsel raise J the point about the jurisdiction of Tribunal being barred under proviso
(c) to section 4 either in objection or at the time of arguments. It seems to have dawned after the announcement of the order now under review. We are also strengthened in our view by two authorities reported in Gulshir Khan and another v. The Province of West Pakistan and 2 others(PLD 1975 Lab. 722) and Director of Education, Peshawar v. Sanaullah and others (1976 PLC (C. S. T.) 156).
14. In view of this legal position we find no force in this review petition as the order under review is fully covered under proviso to section 8 of the Act and thus there is no error on the face or otherwise of the order to justify our interference by way of review. Wa, therefore, dismiss the review petition but in view of the complexities of the legal points involved pass no orders as to costs.