1. The petitioner was employed by Pakistan International Airlines Corporation as Special Security Assistant. In response to an advertisement given by the Corporation he applied for the post of Flight Steward and was selected for training. Before his selection for the new post the petitioner was required to resign from the first post held by him. In the offer originally given to him, the petitioner was told that he would maintain his lien over tile post of Special Security Assistant but immediately thereafter another letter was issued to him to the effect that he would not maintain his lien on the said post as he was a contractual and not a permanent employee. The petitioner thereafter tendered his resignation from the post of Special Security Assistant. Later he completed his training as Fight Steward and was appointed in the same capacity with effect from 23rd October, 1975 for a period of two years. Thereafter vide letter dated December 20, 1975 the petitioner was informed that he had been reverted back to his substantive post of Special Security Assistant. The letter is reproduced as under:- "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, KARACHI AIRPORT NO G M (F S)/P-32240/75.December 20, 1975.
2. Mr. Aurangzeb Sarwar,Registered A/D.
3. P-32240 Flight Steward, Quarter No. 110, Drigh Colony, Karachi-25.
4. Mr. Aurangzeb Sarwar, P 32240 Flight Steward, Through: Flight Service Manager.
5. As per terms of your appointment advice issued by the Employment Manager, it has been decided by the Management to revert you back to your substantive post of Special Security Assistant in pay Group IV in Security Section, Karachi, with effect from the date of this letter.
6. (Sd).
7. S. M. A. Qadri, (Personnel Officer), Flight Services."
8. The petitioner reported for duty to the Security Employment Department but was refused on the ground that he had already resigned from the post of Special Security Assistant, and hence this petition. The respondent's counsel has conceded before me that although the letter dated December 20, only referred to reversion of the petitioner, it in effect amounted to termination of his services, as the petitioner had no lien over the original post.
9. In this petition which has been fled under section 6 of the Essential Services Act, the petitioner has challenged this action of respondents on 3groundst Firstly, that after the successful completion of his training period the petitioner was not a probationer but a permanent employees; Secondly, that the letter dated 20th December, 1975 informing him about his removal from the post of Flight Steward, did not state any reasons for such action, which was in contravention of the provisions of Standing Order 12 (3) ; and lastly, that since the petitioner was punished for his alleged unsatisfactory work, the Corporation was bound to give him a proper show-cause notice and consequently the petitioner's removal was against the principles of natural justice.
10. The petitioner's counsel has failed to convince me with regard to the first ground taken by him. In this respect I may refer to the Employment Agreement, para. No. 2 of the preamble whereof clearly states that "the employee has offered himself for training with the Corporation as a Fight Steward, and upon successful completion thereof further offered to serve the Corporation as Flight Steward for a period of two years, commencing after the successful completion of his training in accordance with and upon the terms and conditions as set forth in this agreement." Paragraph No. 1 of the terms and conditions then clearly provides that the training period which may be from three to nine months shall not count towards the service or employment of the employees with the Corporation. Paragraph 2 states that the employees could not be entitled to any wages. allowances, benefits etc , except a monthly stipend amounting to Rs. 200 per month. Paragragh 4 then further clarifies that after "the Employee successfully completes his training and qualifies for appointment as a Flight Steward it shall appoint. The employee as a Flight Steward for the period of two years---------. This clearly shows that the term of service starts after completion of training period, and latter is not to be counted towards service. the next important 1 is paragraph 9 of the Employment Agreement clauses (a) and (b) whereof provides as follows: "9. Notwithstanding anything contained herein or in any of the rules and regulation of the Corporation, the employee's services may be terminated by the Corporation as under:-
(a) At any time without any notice and reason being assigned therefore during the training.
(b) At any time without any notice and reason being assigned therefore during the period of probation."
11. It is clear from clause (b) that there was to be a probation period. Since the Agreement itself is silent about its duration, we may, invoke the provisions of Standing Order 1, clause (c) which fixes such a period as three months. Since admittedly, after completion of his training period `he petitioner had not yet' completed three months in his new assignment, according to me he was still a probationer.
12. Coming to the next two grounds urged by the petitioner's counsel, clause (3) of, Standing Order 12 provides as follows:- "12. Termination of employment . . . . . . .
(3) The services of a workman shall not be -terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except, by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance."
13. The letter dated December 20, 1975 which terminated the petitioner's service as a Flight Steward obviously did not conform to the requirements of Standing Order 12 (3) as it stated no reasons for the action taken against him. The respondent's counsel has argued that according to clause (b) of paragraph 9 of the Agreement, the respondents were not bound to state any reasons. That may be so, but as clause (3) of Standing Order 12 clearly makes it obligatory upon the employer to state reasons, the letter dated December 20, was obviously in contravention thereof. In fact, according to me, the respondent's action was clearly against the principles of natural justice as the petitioner' removal from service. Obviously was as a punish--ment for his alleged unsatisfactory performance, which required a proper show-cause notice, before taking any action against him.
14. For the foregoing reasons I accept this petition and order the petitioner's immediate re- instatement with full back benefits with effect from the date of his illegal removal from service.